bevorzugt die Fed-Bilanz abzubauen (birgt Gefahren, siehe # 537 + 538), dafür aber im Gegenzug die US-Leitzinsen zunächst nicht weiter zu erhöhen.
Brainard, seit 2014 Mitglied des Fed-Direktoriums, sagte in ihrer Rede (unten), dass beide Straffungs-Methoden eine ähnliche Wirkung hätten. Die Fed habe bislang vorgezogen, zunächst die Zinsen zu erhöhen und erst später die Bilanz zu reduzieren, weil sie damit einen frischen Krisenpuffer an die Hand bekommt, d.h. die Fed kann dann in Notfällen die Zinsen wieder senken. Dafür müssen die Zinsen logischerweise zuvor erst mal wieder steigen.
Allerdings würden Zinserhöhungen den US-Dollar zu stark machen, was die US-Wirtschaft schwächt, während die US-Ausländer von ihren dann zum Dollar schwachen Währungen ökonomisch profitieren. Da beide Straffungsmethoden in USA ähnlich wirkten, sie daher der Bilanz-Rückbau weiteren Zinserhöhungen vorzuziehen.
Passt dann auch besser zu Trumps "America first".
---------------
Anmerkung für Ariva-mods: Der Text ist für die öffentliche Verbreitung vorgesehen und unterliegt KEINEM Copyright, so dass ich auch lange Auszüge zitieren kann.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20170711a.htm
... In the United States, in my assessment, normalization of the federal funds rate is now well under way, and the Federal Reserve is advancing plans to allow the balance sheet to run off at a gradual and predictable pace. And for the first time in many years, the global economy is experiencing synchronous growth....
Unlike in previous tightening cycles, many central banks currently have two tools for removing accommodation. They can therefore pursue alternative normalization strategies --f irst seeking to guide policy rates higher before initiating balance sheet runoff, as in the United States, or instead starting to shrink the balance sheet before initiating a tightening of short-term rates, or undertaking both in tandem. Shrinking the balance sheet and raising the policy rate can both contribute to achieving the domestic goals of monetary policy, but it is an open question whether alternative normalization approaches might have materially different implications for the composition of demand and for cross-border spillovers, including through exchange rates and other financial channels.
Before discussing the cross-border effects of normalization, it is worth noting that the two tools for removing accommodation--raising policy rates and reducing central bank balance sheets--appear to affect domestic output and inflation in a qualitatively similar way. This means that central banks can substitute between raising the policy rate and shrinking the balance sheet to remove accommodation, just as both were used to support the recovery following the Great Recession.
Insofar as a range of approaches is likely to be consistent with achieving a central bank's domestic objectives, the choice of normalization strategy may be influenced by other considerations, including the ease of implementing and communicating policy changes, or the desire to minimize possible credit market distortions associated with the balance sheet. In the case of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided to delay balance sheet normalization until the federal funds rate had reached a high enough level to enable it to be cut materially if economic conditions deteriorate, thus guarding against the risk of returning to the effective lower bound (ELB) in an environment with a historically low neutral interest rate. The greater familiarity and past experience with the federal funds rate also weighed in favor of this instrument initially. Separately, for those central banks that, unlike the Federal Reserve, moved to negative interest rates, there may be special considerations associated with raising policy rates back into positive territory. (Sprich: Bei weiteren Zinserhöhungen wird der Dollar zu teuer, solange Draghi weiter druckt und Negativzinsen kassiert, A.L.).
One question that naturally arises is whether the major central banks' normalization plans may have material implications for cross-border spillovers--an important issue that until very recently had received scant attention. This question is a natural extension of the literature examining the cross-border spillovers of the unconventional policy actions taken by the major central banks to provide accommodation.
Although this literature suggests there are good reasons to expect broadly similar cross-border spillovers from tightening through policy rates as through balance sheet runoff, the effects may not be exactly equivalent. The balance sheet might affect certain aspects of the economy and financial markets differently than the short-term rate due to the fact that the balance sheet more directly affects term premiums on longer-term securities, while the short-term rate more directly affects money market rates. As a result, similar to the domestic effects, while the international spillovers of conventional and unconventional monetary policy may operate broadly similarly, the relative magnitude of the different channels may be sufficiently different that, on net, the two policy strategies have distinct effects.
For example, as will be discussed at greater length shortly, the two strategies may have very different implications for the exchange rate. Moreover, as was evident with the European Central Bank's (ECB) asset purchases in late 2014 and early 2015, and as we have seen again in reverse in recent weeks, in addition to the standard demand and exchange rate channels, expected or actual asset purchases may have spillovers to foreign financial conditions--by lowering term premiums and the associated longer-term foreign bond yields--that are greater than conventional monetary policy.
To explore possible differences, it is useful to compare two different approaches to policy normalization, each of which is designed to have identical effects on aggregate domestic activity and thus, at least in the long run, on inflation. At one extreme, a central bank could opt to tighten primarily through conventional policy hikes, while maintaining the balance sheet by reinvesting the proceeds of maturing assets. At the other extreme, a central bank could rely primarily on reducing the balance sheet, while keeping policy rates unchanged in the near term.
The question is whether there are circumstances in which the choice of normalization strategies, which are similarly effective in achieving domestic mandates, might matter for the global economy. Where the two approaches have entirely equivalent effects, the central bank could freely substitute between them without changing the composition of home demand, and net exports, the exchange rate, and foreign output would also be unaffected.
Conversely, under different assumptions about the transmission channels of monetary policy, alternative approaches to normalization can have quite different implications for foreign economies. Most prominently, the exchange rate may be more sensitive to the path of short term rates than to balance sheet adjustments, as some research suggests. [US-Dollar würde bei Zinserhöhungen zu teuer, während Bilanzreduzierungen in der US-Wirtschaft ähnliche Auswirkungen hätten, OHNE den Dollar hochzutreiben, A.L.] Although several papers using an event study approach find on balance little disparity in the exchange rate sensitivity to short-term compared to long-term interest rates, this lack of empirical consensus may simply reflect the difficulty of disentangling changes in short-term and longer-term interest rates, which are highly correlated.
Let's turn to a simulation of a highly stylized model to explore how a greater sensitivity of the exchange rate to conventional policy relative to balance sheet actions can make a difference in terms of cross-border transmission. In particular, let's assume a 100-basis-point rise in long-term yields coming from the conventional channel of higher policy rates has double the effect on the exchange rate as a 100 basis point rise in yields coming from higher term premiums.7 If a large country, which is already at potential, experiences a favorable domestic demand shock, it would need to tighten monetary policy to return output to potential. If the central bank chooses to use the short-term interest rate as its active policy tool, and keeps its balance sheet on hold, the current and expected path of short-term interest rates rises, putting upward pressure on long-term bond yields and causing the real exchange rate to appreciate. The stronger currency coupled with some initial expansion of domestic demand in turn cause a deterioration in real net exports. (Starker Dollar schwächt US-Wirtschaft, fördert hingegen ausländische Ökonomien, A.L.)
Turning to the effects abroad, the decline in domestic real net exports corresponds to an increase in foreign net exports, which will tend to boost foreign GDP, other things being equal....
Now, let's instead consider tightening through the balance sheet. If the same amount of policy tightening in the country experiencing a positive demand shock is achieved exclusively through a reduction in the balance sheet, while keeping the policy rate unchanged, the exchange rate would appreciate to a smaller degree, reflecting the lower assumed sensitivity of the exchange rate to the term premium than to policy rates. Net exports would decline by less--reflecting both the smaller exchange rate appreciation and the smaller rise in domestic demand--and similarly this would result in smaller cross-border spillovers to foreign GDP.
......
......
Let me conclude by returning to the policy choices facing central banks. The Federal Reserve chose to remove accommodation initially through increases in the federal funds rate. In light of recent policy moves, I consider normalization of the federal funds rate to be well under way. If the data continue to confirm a strong labor market and firming economic activity, I believe it would be appropriate soon to commence the gradual and predictable process of allowing the balance sheet to run off.
|
Thread abonnieren
