Hier ein paar Informationen für euch. Da es ja nicht mehr viele sind die hier reinschauen und schreiben ist diese Information bez. WMIH wichtig für euch. Ich hoffe es beantwortet eure vielen Fragen .-)
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/...msg.aspx?message_id=111151510
A Refresher - Escrow Share Account Owners - Discussion on Asset Sales/Transfer
I have long said the resolution P&A, finalizing tranches 5/6 by the FDIC is key to the ending of this case. ____________________________________ HIDDEN ASSETS - LOOK AT THIS LINK and thanks again goes to that Biker AZ.
http://www.scefiling.org/filingdocs/17733/68131/...lyxDeclaration.pdf
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Nobody would know what did or did not happen in two months of mediation or what is under the court seals. I sure do not know. So one can expect almost anything in a case that is ANYTHING but a normal case.
As you know Piers investors have ZERO chance of a HUGE payoff because they were NOT awarded escrow shares. IMHO, this is where the "mother load" of monies is going to be placed. I have included some very important information regarding our (Escrow Account Owners) and how this is possible.
If one did not invest primarily with equity, then this information may not align with their interest.
I will leave with a couple of links for investors to research if they so choose. All I can say is as the official close of the P&A nears, I sure do LOVE my escrow shares!
The following is from (Co-written) Weasel/Gotcha/Mangle - Imagine that! Ensure you pick on the "melting ice-cube theory. Also registry accounts on pages 50/51
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Roe_645.pdf
http://materials.abi.org/sites/default/files/2013/...3SalesTopics.pdf
This is a great read about Rule 363 being used recently. Look at pages two to five discussing 'vanishing sub rosa plan doctrine' plus how 363 plan sales are used to funnel asset sales while a shell company goes through chapter 11.
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.17844.10.pdf This is a super refresher of what happened. Also term sheet that was finalized on 5/2010 and 363 sale placed in Treasury Bonds
http://www.scribd.com/doc/63319846/...mation-Hearing-in-December-2010
The following is about Chrysler and how a 363 sale can be violated and to bring in someone from the outside such (example) as JPM.
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Roe_645.pdf
WMIH,WMILT, IMHO, Escrow Share Account Owners, Piers, Tranches 5/6 and employee claims are all directly tied together The FDIC also has to make a filing whether these employee claim settlements can be paid or not. At this point, makes no difference to me as I see an HUGE amount of money transferring into the accounts of escrow share account owners.
Tranches five and six will be more procedural than litigation. This is because they cannot litigate these claims for the same reason I said three years ago there would NEVER be any third party suits (not including D&Os that were already in play) all because this would become public knowledge while people defended themselves and this CAN NEVER happen! We have signed term sheets and other information regarding this under seal and we may never see this information because everybody will have been paid off in one form or another.
Insider Trading AGAINST HEDGE-FUNDS- Capital Management LP, Centerbridge Partners LP, Appaloosa Management LP and Owl Creek Asset Management. These claims can still haunt Hedge Funds if what they have agreed to in secret mediation is not followed ____________________________________
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-25/...er-trading-ruling-1-.html
Very Juicy Material from the Texas Litigation involving the illegal seizure of WaMu
http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229090501000000000002.pdf
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-25/...er-trading-ruling-1-.html
_____________________________________ WaMu Bankruptcy Judge Agrees to Drop Insider-Trading Ruling By Steven Church Jan 25, 2012 12:33 PM ET The judge overseeing Washington Mutual Inc. (WM)s bankruptcy agreed to drop a ruling that hedge funds may have engaged in insider trading.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Mary Walrath in Wilmington, Delaware, found in September that there was enough evidence of insider trading to allow a lawsuit to be filed against four hedge funds that hold billions of dollars of WaMus debt.
Walrath agreed today to certify to a higher court that she probably will vacate (YOU DONT SAY) that order, which is on appeal. The certification would allow Walrath to drop the ruling if she approves WaMus $7 billion reorganization plan at a hearing scheduled for next month. Striking part of the insider-trading order will pave the way for the debtors to finally exit bankruptcy after three years of extensive litigation and negotiation with a multitude of interested parties, WaMu said in court papers.
WaMu is preparing to try for the third time to win approval of its plan after settling the objections of critics including shareholders. The Seattle-based company filed for bankruptcy on Sept. 26, 2008, the day after its banking unit was taken over by regulators and sold to JPMorgan (JPM) Chase & Co. for $1.9 billion.
Creditors Rejected Walrath today rejected the arguments of a group of creditors that oppose WaMus reorganization plan. The group claimed that Walrath would set a bad precedent by vacating her ruling ( YOU DONT SAY) and that the four hedge funds were trying to restore their reputations after being accused of insider trading. The hedge funds are pursuing this so they can go out as part of their business model and say, Look, the judge supported our position, Howard J. Kaplan, a lawyer for creditors, told Walrath at the hearing. Shareholders had accused Aurelius Capital Management LP, Centerbridge Partners LP, Appaloosa Management LP and Owl Creek Asset Management LP of receiving inside information and using it to trade on WaMu securities. The four funds denied the allegations and supported vacating the order.
From http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/...on-plan/53133432/1 In approving Washington Mutual's plan, Walrath agreed to strike language in her September ruling (OH, NO) that referred to the insider trading allegations (YOU DONT SAY) against the hedge funds, a condition the hedge funds had demanded in the December settlement that paved the way for the plan. Distressed Claims Trading: Insider Trading May Lead to Disallowance of Bankruptcy Claims and Breach of Fiduciary Duties By Paul J. Ricotta
In a significant expansion of the potential risk for distressed claims traders, the Delaware bankruptcy court has recently ruled 1 that traders who engage in insider trading may have their claims subordinated to equity, and that traders who amass claims sufficient to block a plan of reorganization owe fiduciary duties to all other creditors and shareholders during plan negotiations.
Washington Mutual, Inc., a bank holding company that formerly owned Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), was once the nations largest savings and loan association, having over 2,200 branches and holding $188.3 billion in deposits. When WaMu filed for bankruptcy protection in September, 2008, disputes immediately arose among a number of parties regarding the ownership of certain assets and various claims that the parties asserted against each other. After more than a year of negotiations, a settlement was reached among some, but not all of the parties (the Settlers), and was incorporated into a proposed plan of reorganization that offered to pay creditors but would leave nothing for shareholders. The non-settling parties, including the Debtors Equity Committee (Equity), sought, among other things, to equitably subordinate the Settlers claims on account of alleged insider trading and to hold the Settlers liable as temporary insiders for breach of fiduciary duty because the Settlers held claims that were sufficient to block confirmation of any other plan.
Equitable Subordination
Equity claimed that, during the course of the settlement discussions which ultimately lead to the proposed plan of reorganization, the Settlers obtained material, non-public information about WaMu and traded in its securities. They further claimed that the Settlers maintained a blocking position which would prevent the confirmation of any plan that did not have the support of the Settlers. By virtue of their leverage, the Settlers then dominated plan negotiations to assure that their settled claims would be paid while nothing was given to WaMus equity.
Based on these facts, Equity sought to equitably subordinate the claims of the Settlers despite the fact that other courts have held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize the disallowance of a claim on purely equitable grounds. Notwithstanding prior case law, the Delaware bankruptcy court held that it had the power to equitably subordinate claims if they were subject to a defense outside of bankruptcy (in this case, a securities law violation).
A securities law violation can be established if a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, non-public information. The court found a colorable claim for liability because the Settlers traded in WaMus securities with knowledge that a settlement was being discussed, including the relative stances the parties were taking in those negotiations over the course of the discussions, and with knowledge of the settlement term sheets exchanged by the parties, all at a time when the public knew only that WaMu and its creditors were engaged in contentious litigation.
The court found no merit in the Settlers arguments that Equity was simply utilizing 20/20 hindsight based on the fact that a settlement had ultimately been agreed upon or that, until a deal in principle is reached, mere negotiations do not constitute material, non-public information. The court noted that, as the negotiations progressed, it became clear to the parties involved but not the public that a settlement was becoming more probable and that the funds available to the bankruptcy estate were increasing. The court also dismissed the Settlers argument that the fact that some Settlers bought claims, some sold, and some did neither, demonstrated that the information gleaned during the negotiations was not material, because unwise or contrary trading does not provide a defense to a securities law violation. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Equity also contended that the Settlers became temporary insiders, which include those who have entered into a special, confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to confidential information solely for corporate purposes. Equity asserted that the Settlers became temporary insiders when they were given access to the settlement term sheets and participated in confidential settlement discussions. As insiders, the Settlers owed a fiduciary duty to act for the benefit of all creditors and shareholders, which was breached when they supported a plan that paid nothing to the shareholders. The Delaware bankruptcy court agreed with Equity, deeming the Settlers temporary insiders, and ruling that they owed fiduciary duties to all other creditors and shareholders because they held blocking positions in two classes of WaMus debt structure. The court authorized Equity to commence litigation against the Settlers for breach of that fiduciary duty.
_____________________________________ Thanks goes to tanjazielman (IHUB # 400941) for an EXCELLENT Summation!
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/813494/jpmfdic.pdf
These releases are IMO part of a deal. A deal has to be negotiated.
The release of AAOC was not something that they would get for free. And handing over 95% ownership of WMIH for equity didn't cut it either. Not if you have negotiators like Ed Sargent and Mike Willingham at the table.
My opinion is AAOC would give a whole lot more to be rescued from a dangling sword above their heads waiting to fall down at any moment in the future.
EC got a good hand there. Insider trading charges against Hedge Funds with big clients. People would be facing jail time, and their methods would be monitored more strictly on a permanent basis. They would do anything to sweep it under the rug! The releases must be given at all cost!
If one thinks the EC didn't have a strong leverage here, one must be completely oblivious to power play.
The EC was willing to talk (and especially listen) And remember: only Willingham and Sargent sat at the table for the EC!
(Remember Susman & Godfrey's motto: "Trial by agreement")
JPM and FDIC were not present at mediation. WHICH WASN'T NECESSARY BECAUSE THE NEGOTIATION WAS ALL ABOUT THE RELEASE OF AAOC.
Also: All term sheets are under seal. And let's sum up what we have seen so far by the LT:
- Litigating Trust: 20 million used for litigation? No way man! We bring back 12 million, we don't need 20 million... "we're not gonna sue anyone!" Until today that appears to be FACT. - Depositions and subpoena's of former employees, directors and JPM are postponed until after the life span of WMI LT. Don't believe anyone who tells you the three years can be prolonged with three years. It's not going to happen. Why? It's not necessary! See the statement above why the LT is not necessary. - Escrows are not an asset of the WMI LT. It's not on the books, there is no mention of it in the FAQ on wmitrust.com. But the legal definition in a bankruptcy context it is a "legal obligation to distribute assets, mostly money". Whole different beast then an LTI? And who got those? PIERS of course. - Susman, who takes care of the claims FOR the LT, didn't bill squat.
"13.12 Term of Agreement. This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect until the sixth (6th) anniversary (NOW EXPIRED) of Bank Closing" (which is until 25th of Sept. 2014, ladies and gentlemen) Which literally STATES what we end up with:
SCHEDULE 3.2 - Purchase Price of Assets (Whoa-Billions-YOU DONT SAY!) (a) cash and receivables from depository Book Value institutions, including cash items in the process of collection, plus interest thereon: (b) securities (exclusive of the capital stock of Market Value Acquired Subsidiaries), plus interest thereon: (c) federal funds sold and repurchase Book Value agreements, if any, including interest thereon: (d) Loans: Book Value (e) Other Real Estate: Book Value (f) credit card business, if any, including all Book Value outstanding extensions of credit: (g) Safe Deposit Boxes and related business, safekeeping business and trust business, if Book Value any: (h) Records and other documents: Book Value (i) capital stock of any Acquired Subsidiaries: Book Value (j) amounts owed to the Failed Ban by any Book Value Acquired Subsidiary: (k) assets securing Deposits of public money, Book Value to the extent not otherwise purchased hereunder: (1) Overdrafts of customers: Book Value (m) rights, if any, with respect to Qualified Market Value Financial Contracts. (n) rights of the Failed Ban to provide Book Value mortgage servicing for others and to have mortgage servicing provided to the Failed Ban by others and related contracts. (0) Bank Premises: Book Value (p) Furniture and Equipment: Book Value (q) Fixtures: Book Value |