HELLO GUYS,
Subject: 'Fast normal WHOA Abuse in the Netherlands, facilitated and approved by the Court Amsterdam'.
I have send this email to 135 adresses, o.a. 'belastingdienst', Fiod, Ministerie EZ, Finance, Rutte, King Alexander and media in ZA and NL, Europe. I have attached the video's from Wulf and SdK.
As always, stay tuned!
Mail:
'Dear All,
The ungoing Steinhoff Scandal......
het Zuid-As-Feestje van de adviseurs en advocaten......
Fast normal WHOA Abuse in the Netherlands, facilitated and approved by the Court Amsterdam.......
and nobody seems to care!
I would like to inform you about a WHOA decision for the scandal company Steinhoff International.
Are we dealing with abuse of the WHOA law here?
Up to you to judge.....
Stay tuned!
Kind regards, Jaap Peer
NEW OWNERS/ NIEUWE EIGENAREN VAN STEINHOFF INTERNATIONAL. THESE 'LOAN TO OWN- HEDGEFUNDS' ARE THE WINNERS:
Silver Point Luxembourg Platform S.5 r.I., (ii) Affix Holdings LLC, (iii) Baupost Group Securities, L.L.C., (iv) Sculptor Investments IV S.5 r.I., (v) Retail Credit Holdings SV S.5 r.I., (vi) Burlington Loan Management DAC en (vii) PIMCO Strategic Income Fund, Inc.,
https://www.steinhoffinternational.com/downloads/...3-Fw-redacted.pdf
https://www.steinhoffinternational.com/WHOA-restructuring-plan.php
THE LOSSES OF THE SHAREHOLDERS, LEGAL ROBBERY?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOlDuxW6Jf0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RtBoOcf_tuk
Van Moorsel about the WHOA Steinhoff: 'During the “walk” through this letter, you may find that the Restructuring Plan fails to meet critical standards'.
https://www.steinhoffinternational.com/downloads/...2520-%252010.pdf,
Exhibit 2 – 9 , page 150-166.
'10.Closing remarks
'In view of the above-and please do appreciate that I am certainly not perfect-I have material doubts as to the question whether this Restructuring Plan can be confirmed and crammed on the shareholders.It is not in accordance with the WHOA, at least not sufficiently convincing.In case neither SIHNV nor the observers or an impartial other expert appointed by the Court can effectively explain or relinquish these remarks and doubts, SIHNV or the Court would need to explore alternative mechanisms.
It is up to the Court to make its evaluations.Should the Court find merit in these questions and remarks but SIHNV and its secured creditors would still be unwilling to convince and cooperate to a solution,the accurateness of the “liquidation value”may well be tested in real life'.
https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/...ument_INSOLVENCY.pdf
Page 330 e.f.
‘Extra value ownership argument’: It seems also questionable to simply suggest that all extra value extracted in a restructuring must be allocated to creditors as long as they have not yet been paid in full. This assumption is governing US, English and German restructuring law, best highlighted in their “absolute priority rule”, but the assumption itself seems to beg the question. If a specific value can only be created in cooperation with the entity and its legal owners (shareholders), it might not belong to creditors alone in the first place. The argument that shareholders with no real economic interest cannot claim any value (including the extra value from cooperation) as long as creditors have not yet been paid in full has no legal basis.
First, it is not consistent with property law, because, during reorganisation proceedings, the legal ownership of the entity still rests with the shareholders. Second, creditors cannot claim the extra value based on their pre-insolvency rights because they are not entitled to this value under any enforcement law. Stating such a right in insolvency turns out to be a petitio principii
‘Creditor’s privilege argument’:
'A strict APR improves one-sidedly the position of creditors. Outside of reorganisation proceedings, a creditor may decide to maintain the investment in the debtor’sbusiness in case of a default which means to waive the right to declare a default (and toaccordingly repossess collateral in case of secured creditors). In reorganisation proceedings, a creditor may decide to do just the very same, e.g. by accepting a plan that offers himthe adapted value of hisrights. Outside of reorganisation proceedings,however, creditors may not keep their stake in the firms and, at the same time, also eliminate junior creditors and shareholder in the capital structure while under insolvency law, a strict APR compels reorganisation plans that eliminate junior stakeholders. A more flexible (relative) priority rule would better reflect pre-insolvency entitlements as it allows to create a new capital structure that also keeps everyone in the picture'.
As Douglas G Bairdputs it: “Such a new capital structure can be consistent with the firm’s current financial condition (doing away with such things as the obligation to pay dividends and interest as well as stripping junior investors of voting or other control rights), yet still recognize the junior investors’ right to any excess that remains when, at some time in the future, all the accounts are ultimately squared. This is the essence of relative priority.”1117
‘Shareholder protection argument’:
'Any rule that disregards a shareholder vote for the simple reason of not having a “real economic interest in the company” may also conflict with the protection that a shareholder enjoysunder the fundamental rights guarantees of constitutional law. Here,the right of property usually includes protection of shares and may not only provide for a due process guarantee and sufficient compensation if the owner of a share was to be expropriated. An infringement of ownership may also meet further requirements under the restriction of commensurability, like e.g. the size of the debtor or systemic risks resulting from not confirming the plan'.1118
'Beyond the right of property, shareholders may also have the protection of other, more specific constitutional rights. In Germany, for instance, Article9 of the constitution provides for the right to establish (and manage) a company. It is discussed whether the resulting protection conflicts with the existing rules of a cross-class cramdown because shareholders are rendered defenceless in insolvency proceedings'.1119
AS A REMINDER, AGM 22 MARCH 2022:
14:02 Uhr übernahm wieder Louis du Preez – Ausblick und vordringliche Aufgaben, damit die Steinhoff Aktie eine „normale“ Aktie werden kann. „Mattres firm is IPO ready“
'Nach einer Zusammenfassung der anstehenden Probleme kam der CEO zu einem Appell an die Aktionäre, den er in folgenden Punkten in seiner Präsentation zusammenfasste:
„The team has successfully delivered over the past four years – Support the boards to complete the process:
– Many of the risks associated with Steinhoff have been resolved – viele Risiken /Probleme wurden gelöst
– Significantly reduced risk profile – Steinhoff Konzern weist ein wesentlich besseres Risikoprofil auf als 2017
– The underlying operations are performing well – Töchter sind operativ erfolgreich
– Focus is now on restructuring the terms of the debt: – letzte grosse Aufgabe ist Umschuldung
–Extend the due date past 2023 – Fälligkeit über 2023 verlängern
–Reduce the interest rate payable in line with the reduction in the risk profile – Reduktion der Zinssätze wegen stark reduzierter Risiken im steinhoff Konzern
–Reduce the absolute level of debt when opportune“ – Reduzierung des Verschuldungsgrads „wenn es passt“.'
„…supporting the good work of the management…“ –
M. Moses bei der Einleitung zur AGM
'Dann war CFO Thedore de Klerk „dran“ (13:36 – 13:52 Uhr) Bilanz, Q1-Zahlen und starker Start in Q2'
Source:
https://www.nebenwerte-magazin.com/steinhoff-aktie-generalversammlung/
Page 21
'The Audit & Risk Committee and the Supervisory Board had considered each of the key judgements and estimates, and noted that the level of uncertainty had reduced considerably in comparison to the previous reporting period. Most notably, the uncertainty related to the going concern assumption had reduced significantly after the reporting date as a result of the order that was granted by the Western Cape High Court on 24 January 2022, whereby the SIHPL Section 155 Scheme was approved and sanctioned.
Ms. Watson was very pleased to note that the reduction in the uncertainties had resulted in an unqualified audit opinion from Mazars'.
Page 31
Louis Du Preez: 'He reiterated that ultimately the goals were to obtain an extension of the maturity date of the debt and to make sure that the interest coupon matched the risk of the underlying businesses and the Group as a whole'.
https://www.steinhoffinternational.com/downloads/...0Presentation.pdf
'Pepco's half-year results impress again as store openings rocket'
'European value retail giant
Pepco Group said Thursday that half-year trading results were “encouraging”. And while for the huge-but-still-growing retailer, the word “encouraging” may suggest it was an average period, it was still one that many peers would envy'.
It saw 22.8% year-on-year revenue growth to €2.84 billion, driven by strong Pepco brand growth of 36.9%.
Its key expansion programme for the period continued apace with 166 store openings for the six months to 31 March. For the first time, the number of new store openings in Western Europe outweighed Central Europe openings for the first time across Q2, it noted.
The group, which owns the Pepco and Dealz brands in Europe and Poundland in the UK, saw like-for-like (LFL) revenues jumping 11.1% in H1, with Q2 LFLs up 8.5%, ensuring its value offer continues to appeal to cash-strapped shoppers. Poundland Group LFL rose 4.9% in H1 and by 5.7% in Q2'
Source: https://ww.fashionnetwork.com/news/...re-openings-rocket,1508404.html
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