Die Berechnung ist nicht plausibel von Gotham um es genau zu zitieren (somit widerlegt es die Berechnung von Gotham). Entschuldigte meine etwas flasche Audrucksweise bin nicht so gut mit meinen deutsch etc...
Gotham asserts: “Our estimate of NAV is 80%-90% lower than AURELIUS’
unaudited and DCF-based NAV.”22
This is implausible.
What Gotham calls “NAV” actually is the “portfolio NAV” only. In order to come
to the full NAV of the entire group, the value of the holding (“the deal machine”)
has to be added.
Gotham asserts that most AURELIUS’ portfolio companies are sick. This is factually
wrong: while it is true that AURELIUS buys businesses in special situations,
today's portfolio of companies consists of a mix of newly acquired
businesses and businesses that were successfully restructured and have been
in the portfolio for years. The total operating EBITDA of the portfolio is anything
but “sick”, amounting to 114m EUR in 2016.
The Gotham Report aims to compute the sum of AURELIUS’ NAVs from the
WACC range published by AURELIUS in 2014 (5.7-11.9%) and 2015 (4.2-9.3%).
In doing so, Gotham assumes that, due to the decrease of the WACC range
20 Gotham Report, p. 36 et seq.
21 Referenced on p. 37-39 of the Gotham Report.
22 Gotham Report, p. 4/43-49.
13
AURELIUS 2015 NAV is increased by 33%. This is wrong for the following reasons:
• The WACC range does not say anything about the WACCs of
AURELIUS’ subsidiaries.
• The WACC range does not say anything about increases or decreases of
the WACCs of AURELIUS’ subsidiaries.
• Planned negative cashflows (which are possible under AURELIUS’ business
model and which are taken into consideration when calculating the
NAV) lead to a decrease in NAV, not an increase.
If one was to run a sensible back-of-the-envelope cross check calculation
to see whether AURELIUS’ NAV was plausible, this is what it could look
like:
Take the latest NAV (31 December 2016) or 1.45bn EUR and deduct nonoperating
cash in the group (defined as cash sitting at holding levels and
not in the portfolio) of roughly 250m EUR. This results in a value of roughly
1.2bn EUR which we shall call “cash-free NAV”.
Now take the operating EBITDA of the portfolio of 114m EUR and add back
holding expenses of roughly 20m EUR related to portfolio companies. This
yields operating EBITDA of the portfolio of roughly 135m EUR.
Now divide the cash-free NAV of 1.2bn EUR by the operating EBITDA of
the portfolio of 135m EUR which gives roughly 8.9. So the current NAV
values AURELIUS’ portfolio at a multiple of roughly 8.9x their EBITDA.
Most EBITDA-multiples for non-listed small and mid-sized companies in
Europe fall in a range of 7x to 10x23 so 8.9x is plausible.
In order to get all external information needed to calculate NAVs, AURELIUS
uses a premium tool called Capital IQ, which is also used by international audit
companies such as PwC.
The calculation of the discount rates includes several parameters. All these
parameters are audited by our auditors at the time of the first-time consolidation
process of each acquisition. Later, the fixed and audited peer group will be updated
as a function of changing external factors, for instance interest rates, betafactors,
market risk premiums etc. This is the reason why discount rates change
from year to year. According to KPMG’s study on cost of capital („Cost of Capital
Study 2015“), published annually, WACC-rates have been declining, especially
in the mentioned comparison period of 2014 and 2015. WACC rates used by
AURELIUS have declined accordingly |
Thread abonnieren
