WMIH + Cooper Info

Re: Big Bang vs. Multiple smaller acquisitions
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=5428.msg74629#msg74629

Zitat Scott Fox:
4.  I have the gut feeling that (a) our BOD believes it knows exactly what it is doing;  (b) that everything is going according to a plan; and (c) they are waiting for something to happen.    This feeling is reinforced by reports from shareholders at the meeting who reported a sense of confidence from our BOD in both 2013 and 2014.............................Wholeheartedly agree, not only because of the meetings but also the total lack of any statements. No jeopardy of any deals.
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

How come JPMC is assuming Liabilities that it did not own

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=5985.msg74651#msg74651

ZItat deekshant:

This was in reply to BKshadow on Ihub but is relevant here

Quote "Case 1:13-cv-01997-RMC Document 1 Filed 12/17/13 Page 4 of 24 11. While JPMC acquired the FDIC's title to all of the assets of WMB, "whether or not reflected on the books of' WMB (P&A § 3.1), JPMC did not assume all of the liabilities of WMB, but rather assumed only an expressly defined subset of them. The P&A Agreement provides that JPMC "expressly" assumed "at Book Value ... all of the liabilities of the Failed Bank [WMB] which are reflected on the Books and Records of the Failed Bank as of Bank Closing [September 25, 2008]." (Id. § 2.1.) Therefore, with certain explicit exceptions not relevant here, JPMC did not assume any liability of WMB that was not reflected on WMB' s general ledger, subsidiary ledgers, and supporting schedules as of September 25, 2008. "

Given the above, how come JPMC is assuming liabilities that it did not own and paying for them.

Quote Quote: "In a Jan. 9, 2009, SEC filing, Freddie Mac disclosed that "JPMorgan Chase will assume Washington Mutual"s recourse obligations to repurchase any of such mortgages that were sold to Freddie Mac with recourse. With respect to mortgages that Washington Mutual sold to Freddie Mac without recourse, JPMorgan Chase has agreed to make a one-time payment to Freddie Mac with respect to obligations of Washington Mutual to repurchase any of such mortgages that are inconsistent with certain representations and warranties made at the time of sale[xviii]." This filing, like several filings made by JPMorgan, demonstrate that the firm had recognized its obligations to repurchase WaMu-related mortgages sold to the GSEs[xix]. If, as JPMorgan now contends, these repurchase obligationswere the rightful liabilities of the FDIC, then one must ask how the firm could legally have settled them on behalf of the FDIC. In fact, section 12.2(f) of the Purchase Agreement specifically protects the FDIC from paying for liabilities it did not assume by requiring that it consent to any settlement that would result in an indemnification obligation. " www.ritholtz.com/blog

The following decision against JPMC is very important and sets a precedent, imo, with respect to liabilities Quote

Quote: Page 56 and 57

FHFA Vs JPMC 11 Civ. 6188 (DLC)

JPMorgan does not directly contest the Amended Complaint"s detailed allegations that it has assumed WaMu Bank"s liabilities with respect to the securitizations at issue here. Indeed, as the plaintiff points out, JPMorgan itself has publicly referenced its liability for "repurchase and/or indemnity 57 obligations arising in connection with sale and securitization of loans" by, among others, WaMu. The FDIC has likewise opined that "the liabilities and obligations" arising from WaMu"s sale of mortgage-backed securities "were assumed in their entirety by JPMC [(JPMorgan Chase)] under the P&A Agreement, thereby extinguishing any potential liability by FDIC Receiver." Thus, for the purpose of this motion, there is no dispute that JPMorgan is a proper defendent with respect to FHFA"s WaMu related claims. In insisting that FHFA was required to exhaust FIRREA"s Administrative procedures before filing suit, however the JPMorgan defendents have failed to explain how the agency"s claim against them "could be brought" through that procedure. Indeed, as FIRREA"s judicial review provision suggests, the administrative procedures were designed to permit a claimant to "seek[] a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation has been appointed receiver."20 But the assets -- and liabilities -- at issue here have passed, by operation of the PAA, to JPMorgan

Page 60

                                                      CONCLUSION  

The defendants' September 7 motions to dismiss are granted with respect to:

• Plaintiff's Virginia Securities Act claims against the Other Underwriter Defendants;

• Plaintiff's claims of owner-occupancy and LTV-ratio fraud relating to the securities for which JPMorgan served as lead underwriter;

• And plaintiff's claims of owner-occupancy fraud relating to the securities for which WaMu or Long Beach served as sponsor, depositor, or lead underwriter.

The motions to dismiss are denied in all other respects

wallstreetonparade.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Judge-Denise-Cote-Decision-Against-Dismissal-of-Federal-Housing-Finance-Agency-v.-JPMorgan-Chase-Co.-et-al-Dated-November-5-2011-11-Civ-6188-in-the-U.S.-District-Court-for-the-Southern-District-of-New-York.pdf

[color=red]Outcome:[/color] The deal includes $4 billion to end the FHFA"s 2011 lawsuit accusing JPMorgan of selling Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FMCC) faulty mortgage bonds, the agency said yesterday.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-25/...ttle-mortgage-claims.html

Quote

"In January 2010, recognizing that JPMorgan"s disclosures were inadequate for investors" ability to analyze its risks, the SEC sent a letter to Michael Cavanagh directing the bank to provide greater detail[xxiv] of their repurchase obligations. Again, rather than providing investors with the class-leading transparency JPMorgan often claims, the bank responded to the letter, in redacted form[xxv], requesting confidential treatment of certain portions of their response." http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/03/jpm-wamu/

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 ZItat Scott Fox dazu : 

"In January 2010, recognizing that JPMorgan"s disclosures were inadequate for investors" ability to analyze its risks, the SEC sent a letter to Michael Cavanagh directing the bank to provide greater detail[xxiv] of their repurchase obligations. Again, rather than providing investors with the class-leading transparency JPMorgan often claims, the bank responded to the letter, in redacted form[xxv], requesting confidential treatment of certain portions of their response."

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/03/jpm-wamu/

Maybe they know people are watching a little closer this time.

Zitatende -------------------------------------------------- MfG.L:)

Was WMI' (the parent) Separate from WMB (the bank) at Seizure ?

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=5984.msg74649#msg74649

Zitat azcowboy:
From WMI's own SEC Filed report;

WMI (the parent) Operating Segments

"The Company has four operating segments for the purpose of management reporting: the Retail Banking Group, the Card Services Group, the Commercial Group and the Home Loans Group. The Company's operating segments are defined by the products and services they offer. The Retail Banking Group, the Card Services Group and the Home Loans Group are consumer-oriented while the Commercial Group serves commercial customers. In addition, the category of Corporate Support/Treasury and Other includes the community lending and investment operations; the Treasury function, which manages the Company's interest rate risk, liquidity position and capital; the Corporate Support function, which provides facilities, legal, accounting and finance, human resources and technology"

Off-Balance Sheet Activities

"The Company transforms loans into securities through a process known as securitization. When the Company securitizes loans, the loans are usually sold to a qualifying special-purpose entity ("QSPE"), typically a trust. The QSPE, in turn, issues securities, commonly referred to as asset-backed securities, which are secured by future cash flows on the sold loans. The QSPE sells the securities to investors, which entitle the investors to receive specified cash flows during the term of the security. The QSPE uses the proceeds from the sale of these securities to pay the Company for the loans sold to the QSPE. These QSPEs are not consolidated within the financial statements since they satisfy the criteria established by Statement No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities . In general, these criteria require the QSPE to be legally isolated from the transferor (the Company), be limited to permitted activities, and have defined limits on the types of assets it can hold and the permitted sales, exchanges or distributions of its assets."

       When the Company sells or securitizes loans that it originated, it generally retains the right to service the loans and may retain senior, subordinated, residual, and other interests, all of which are considered retained interests in the sold or securitized assets. Retained interests in mortgage loan securitizations, excluding the rights to service such loans, were $1.23 billion at June 30, 2008, of which $1.13 billion are of investment-grade quality. Retained interests in credit card securitizations were $1.56 billion at June 30, 2008, of which $421 million are of investment-grade quality. Additional information concerning the pretax gains, cash flows, servicing fees, principal and interest received on and valuation of retained interests and loan repurchases, in each case, arising from the Company's securitization activities is included in Note 7 to the Consolidated Financial Statements – "Securitizations" in the Company's 2007 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A. Additional information concerning the revenue and expenses from the sales and servicing of home mortgage loans, including the effects of derivative risk management instruments is included in Note 8 to the Consolidated Financial Statements – "Mortgage Banking Activities" in the Company's 2007 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A. "

http://www.otcmarkets.com/edgar/GetFilingHtml?FilingID=6093324

ugh I am not a self proclaimed ... "genius" ... as referred to earlier on this MB, ... I am a self proclaimed ... "dumb ass biker" ... that was at least smart enough & listened' attentively when ... EVEN ol'  Rosen said, "don't forget to sign those releases"

I guess Rosie was talkin' only to the equity people' .... since that statement would not have mattered to any of the creditor classes' ... right?
just sayin'
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++
WMI, (the parent) had some 28 billion dollars ... 24.375 billion dollars worth of Certificates still waiting to be sold (product on the shelf) when the September seizure occured ... Placed under the procedural guidance and protection of the FDIC - R'  ....

.. 2008 was a tough year for a whole bunch of people, businesses, banks and country's ..

WMI, (the parent) had been issuing Certificates for many years, I only went back as far as 2002, and saw more than enough to satisfy my own curiosity

.... JPM did not get everything .... due to the fact that it wasn't the FDIC's to give'  .... Not only did the FDIC know that at the time, ... but now this "ol' dumb ass biker" knows tooooooo  

... Everyone listened to Rosie' and signed the release ... right?

just sayin'
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Zitat xfidfed1:
AZ- I concur with you on the $ 28 billion, as I posted the following back on 8/6/14:

Please forgive my ignorance if the following information has already been discussed, but are the following pre-BK WMI assets stated in WMI"s 2008- 2ndQ 10-Q,  the "FDIC seized assets" that may still belong to WMI and are at issue in this MB discussion ?

Per page 39 of said report, during 2nd Q 2008:

• WMI had an average balance of approximately $ 28 billion in "Available for sale securities (Mortgage-backed securities and Investment securities)", and "Loans held for sale," which are listed separate and apart from the Company"s $ 230 billion "Loans held in portfolio"; and,

• Nearly $16 billion in "Other Assets", which most likely included the value of corporate/ bank branch owned real and personal property acquired by JPM . However, IMO the value of the corporate/branch properties would have been a small percentage (under 25%) of this $ 16 billion total. (Years ago, I was head of Corporate Admin for a CA bank and my areas of responsibility included management of all Bank properties)
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Zitat azcowboy:

XFIDFED1,

A Job well done' ... Thank You'

Yes, this number referenced IS ONLY the Certs that WMI had ready for sale, ... obviously, the times being what they were in 2008' ... they had an overabundance of product' availability' (Mortgage Pass-Through Certs)

Honestly' ... I am more interested in the interest returns that "R" would have received on all of the already issued Certs, that WMI the parent owned' ... That would seem to be a large number after some six years' of accumulation

The cash is gone, the creditors have been paid ~ spilt milk' ~ lets see what has been coming in to "R" as defined as "OFF-BALANCE Sheet Activities" (on behalf of WMI' the parent) .. since October of 2008'
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Zitat CSNY:
This is what we've been talking about: residual interests.  Residual interests are the bottom rung, underbelly tranches but 92% of these residuals were investment-grade, so they would not go to $0.  Although the $1.23B seems like a very modest number, I expect that was the market value of these bottom-rung tranches.  They might have been marked-to-market at 1% -- or less, so their realized value could be considerably higher.

Also, "the Company" probably refers to WMI, not WMB, so the residuals might be WMI's property.  Lawyers are usually very careful about anything said in a '34 Act filing.  If the $1.23B in residuals belong to WMI,  those residuals should not have been seized.  I don't, however, ignore the possibility that they could have been sold by Weil to JPM.  We just don't know.

Zitatende
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MfG.L:)

Form 10-Q for WMI HOLDINGS CORP.

http://biz.yahoo.com/e/140808/wmih10-q.html

ZItat Mr_Simpson:

From Yahoo Board  mrbusiness1982
Per WMIH's 10-Q:

"Shares used in computing diluted net income (loss) per share: 243,587,216 shares."

See pages 4 and 27.

1) WMIH Starting Shares: 200M
2) Board of Director Shares: 3.3M
3) KKR Preferred Shares: 9.6M
4) KKR Warrants Issue One: 30.7M
5) KKR Warrants Issue Two: 30.7M

1+2+3+4= 243.6M shares.

It looks like KKR just cashed in their first half their warrants. They can only receive these if WMIH borrows money. If WMIH is borrowing money does this mean an M&A is in progress?

If all warrants were exercised, the float would be 274M. The 243.6M reported only supports the exercise of the first group of warrants for the strike of $1.36/share.

"...has issued to KKR Fund warrants to purchase, in the aggregate, 61.4 million shares of the Company"s common stock (the "Common Stock"), 30.7 million of which have an exercise price of $1.32 per share and 30.7 million of which have an exercise price of $1.43 per share (together, the "Warrants")."

You are correct, the cash should show however there is only a line for $9.4M from preferred. "Preferred deemed dividend recorded due to beneficial conversion feature."

Here is the rub. The KKR deal closed in January. Diluted Net Income assumes the conversion of all convertible preferred stock and debt. Q1 2014 should have reported 274M shares if they were going to report warrants. It did not. Nor did Q2 report the full amount of warrants. So why then only report the first half of the warrants. It should be all or none and really none because warrants don't apply until exercised.

March 31st: Shares used in computing basic and diluted net (loss) per share: 200,474,070.
June 30th:Shares used in computing diluted net income (loss) per share: 243,587,216.

Something is going on and WMIH isn't saying.
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Zitat Primtah:
Those are only "potential" shares. You're looking at an accounting feature intended to aid investors in their understanding of our share structure. For example, if we had 200,000,000 shares issued but 200,000,000 potential shares outstanding (i.e., warrants), it would let you know that the potential for a drastic drop in PPS exists if all of the warrants were exercised.

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fullydilutedshares.asp

The wikipedia article is also helpful.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diluted_earnings_per_share

Basically it is just a way of gauging earnings per share in a "worst case scenario" where all potential shares existed. Reporting this information is a Generally Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP). It is reported because it is both "material" and part of a "conservative" evaluation of earnings.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/..._Accounting_Principles_(United_States

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ZItat WAMUCHEN:
Will KKR execute the 2nd 30.7 MM shares in Q3? Then WMIH will announce preferred issuance.

1st PART WARRANT  PRICE = $1.32 per share

Share-wise: (9.6 MM + 30.7 MM) / 243.587216 MM shares = 16.544%

Dollar-wise: 10.55+ 40.524 = $51.074 MM

So if KKR exhausts her 2nd part of the warrant in Q3, then

2nd PART WARRANT PRICE = $1.43 per share

Share-wise: (9.6 MM + 30.7 MM + 30.7 MM) / 274.2726 MM shares = 25.89%

Dollar-wise: 10.55+ 40.524 + 43.901 = $94.691 MM

What is left is that KKR will be permitted to participate the coming right offering of WMIH for not exceeding $1 BB or 50% of the offering size, under the condition of its grand total equity holding not over 42.5%.
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ZItat T1215s:
WAMUCHEN

I believe any warrent executed regardless of an agreement signed in the past to do so needs to be 8K'ed  when & how much to inform the shareholders said warrent/s was executed/ anychange in a pub. corp. shareholders need to be informed as per SEC regs IMHO.

HAVE A GREAT DAY -Ts
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ZItat WAMUCHEN:
Well the fact was they didn't file the 8K.

The materiality of the event had been reported by WMIH and KKR's PR. The deadline was Jan 31, 2014. If the deal was off, WMIH would have reported a pay-out of $2 MM to KKR. On the other side, WMIH would report nothing.

The materiality of the deal, I repeat and argue that, had been reported and fully disclosed. So the execution of it doesn't require another 8K for that.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Re: Form 10-Q for WMI HOLDINGS CORP. -2014/08/08

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=5974.msg74734#msg74734

Zitat dixdeau:

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/8-kinterp.htm

Section 102. Item 1.01 Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement

Question 102.01

Question: If an agreement that was not material at the time the registrant entered into it becomes material at a later date, must the registrant file an Item 1.01 Form 8-K at the time the agreement becomes material?

Answer: No. If an agreement becomes material to the registrant but was not material to the registrant when it entered into, or amended, the agreement, the registrant need not file a Form 8-K under Item 1.01. In any event, the registrant must file the agreement as an exhibit to the periodic report relating to the reporting period in which the agreement became material if, at any time during that period, the agreement was material to the registrant. In this regard, the registrant would apply the requirements of Item 601 of Regulation S-K to determine if the agreement must be filed with the periodic report. [April 2, 2008]

212.03 An Item 3.02 Form 8-K filing requirement is triggered upon an unregistered sale of warrants to purchase equity securities (or an unregistered sale of options outside a stock option plan), if the volume threshold under Item 3.02 is exceeded, or upon an unregistered sale of convertible notes (convertible into equity securities), if the volume threshold under Item 3.02 of the underlying equity security issuable upon conversion is exceeded. Pursuant to Item 701(e) of Regulation S-K, the registrant must disclose the terms of, as applicable, the exercise of the warrants or the options or the conversion of the convertible notes in the Item 3.02 Form 8-K. If the Item 3.02 Form 8-K that discloses the initial sale of the warrants, the options, or the convertible notes also discloses the maximum amount of the underlying securities that may be issued through, as applicable, the exercise of the warrants or the options or the conversion of the convertible notes, then a subsequent Item 3.02 Form 8-K filing requirement is not triggered upon the exercise of the warrants or the options or the conversion of the notes. [April 2, 2008]

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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Re: Was WMI' (the parent) Separate from WMB (the bank) at Seizure ?

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=5984.msg74729#msg74729

Zitat CSNY:

Quote from: azcowboy on Today at 10:35:13 AM
.... They gave up on THEIR (snh's) potential gamble' .... Had the "Litigation Morass" .... moved forward (which isn't what anyone wanted) .... equity requested of the court, ... "an equitable subordination" ... HOWEVER' ... the Court stated that they, (snh's) were gamblin' with the possibility of "equitable disallowance" .... if they lost? ... they were out' ... clean & simple

... Kind of a huge difference' ...

Even though I was observing, I was in the dark because I bought the SNs' sleight of hand that WMI's residual consisted solely of the NOLs.
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Zitat azcowboy:
CSNY,

Initially, we were all distracted by the Bankruptcy for a while' .... Had the case moved into "litigation?" and had Susman been successful at proving insider trading? .... there's not a court in the land that would have allowed the snh's to continue to participate' .... ("equitable disallowance")

.... It was just too much of a gamble, the financial stakes too high', for them (snh's) to continue to fight and NOT settle with equity' ....

Now? ... everyone gets a FDIC procedural return .... us? ... them? .... its all good'
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Zitat Masterp281:
You don't buy into the thought that the SNs did what they did exclusively for the NOLs?
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Zitat CSNY:
No.  While I have no idea what will inure to the LT from the seizure, I am persuaded it will be something of substantial value.  I believe the SNs wanted that value and the NOLs.  

The SNs knew there was no way the FDIC could wade through documentation in one day to determine what was WMI's vs. what was solely WMB's, so there was a chance some of WMI's property was seized.  In the days following the seizure we heard about planes and artwork being sold, but I think the SNs were willing to gamble financial assets like mortgages and residual MBS securities that were not WMB property were seized and would be returned in six years.  

For example, if that property amounted to even 5% of the estimated $300B in mortgages that would be $15B plus six years' interest or about $30B.  Accordingly, why let the waterfall pierce through to the preferreds?  Keep it at the H level and split the $30B (Tepper would probably get at least 40%) -- and the NOLs.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

ps. ist für mich auch heute noch ein Rätsel wie die FDIC in der kurzen Zeit der "Übergabe/Übernahme/Raub  die komplette Übersicht zu erhalten was alles zu Wamu gehört an Geldern, Besitz, Schulden , Hypotheken usw.

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=5984.msg74752#msg74752

ZItat jaysenese:
I wonder if the SNHs' might not have made the conscious decision to bring WMIH shareholders (including, of course, themselves) into the final settlement.  For political purposes only ....

If there really is a residual amount to be returned, compare the two headlines we could see:

"After Six Years, The FDIC Returns $30B in WAMU Mortgages to WAMU Shareholders" compared to

"After Six Years, The FDIC Gives $30B in WAMU Mortgages to Hedge Funds"
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Zitat larry5476:
Jaysen:  More like, "After conducting a six year study, costing $30B, the FDIC has decided to permanently destroy any evidence of residual WAMU Mortgages due to their toxicity as per CDC guidelines."
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ZItat CSNY:
I disagree.  The FDIC has a plausible story in the 2008 meltdown (caused largely by issuing mortgages to people who couldn't afford them and WaMu was deeply into this game) and neither the current FDIC head nor the president would be harmed by the revelation.

Further, the money would be paid in increments so the amounts may be less shocking.
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Zitat kenwalker:
FDIC quoted Section 13(k) and 1823(k) of the FDI Act  both deal with Emergency Acquisitions: ".......condition exist which threaten the stability of a significant number of savings associations.........." then you always have the OTS supervision - or lack of - to blame.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

1.

MfG.L:)

2.

MfG.L:)

3.

MfG.L:)

Re: Was WMI' (the parent) Separate from WMB (the bank) at Seizure ?

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=5984.msg74834#msg74834

Quote from: azcowboy on Today at 09:31:12 AM
Proof that JPMorgan was NOT given ownership' to WMI's Loan Portfolio, interest income Pass-Through Certs ... (posted)

AZ

Zitat rockwell dazu:
WMI had no loan portfolio. WMI never originated loans. It was all WMB. You all think it's WMI's because it's listed on WMI's quarterly & yearly reports but WMI lists everything it owns, direct and indirect, in there. There might be residual stuff but I doubt it'll be in the 10s of billions. I don't want to see people sit around waiting years for something that might let them down.

Here's a question I just thought of. Is a holding company allowed to originate loans?
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Zitat Kszabo:
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT JPMORGAN CHASE DID NOT ACQUIRE WAMU LOANS FROM FDIC BY OPERATION OF LAW AND IS REQUIRED TO PROVE OWNERSHIP THROUGH EVIDENCE
DECEMBER 28, 2012
December 28, 2012

In a decision rendered on December 21, 2012, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that JPMorgan Chase did not acquire any WaMu loans from the FDIC by operation of law, as when a subsequent mortgagee acquires an interest in a mortgage through a voluntary purchase agreement with the FDIC, the mortgage has not been acquired by “operation of law” and that subsequent mortgagee must comply with the provisions of MCL 600.3204 and record the assignment of the mortgage before foreclosing by advertisement. The decision affirmed the prior decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals on this issue...
http://foreclosuredefensenationwide.com/?p=491
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Zitat CSNY:
We got that.  WMI was a holding company and WMB its operating subsidiary.

WMB -- not WMI -- is in receivership.  WMB owned mortgages, some of which were not sold to become part of MBS, and may not have been sold to JPM.  They are owned by the receivership and if there's anything left after paying off WMB's bondholders and administrative costs, that value goes to the LT.  Further, any residual interests in MBS that WMB owned may also have not been sold, and the same goes for them.

Of course, any non-WMB asset did not become property of the receivership and the receivership is a mere custodian of such property unless it was sold by Weil Gotshal to keep equity out of the waterfall.  I think such property exists and was never accounted for by the FDIC to WMI during the bankruptcy for whatever reason, i.e., the FDIC did not return anything to WMI, but must do so eventually.  
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Zitat xfidfed1:
“Here's a question I just thought of. Is a holding company allowed to originate loans?”

Rockwell- I believe the following regulatory info answers your question, and the answer appears to be “Yes”.

Title 12: Banks and Banking
________________________________________
PART 225—BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND CHANGE IN BANK CONTROL (REGULATION Y)

§225.28   List of permissible nonbanking activities.

(a) Closely related nonbanking activities. The activities listed in paragraph (b) of this section are so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto, and may be engaged in by a bank holding company or its subsidiary in accordance with the requirements of this regulation.

(b) Activities determined by regulation to be permissible—(1) Extending credit and servicing loans. Making, acquiring, brokering, or servicing loans or other extensions of credit (including factoring, issuing letters of credit and accepting drafts) for the company's account or for the account of others.

(2) Activities related to extending credit. Any activity usual in connection with making, acquiring, brokering or servicing loans or other extensions of credit, as determined by the Board. The Board has determined that the following activities are usual in connection with making, acquiring, brokering or servicing loans or other extensions of credit:

http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/...pt12.3.225&rgn=div5#se12.3.225_127
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Re: WMB 307B Assets, WMB fsb 46B Assets as per FDIC

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6028.msg75649#msg75649

ZItat ron_66271:

This is what the math looked like at the 70/30 'split ratio'.

HLCE

(In this, AllPreferreds refers to preferred equity + TPS. Preferred equity just refers to WAMKQ and WAMPQ.)

* There are 7.5 billion in All Preferreds which includes TPS)
* There are 3 million WAMPQ shares (totalling $3 billion in face value)
* There are 20 million WAMKQ shares (totalling $500 million in face value)
* Therefore, preferred equity comprises 46.6667% of the All Preferreds value ($3.5 billion/$7.5 billion).
* AllPreferreds are to get 140,000,000 shares (70% of the 200,000,000 shares) of common stock in the new company.
* Of that 140,000,000 shares, preferred equity should get 65,333,333 shares (46.6667% of 140,000,000)
* Of the total make up of the preferred equity, WAMPQ makes up 85.7143% of the face value ($3b/$3.5b), and WAMKQ makes up the other 14.2857% ($0.5b/$3.5b).
* Each share of WAMPQ should get 18.6667 shares of the new company (65,333,333 shares * 85.7143% = 56,000,009 new company shares/3,000,000 WAMPQ shares),
* Each share of WAMKQ should get 0.4667 shares of the new company (65,333,333 shares * 14.2857% = 9,333,323 new company shares/20,000,000 WAMKQ shares)

* There are 1,704,958,913 shares of WAMUQ.
* Assuming no dilution from DIME and creditors wanting shares, WAMUQ are to get 60,000,000 shares (30% of 200,000,000 shares) of common stock in the new company.
* Each share of WAMUQ should get 0.0351914639 shares of the new company (60,000,000 shares / 1,704,958,913 shares).

* Therefore 1 WAMPQ has the same value/ownership in the new company as 530.4326 shares of WAMUQ does (18.6667/0.0351914639).
* Therefore 1 WAMKQ has the same value/ownership in the new company as 13.2617 shares of WAMUQ does (0.4667/0.0351914639).

REIT Series @ $4.0 Billion / 4,000 issued at $1,000,000.
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Was WMI' (the parent) Separate from WMB (the bank) at Seizure ?

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=5984.msg74649#msg74649

Zitat azcowboy:

From WMI's own SEC Filed report;

WMI (the parent) Operating Segments

"The Company has four operating segments for the purpose of management reporting: the Retail Banking Group, the Card Services Group, the Commercial Group and the Home Loans Group. The Company's operating segments are defined by the products and services they offer. The Retail Banking Group, the Card Services Group and the Home Loans Group are consumer-oriented while the Commercial Group serves commercial customers. In addition, the category of Corporate Support/Treasury and Other includes the community lending and investment operations; the Treasury function, which manages the Company's interest rate risk, liquidity position and capital; the Corporate Support function, which provides facilities, legal, accounting and finance, human resources and technology"

Off-Balance Sheet Activities

"The Company transforms loans into securities through a process known as securitization. When the Company securitizes loans, the loans are usually sold to a qualifying special-purpose entity ("QSPE"), typically a trust. The QSPE, in turn, issues securities, commonly referred to as asset-backed securities, which are secured by future cash flows on the sold loans. The QSPE sells the securities to investors, which entitle the investors to receive specified cash flows during the term of the security. The QSPE uses the proceeds from the sale of these securities to pay the Company for the loans sold to the QSPE. These QSPEs are not consolidated within the financial statements since they satisfy the criteria established by Statement No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities . In general, these criteria require the QSPE to be legally isolated from the transferor (the Company), be limited to permitted activities, and have defined limits on the types of assets it can hold and the permitted sales, exchanges or distributions of its assets."

       When the Company sells or securitizes loans that it originated, it generally retains the right to service the loans and may retain senior, subordinated, residual, and other interests, all of which are considered retained interests in the sold or securitized assets. Retained interests in mortgage loan securitizations, excluding the rights to service such loans, were $1.23 billion at June 30, 2008, of which $1.13 billion are of investment-grade quality. Retained interests in credit card securitizations were $1.56 billion at June 30, 2008, of which $421 million are of investment-grade quality. Additional information concerning the pretax gains, cash flows, servicing fees, principal and interest received on and valuation of retained interests and loan repurchases, in each case, arising from the Company's securitization activities is included in Note 7 to the Consolidated Financial Statements – "Securitizations" in the Company's 2007 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A. Additional information concerning the revenue and expenses from the sales and servicing of home mortgage loans, including the effects of derivative risk management instruments is included in Note 8 to the Consolidated Financial Statements – "Mortgage Banking Activities" in the Company's 2007 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A. "

http://www.otcmarkets.com/edgar/GetFilingHtml?FilingID=6093324
__________________________________________________
Well, though I am not a self proclaimed ... "genius" ... as referred to earlier on this MB, ... I am a self proclaimed ... "dumb ass biker" ... that was at least smart enough & listened' attentively when ... EVEN ol'  Rosen said, "don't forget to sign those releases"

I guess Rosie was talkin' only to the equity people' .... since that statement would not have mattered to any of the creditor classes' ... right?
just sayin'

AZ
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Email string from the FDIC claims Department

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6102.msg76750#msg76750

ZItat Skidor:

Read from the bottom up.

XXXXX,

For that kind of information you will have to file a FOIA (Freedom of Information request). You can find out how to do that at www.fdic.gov and scroll to the bottom of the page.

Linda

From: XXXX Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 1:58 PM To: Dividends Subject: Re: Washington Mutual

Linda, Do you know how I can find out if the FDIC has assets to be liquidated? We are coming up on the six year anniversary of the failure. Do you know if they have liquidated assets in the past and if they would show in the balance sheet summary? Thank you, XXXX

On Tue, Sep 2, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Dividends wrote:

Kevin,

The answer is we don"t have any assets in liquidation at this time. It doesn"t mean we don"t have any assets at all, just not liquidating any at the moment.

Linda

From: XXXX Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 10:52 AM

To: Dividends Subject: Re: Washington Mutual

Linda,

Do you know why the balance sheet has $0s under Assets in Liquidation and Due from FDIC Corp and Receivables? I looked at several other failed banks and most have amounts there? Thank You, XXXX

On Tue, Sep 2, 2014 at 4:52 AM, Dividends wrote: XXXX,

Sorry for the bad link. If you go to www.fdic.gov you can search for " failed bank list". Scroll down until you see Washington Mutual. Click on it and you will see a menu of the times you can look at.

Linda

From: XXXX Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 9:41 AM To: Dividends Subject: Re: Washington Mutual

Linda, Can you please check the link you sent over? It is not valid. Thanks, XXXX

On Tue, Sep 2, 2014 at 2:25 AM, Dividends wrote:

Good morning:

The Washington Mutual (WAMU) receivership is not scheduled for termination any time soon. You can visit the web site for the receivership at www.fdicfhttp://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/...htmlailedinstititons. You can search for the Washington Mutual receivership and locate a financial statement for the receivership.

Linda Shaw

Claims Department

From: XXXXX Sent: Monday, September 01, 2014 7:58 PM To: Dividends Subject: Washington Mutual

Do you expect to pay any dividends from Washington Mutual once the termination of P&A agreement is effective? Do you have a place we can view the liabilities and assets of WAMUs estate?

Thank you, XXXX -------------------------------------------------- Zitatende MfG.L:)

So; ~ Is The Recent Research Flawed ?

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6098.msg76692#msg76692

Zitat azcowboy:
As everyone, now knows, after I began a study of the WaMu Loan File, WaMu's Mortgage Backed Security's, and Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,  I came to the conclusion that even beyond the Loan File, which JPMorgan had only become the designated servicing entity, .... JPMorgan also, DID NOT receive ownership of all of WaMu's assets ... Primarily, the Loan File, and then other assets as the Receivership begins to disclose.

I kept waiting for someone to prove these findings to be wrong or flawed, and again, as everyone now knows and as additional information was discovered by others, the facts became even more emboldened ....

.... I read most of everyones thoughts and I came to a conclusion ....

The information presented here, regarding the operational procedures and the separations between the bankruptcy and the FDIC-R's responsibilities are not flawed' .... no one has presented anything solid to discredit the basis for these findings and assumptions

After reading Myadads thread a few more times, a consistant pattern arose and it became apparent that the reasoning behind any disbelief or skepticism, is simply not based on any procedural flaw, but that no one from the skeptical side of the group, believes that it is possible for equity to be treated fairly .... treated fairly, by of course the current same involved entities ...

... So, I just wanted to say' .... "Okay' I get that" ....

... So, I still believe the procedural issues are solid and that the Bankruptcy is a separate issue from "R"s handling of the finalization as "R" moves into play, soon within Tranche 5 ...

... Will equity still be cheated somehow ? .... Maybe I guess, anything is possible, ... however I have to put my faith not only in the system' .. but in the snh's, their attorneys, and S&G as well' .. for that next and final phase which is soon to come, as we approach the six year mark' ...

As many know, I began with a study of plan 6, through mediation and the transition to the approved plan 7 ... there aren't a lot of differences except mainly, the reversal of the Payout Matrix and the addition of equity within Tranche 6 .... So I have been looking at this whole deal from a standpoint of the snh's initial plan ... (generally, Big Players want Big Returns)

I figure their (snh's) plan is still alive and well, which now includes equity. .... WE (equity) may have prolonged their plan, but In my opinion, their plan will begin to be realized quite shortly' ....

AZ
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

One of the considerations to WMI --- Mortgage Loans

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6103.msg76758#msg76758

Zitat noname:

From DS supplement, page 71/301 c.

As set forth in more detail in the Global Settlement Agreement, JPMC will cause its affiliates to continue providing loan servicing with respect to certain mortgage loans owned by the Debtors or their affiliates and the remittal of checks and payments received in connection therewith. -------------------------------------------------- Zitatende MfG.L:)

3 Qs on LT

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6086.msg76508#msg76508

Zitat noname:

Just reading thru LT agreement.

1. Where is from LT is expecting assets page 15?

2. What are diffent classes of LTIs page8?

3. Why did LT needed tax info of class 19 and class 22?, no clauses mentioned page19 -----------------------------

http://www.wmitrust.com/WMITrust

Important Documents

WMI Liquidating Trust Agreement - Executed Version

------------------------------

For 1. 4.14 Reports. (a) The Liquidating Trustee shall deliver reports to members of the Trust Advisory Board not later than thirty (30) days following the end of each fiscal quarter. Such reports shall specify in reasonable detail (i) the status of any Causes of Action, Claims and litigation involving the Liquidating Trust or the Liquidating Trust Assets, including, without limitation, Avoidance Actions, including any settlements entered into by the Liquidating Trust, (ii) the costs and expenses of the Liquidating Trust that are incurred (including, but not limited to, any Taxes imposed on the Liquidating Trust or actual reasonable out-of-pocket fees and expenses incurred by Trust Professionals in connection with the administration and liquidation of the Liquidating Trust Assets and preservation of books and records as provided in Section 4.10 hereof) during the preceding fiscal quarter and the remaining amount (if any) of the Administrative Funding and the Litigation Funding, (iii) the amounts listed in clause (ii) incurred since the Effective Date, (iv) the amount of Cash andother assets received by the Liquidating Trust during the prior fiscal quarter, (v) the Liquidating Trustee"s estimate as of the end of the most recent fiscal quarter of the uncollected Tax Refunds and all other Liquidating Trust Assets, (vi) the aggregate amount of Cash and other assets received by the Liquidating Trust since the Effective Date, (vii) the calculation of the estimated amount of the Cash and other assets to be distributed on the next Distribution Date, including any Cash on hand that is not to be distributed pursuant to Section 4.3(a) above, (viii) the aggregate amount of distributions from the Liquidating Trust to the Liquidating Trust Beneficiaries since the Effective Date, and (ix) such other information as the Trust Advisory Board or the Litigation Subcommittee may reasonably request from time to time. The Liquidating Trustee shall also timely prepare, file and distribute such additional statements, reports and submissions (A) as may be necessary to cause the Liquidating Trust and the Liquidating Trustee to be in compliance with applicable law or (B) as may be otherwise reasonably requested from time to time by the Trust Advisory Board

-----------------------------

For 2. (c) Registration. If the Liquidating Trustee, with the consent of the Trust Advisory Board and upon advice of counsel, determines that any class of Liquidating Trust Interests may be subject to registration pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), the Liquidating Trustee shall pursue relief from such registration by obtaining either an exemptive order, a noaction letter or an interpretive letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff or, absent its ability to achieve that objective or in lieu thereof, shall register such class pursuant to section 12 of such statute (it being understood and agreed that the Liquidating Trustee with the consent of the Trust Advisory Board shall be authorized, among other things, to register such class and to seek relief from one or more of the requirements then applicable subsequent to such registration and to de-register such class). To the extent that any Administrative Funding is available, any expenses that are associated with such application for relief and/or registration shall first be deducted from the Administrative Funding.

-----------------------------

For 3. 5.4 Tax Withholdings by Liquidating Trustee. The Liquidating Trustee may withhold and pay to the appropriate Tax Authority all amounts required to be withheld pursuant to the IRC or any provision of any foreign, state or local tax law with respect to any payment or distribution to the holders of Liquidating Trust Interests. All such amounts withheld and paid to the appropriate Tax Authority (or placed in escrow pending resolution of the need to withhold) shall be treated as amounts distributed to such holders of Liquidating Trust Interests for all purposes of the Trust Agreement. The Liquidating Trustee shall be authorized to collect such tax information from the holders of Liquidating Trust Interests (including, without limitation, social security numbers or other tax identification numbers) as in its sole discretion the Liquidating Trustee deems necessary to effectuate the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and the Trust Agreement. In order to receive distributions under the Plan, all holders of Liquidating Trust Interests (including, without limitation, holders of Allowed Senior Notes Claims, Allowed Senior Subordinated Notes Claims, Allowed CCB-1 Guarantees Claims, Allowed CCB-2 Guarantees Claims, Allowed General Unsecured Claims,

Allowed Late- Filed Claims, Allowed PIERS Claims, Allowed WMB Senior Notes Claims,

Allowed Preferred Equity Interests, Allowed Common Equity Interests, holders of Dime Warrants, and Accepting Non-Filing WMB Senior Note Holders, who in each case, deliver a release in accordance with the provisions of Section 41.6 of the Plan) shall be required to identify themselves to the Liquidating Trustee and provide tax information and the specifics of their holdings, to the extent the Liquidating Trustee deems appropriate in the manner and in accordance with the procedures from time to time established by the Liquidating Trustee for these purposes. T

-----------------------------

So somebody is supplying assets on a quarterly basis, who could be it?. :-) ----------------------------------------------

Zitat rockwell:

1. The Trust (or is it WMIH) has a cash reserve it is holding to pay claims which are awaiting resolution. If claims get resolved in favor of WMIH then that money that would've went to claim holders instead goes to holders of trust interests. The trust could also get money from litigation with parties (but I think this has turned to a dead-end road). 2. Classes of LTIs correspond to the bankruptcy creditor/equity classes. Senior bond holders with LTIs are getting their LTIs paid off before equity holder LTIs, etc, etc 3. I don't know. But I'm guessing the trust subtracts federal taxes from any distributions. The trust has received nothing from the FDIC WMB receivership to date. The receivership has paid no dividends to date.

------------------------------

Zitatende

MfG.L:)

wie hoch war er nun wirklich, der Wert der "übernommenen" Wamu Bank ....

ältere Artikel erinneren manchmal daran:

Wamu mortgages worth 239 billion at time of seizure

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6119.msg77193#msg77193

Zitat peterlong:

JPMorgan Chase to Buy Washington Mutual

By Christopher Palmeri September 26, 2008
   

In a deal brokered by the federal government, JPMorgan Chase will pay $1.9 billion for deposits and branches. WaMu depositors will be protected

Washington Mutual's long, drawn-out struggle to find a buyer came to an end late Thursday, Sept. 25, when it was announced that the nation's largest savings and loan would be bought by an even larger rival, JPMorgan Chase (JPM). WaMu customers are not expected to see any disruption in service. The deal, brokered by federal regulators, resolves the largest bank failure in U.S. history. WaMu (WM) had $310 billion in assets.

Regulators have been trying desperately to prevent the kind of run on the bank that occurred when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. seized IndyMac bank in July. "They had to act," former banking exec William Seidman told CNBC. Seidman led America through a previous financial crisis as head of the government's Resolution Trust Corp. in the early 1990s. The FDIC will briefly take over WaMu's deposits and branches before handing them over to JPMorgan. In exchange, the FDIC will receive $1.9 billion. JPMorgan did not acquire claims by equity, subordinated and senior debt holders, the FDIC said.

The deal is a big win for Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan's CEO. The big bank lacks a strong presence on the West Coast. WaMu's 2,200 branches include top-three market-share positions in California and Washington State. Once combined with WaMu, JPMorgan will have No. 1 positions in New York, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, and Phoenix.

For his $1.9 billion, Dimon gets WaMu's deposits along with $176 billion of home loans, on which JPMorgan is expected to lose some $31 billion. These include home equity and options-ARM loans where losses exceed 20%. Dimon emphasized the branch network JPMorgan will pick up. "This builds a big franchise for us. The only negative in the thing was how to handle these bad assets. We think this deal is extremely compelling," he said.

Credit Quality Problems

WaMu had been trying to sell itself for several weeks. A half-dozen potential buyers kicked the tires. The big stumbling block was just what would happen with the bank's huge real estate loan portfolio, totaling some $239 billion. "They have a valuable franchise," Stuart Plesser, a banking analyst at Standard & Poor's, said. "This is a terrible credit-quality bank. Its problem had more to do with credit than deposits."

In a fact sheet it issued on the deal, the FDIC said all depositors will be fully protected. In a statement released late Thursday, WaMu's regulator, the federal Office of Thrift Supervision, said "business will proceed uninterrupted and bank branches will open on Friday morning as usual." OTS Director John Reich said "the housing market downturn had a significant impact on the performance of WaMu's mortgage portfolio and led to three straight quarters of losses totaling $6.1 billion." The OTS said "an outflow of deposits" began on Sept. 15 that totaled $16.7 billion. That left WaMu with "insufficient liquidity" and in "unsafe and unsound condition," the agency said.

The big losers are WaMu shareholders, who are wiped out. On Thursday afternoon, before the deal was announced, WaMu's stock price closed down 57¢, or 25%, to 1.69. Then, in after-hours trading, the shares lost another 73%, to 0.45. That's down from 36.47 last October.

The biggest WaMu shareholder is investor David Bonderman, who led a $7.2 billion private equity consortium that bought WaMu preferred stock in April. Bonderman had made a much more lucrative investment during the last savings and loan bust in the 1990s. Back then, he advised investor Robert Bass on his purchase of California's American Savings & Loan after the government agreed to take the bank's bad loans. American was later sold to WaMu at a sharp premium.

Customers Celebrate Takeover

Although WaMu is disappearing—presumably taking with it the distinctive "Whoo hoo!" slogan—some customers said they were relieved. "Chase should do a better job of it," says Julie Monroe, who has a WaMu mortgage. "I can fairly say that they have just gone downhill over the last couple of years," says William Kuntz, a longtime WaMu customer. "Good riddance."

Seattle-based WaMu had been drifting for weeks, and many depositors feared for its future. The bank had been anticipating $19 billion in loan losses over the next two and a half years; analysts said the losses could go as high as $28 billion. It was not immediately clear how those bad loans will be dealt with in the acquisition.

Although the bank's stock had been sliding amid record losses for more than a year, worries came to a head on Sept. 8, when longtime WaMu CEO Kerry Killinger was replaced by banking veteran Alan Fishman. WaMu stock continued to slide even after Fishman's appointment, as worries about the broadening financial crisis escalated. In September, Standard & Poor's cut WaMu's credit rating to below investment grade, or "junk."

No Laughing Matter

Under Killinger, WaMu pursued a strategy of being one of the largest mortgage lenders in the country. The firm expanded where federally chartered banks had once feared to tread, into subprime loans for borrowers with bad credit. WaMu offered exotic pay-option loans that allowed borrowers to roll many of their interest payments onto their principal instead of paying them. Before the merger news, Ladenburg Thalmann (LTS) banking analyst Richard Bove estimated the cost to taxpayers of a WaMu failure could have hit $24 billion.

In June, Killinger spoke before the Seattle Rotary Club. According to an account of his speech in The Seattle Times, Killinger acknowledged that the business of packaging loans for everything from home mortgages to credit-card debt had gone too far. "I think you guys could have gone out and securitized your coats and pants and shirts—somebody might have bought it," Killinger joked.

For WaMu shareholders and employees, though, the resulting meltdown was no laughing matter.

-----------------------------

Zitat sometimes_wrong:

"the bank's huge real estate loan portfolio, totaling some $239 billion..."

Is this not the loan value measured in late September, 2008 during the "Real Estate Bubble Meltdown, and therefore highly undervalued by at least a third of previous market value... and many local markets have since reflated close to, if not more than 2007 market levels?
-----------------------------

Zitat noname:

Total deposits: $188.3 billion
Brokered deposits: $34.04 billion
Total borrowings: $82.9 billion primarily comprising Federal Home Loan Bank
advances of $58.4 billion and $7.8 billion of subordinated debt
Loans held: $118.9 billion in single-family loans held for investment - this includes
$52.9 billion in payment option ARMs and $16.05 billion in subprime mortgage
loans
Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs): $53.4 billion
Credit Card Receivables: $10.6 billion
Total loan servicing: $689.7 billion total loans serviced, including $442.7 billion in
loans serviced for others and $26.3 billion of subprime mortgage loans
Non-performing assets: $11.6 billion, including $3.23 billion payment option ARMs
and $3.0 billion subprime mortgage loans
Institution History
WMI is the top-tier savings and loan holding company and owns two banking
subsidiaries, WMB and Washington Mutual Bank, fsb (WMBfsb), as well as nonbank
subsidiaries.
--------------------------------------------------

Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Zitat msinknox:

http://blogs.marketwatch.com/capitolreport/2014/...achs-analyst-says/

Just wondering if corporate tax reform will NEGATIVILY IMPACT the use of our valuable NOLS...

WMIH needs to "HURRY UP ALREADY" with it's strategy before new tax laws get passed that will decrease the value of our NOLS!
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Inhalt wurde warum auch immer damals von Ariva gelöscht ... (ich glaube mich errinnern zu können auf Anraten von User Anal aas oder so ähnlich ...)

Re: Unspecified damages on behalf of the failed banks.
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=5240.msg69054#msg69054

Zitat Dmdmd1:

More excerpts from the FSA Final Report published in 2012 regarding Barclays LIBOR scandal

PDF Page 18-19/44:

"Requests from external traders
81.  The examples given above relate to requests that were made by Barclays" Derivatives Traders to benefit their own trading positions. However Barclays" Derivatives Traders also made internal requests for EURIBOR and US Dollar LIBOR submissions based on the trading positions of traders at other banks who had asked them to pass requests on to Barclays" Submitters.

82.  At least 12 of the US dollar LIBOR requests made to Barclays" Submitters were made on behalf of external traders that had previously worked at Barclays and were now working at other banks (although those banks did not contribute US dollar LIBOR submissions).

83.  For example, on 26 October 2006, an external trader made a request for a lower three month US dollar LIBOR submission. The external trader stated in an email to Trader G at Barclays "If it comes in unchanged I"m a dead man". Trader G responded that he would "have a chat". Barclays" submission on that day for three month US dollar LIBOR was half a basis point lower than the day before, rather than being unchanged. The external trader thanked Trader G for Barclays" LIBOR submission later that day: "Dude. I owe you big time! Come over one day after work and I"m opening a bottle of Bollinger".

Attempts to influence other banks" submissions
88.  Barclays" Derivatives Traders attempted to influence the EURIBOR (and to a much lesser extent, US dollar LIBOR) submissions of other banks by making requests to external traders. One of the Derivatives Traders also embarked on co-ordinated strategies to align Barclays" positions with traders at other banks and to influence the EURIBOR rates published by the EBF.

89.  Between February 2006 and October 2007, Barclays" Derivatives Traders made at least 63 requests to external traders with the aim that those traders would pass on the requests for EURIBOR and US dollar LIBOR submissions to their banks" submitters. 56 of those requests related to EURIBOR submissions. Five Derivatives Traders made the requests to external traders.

CONCLUSIONS...IMO:

1) Barclays submitters not only manipulated the US LIBOR for their own benefit, but they also did it on behalf of other dervative traders from other banks.

2) Barclays traders also attempted to influence other submitters from the other banks.

3) The FDIC LIBOR complaint only mentions the 16 defendant banks of collusion and conspiracy to manipulate USD LIBOR, but it is obvious that other banks (other than the 16 defendant banks) were attempting and succeeding in manipulating USD LIBOR also.  I suspect that this conspiracy is so pervasive throughout the global financial world, that the FDIC and the other CLOSED BANKS should include other banks (other than the 16 defendant banks) as potential defendants.
-----------------------------
ZItat bgriffinokc:
"3) The FDIC LIBOR complaint only mentions the 16 defendant banks of collusion and conspiracy to manipulate USD LIBOR, but it is obvious that other banks (other than the 16 defendant banks) were attempting and succeeding in manipulating USD LIBOR also.  I suspect that this conspiracy is so pervasive throughout the global financial world, that the FDIC and the other CLOSED BANKS should include other banks (other than the 16 defendant banks) as potential defendants."


I'm sure that the FDIC could have added additional banks as defendants, however this group may be settle with enough money to Keep the FDIC under the radar for their theft of WAMU and possibly the other banks to enrich the big boys..  I'm not familiar with the other banks  that were harmed and whether or not their bankruptcies are fully discharged....research might reveal some interesting info....anyone game?  I'll research a third of them.
-----------------------------
ZItat Dmdmd1:
Payment = Notional Amount x (Fixed Rate - Floating Rate) x days/360


The ISDAfix scandal is similar to the LIBOR scandal in fact ISDAfix benchmark is incorporated in the formula referenced above.

The blue bold font "Fixed Rate" is the ISDAfix and the red bold font "Floating Rate" is the LIBOR benchmark.

In an article published on July 25, 2013, "Understanding the ISDAfix Controversy and Its Potential Impact" describes the scandal in detail.
http://voiceofdetroit.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/...ntial-Impact.pdf
PDF Pages 5-8:

"Possible impact of any ISDAfix manipulation on LIBOR damages

The LIBOR controversy has been thoroughly covered by various news media, academia and market observers. Here are the highlights of the latest legal and regulatory developments:

 Regulators around the globe are conducting multiple investigations into the alleged manipulation of LIBOR and Barclays, UBS and Royal Bank of Scotland have paid more than USD$2.5 billion in fines with more potential penalties to come from other banks.

 On March 29, Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald of the U.S. District Court of Southern District New York dismissed plaintiffs" federal antitrust and RICO claims.

 Partially in response to Judge Buchwald"s dismissal, a number of financial institutions have filed individual lawsuits in both state and federal court, including—among others—Freddie Mac, the Charles Schwab entities, The Berkshire Bank, Regents of the University of California and Salix Capital, alleging various fraud and contractual claims.9

Fixed to floating swaps—ongoing payments

The following example of a simple interest rate swap demonstrates how the manipulation of LIBOR and ISDAfix can together affect the value of a swap.

Assume that there is a $500 million swap that matures in 20 years, where a bank (Party A) makes a floating payment based on the LIBOR rate (3-month USD LIBOR paid quarterly) and receives a fixed rate of 5.9% (which was determined using ISDAfix) paid quarterly by a pension fund (Party B). Party A, would receive the same fixed quarterly payments from Party B for the life of the swap. This fixed payment is $7,273,97210. Assume further that on day 90, the end of the first quarter, the current 3-month USD LIBOR rate is 6.2%. This would mean that Party A would pay Party B $7,643,83511 and would receive $7,273,972. In net terms, the bank owes the pension fund $369,863. If, however, the bank had
manipulated the fixed rate and increased the relevant ISDAfix rate by five basis points (0.05 percent) to 5.95% at the beginning of the swap, the bank would have received an ill-gotten gain each quarter in the amount of $61,645 or $246,580 annually for a total manipulated gain of $4,931,600 for the life of the swap.12
Fixed to floating swaps—termination payments

Any manipulation of the ISDAfix rates would also likely impact the termination costs of a fixed to floating swap, depending on the facts and the terms of the trade. The calculation of the termination value of a fixed-to-floating swap is based on the following variables:

(i) the swap"s fixed rate;
(ii) the value of the referenced floating rate;
(iii) the notional amount;
(iv) the remaining term of the swap contract;
(v) the forward curve as of the valuation date; and
(vi) the discount rate to be used to calculate the present value.

The forward curve is updated daily based upon market trading conditions. Any manipulation of ISDAfix rates (or LIBOR, for the purposes of our example) most likely would have also affected the forward curve. A party assessing its damages from any potential rate manipulation should account for this in its analyses. Using the swap example above, if that trade was terminated after one year, a ten basis point (0.1 percent) manipulation of the interest rate could increase the termination
payment paid by the pension fund to the bank by nearly half a million dollars.13


Potential double dipping

If the bank in the above example was manipulating both LIBOR and ISDAfix, it was essentially double dipping, creating a "manipulation-on-manipulation" situation whereby the swap customers would have been paying for two different layers of price-fixing corruption. Using the same swap example to illustrate this potential double dipping, assuming that LIBOR stays constant but is manipulated by 5 bps
to the advantage of the bank and the fixed rate at the time the swap was entered into was also manipulated by 5 bps, the bank in our hypothetical would have received ill-gotten gains of $123,290 quarterly, $493,160 annually and $9,863,200 for life of the swap.

Evaluating the impact of ISDAfix manipulation

The example we used above was a fixed to floating swap but the potential impact from any ISDAfix manipulation is not limited to swaps. To state the obvious, all of the markets and products that rely on ISDAfix are potentially affected.

A financial institution that wants to conduct an internal assessment of any potential impact from ISDAfix manipulation would need to undertake an extensive review that would generally include:

 Review of the firm"s derivatives portfolio and ISDA documentation, including all trade confirms.

 Analysis of the firm"s interest rate exposure in its swap book based upon currency and duration.

 Categorization of the firm"s cash portfolio composition by asset types and identifying those with interest rate risk and potential exposure to ISDAfix.

 For public pension funds and any institution with liabilities in the form of annuities, a review of its pricing practices and procedures.

Possible areas of focus in the CFTC investigation

While the LIBOR controversy appeared in the mainstream with the Wall Street Journal"s April 16, 2008 article,14 the CFTC"s investigation into the ISDAfix rate setting process was only first reported this year. In fact, regulators have released no details about the full scope of the investigations, and, indeed, there may be no finding of any wrongdoing. Nonetheless, regulators are plowing ahead with the
ISDAfix inquiry, with the CFTC reportedly having issued subpoenas to ICAP and as many as fifteen Wall Street banks15 and reviewing one million emails and instant messages looking for evidence of manipulation and wrongdoing.16

We have identified two areas of potential interest to the CFTC. First, the CFTC may be looking for evidence of manipulation of the ISDAfix rates. This case would be fairly straightforward in following the blueprint of the LIBOR investigations. The two indices follow a similar setting process in their daily reporting and share some common characteristics. Second, the CFTC may be examining whether ICAP
delayed the reporting of swap rates to Screen 19901, for trades it has executed or matched, in order to provide a trading advantage to itself or another swap broker. While ICAP"s Screen 19901 is widely followed in the swaps market, this information differs from a reported index that holds itself to be representative of the market generally.

Conclusion

Quick glance of key publicly reported indices subject to regulatory investigations around the world:

Index                         USD LIBOR                         ISDAfix

Est. Market Size         $350 trillion                     $379 trillion

Investigation targets  LIBOR panel banks                 ISDAfix contributing banks
                                                                                 & ICAP



These indices and the markets to which they relate share a number of characteristics:

 Traders working in high-pressure environments where an unprofitable quarter or year can
mean job loss.

 Markets where advance (and accurate) information could be translated into millions of
dollars of profit.

 Indices that the market generally has trusted (and assumed) to be calculated in an objective manner and has therefore relied upon heavily.

Given the gargantuan sizes of the various markets that rely on ISDAfix for pricing, the temptation for manipulation can be overwhelming as even the smallest change could result in millions of dollars in ill-gotten gains. If the CFTC investigation reveals wrongdoing, the amount of damages in the ISDAfix controversy could rival and potentially surpass the LIBOR scandal."

Excerpts from another linked source:

http://www.marketswiki.com/mwiki/ISDAFIX


"ISDAFIX is derived from a process in which 15 banks submit bids and offers for swaps in various currencies and denominations. The contributors to ISDAFIX are Bank of America Corp., Barclays, BNP Paribas SA, Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., HSBC Holdings Plc, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Mizuho Financial Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, Nomura Holdings Inc., Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS and Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), according to ISDA.

Manipulation Scandal

In April 2013, several news outlets reported that the CFTC was investigating possible manipulation of the ISDAFIX rates and had issued subpoenas to ICAP and as many as 15 Wall Street banks. In August 2013, Bloomberg reported that U.S. investigators had uncovered evidence that banks made millions in trading profits at the expense of companies and pension funds by manipulating a the ISDAfix benchmark.[7]

The IDSAFIX investigation stemmed from the LIBOR manipulation scandal, in which fines were assessed and charges brought against numerous banks and bank employees for submitting inaccurate rate quotes in order to skew the published rate. The LIBOR investigation led to a reassessment of other financial benchmarks, including ISDAFIX. In April 2013, IOSCO published its Principles for Financial Benchmarks."

IMO...Conclusions:

1) With the possibility of double dipping the two scandals yield total market size of USD LIBOR ($350 trillion) + ISDAfix ($379 trillion) = $729 trillion.

2) As of August 2013 there have been evidence of ISDAfix rigging.

3) Some of the same defendant banks involved in the FDIC LIBOR scandal are possibly involved in the ISDAfix scandal.  Notice that Goldman Sachs, BNP Paribas, and Morgan Stanley are some of the contributing banks in the ISDAfix scandal.

4) WMILT should pursue the ISDAfix rigging scandal along with the current FDIC LIBOR scandal.
-----------------------------
Zitat Dmdmd1:
In this report, Barclays started manipulating LIBOR on January 2005.[/b]

dazu:
http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/05/27/...ays-idINL6N0OD3LG20140527
An excerpt from the May 27, 2014 article:

"LONDON, May 27 (Reuters) - Three ex-traders from banking group Barclays appeared in a London court on Tuesday as Britain began criminal proceedings against U.S.-based Libor traders, part of a global investigation into alleged rigging of benchmark interest rates.

The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) alleges that Jay Merchant, 43, a director of dollar fixed-income swaps, and interest-rate derivative traders Alex Pabon and Ryan Reich, aged 35 and 32 respectively, conspired together and with others to defraud between June 2005 and September 2007."

...

"But the inquiry into Libor and related Euribor rates has been gathering steam. British and U.S. watchdogs fined brokerage RP Martin $2.3 million two weeks ago to settle claims its staff helped manipulate Libor, and in March the SFO charged three former ICAP brokers."

IMO...Conclusions:

1)  New evidence will show in upcoming trials and investigations that the LIBOR rigging started before the alleged dates of August 2007 (the start date of the LIBOR rigging that is cited in the FDIC LIBOR complaint).

2)  LIBOR investigations are continuing and now the trials are just starting throughout the world.  More and more defendants are being added to the LIBOR scandal.
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=5240.msg69637#msg69637

Re: Unspecified damages on behalf of the failed banks.

Zitat Dmdmd1:

If you've been asking yourself: Why are swaps in existence, and why were the contributing banks so eagar to look the other way when LIBOR and ISDAfix rigging was discovered? First you have to understand what a swap is....then you'll see how easy it was for the contributing banks (the banks that determined LIBOR and ISDAFix) to reap so much profit from manipulating the benchmarks. The following link is the easiest and most comprehensive that I've seen :

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uVq384nqWqg

IMO....Conclusions:

1) Since the inception of swaps, it is clear that the contributing banks could easily manipulate the LIBOR and ISDAfix benchmarks without non-contributing banks or retail investors ever being able to do detect, much less, to rectify any wrongdoing even if they knew it was going on.

2) Too much profit for the contributing banks/brokers blinded them, thus their intrinsic regulatory processes were sacrificed for the greater greed for more profits, without having to do any real work other than manipulating the two benchmarks.

----------------------------

Zitat ron_66271:

without having to do any real work other than manipulating the two benchmarks.

Back to the original FDIC filing that states;

"In the suit filed Friday, the FDIC claimed the fixed rates caused the failed banks to pay higher prices for Libor-based financial products and to get lower interest payments from the defendants and others.

The FDIC alleges the banks committed fraud and violated U.S. antitrust laws in fixing the U.S. dollar Libor benchmark. It seeks unspecified damages on behalf of the failed banks, including punitive damages and triple damages for price-fixing. Most of the closed banks were relatively small, although one cited by the agency, Washington Mutual, was the nation"s largest thrift when it was taken over by FDIC in September 2008 In the suit filed Friday, the FDIC claimed the fixed rates caused the failed banks to pay higher prices for Libor-based financial products and to get lower interest payments from the defendants and others. The FDIC alleges the banks committed fraud and violated U.S. antitrust laws in fixing the U.S. dollar Libor benchmark. It seeks unspecified damages on behalf of the failed banks, including punitive damages and triple damages for price-fixing. Most of the closed banks were relatively small, although one cited by the agency, Washington Mutual, was the nation"s largest thrift when it was taken over by FDIC in September 2008" Who is litigating the LIBOR case for the FDIC, or said another way. What attorney firm represents the FDIC in the LIBOR case? The FDIC hires outside counsel.

-----------------------------

 Zitat Dmdmd1:

Ron, Are you referring to Dickstein & Shapiro?

http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/libor-complaint.pdf

Dickstein & Shapiro are also representing Freddie Mac in a LIBOR suit that was filed exactly one year prior to the FDIC LIBOR complaint, and in fact if you read the full 65 page suit filed in that case, it is very similar. In fact, most of the arguments in that suit are similar to the FDIC LIBOR suit.

I don't know the status of the Freddie Mac LIBOR suit, but it might be consolidated in a Multi-District Litigation (MDL) LIBOR case that was initially in favor of the Defendant banks ruled upon by Judge Naomi Buchwald of the Southern District of NY in 2013. The current status of that MDL is an appeal to the US Supreme Court, because the individual parties that were consoldiated in that suit were not allowed to immediately appeal to the 2nd Circuit due to the fact that some of the planitiffs' cases that were consolidated in that MDL were not fully ruled upon.

http://www.law360.com/articles/533278/...circuit-split-with-libor-mdl

It's very confusing, but as of April 30, 2014, the OTC plantiffs appealed to the US Supreme Court for the right of individual plaintiff parties to directly appeal to the 2nd Circuit Court if those parties are involved in an MDL where not all the plaintiffs' suits were ruled upon by the lower district court.

BTW....the name of that suit is:

Ellen Gelboim and Linda Zacher et al.v. Credit Suisse Group AG et al., case number 13-1174 Excerpts:

"Law360, New York (April 30, 2014, 6:27 PM ET) -- Institutional investors who brought antitrust claims against several major banks accused of rigging the London Interbank Offered Rate urged the U.S. Supreme Court on Friday to review a circuit split over whether parties whose suits are dismissed from in consolidated litigation can appeal immediately. A group of cities, pension funds and others known as the over-the-counter plaintiffs in the multidistrict litigation over Libor-rigging said the justices should review the Second Circuit's refusal to hear appeals from the plaintiffs whose antitrust suits were entirely dismissed from the litigation.

The so-called OTC plaintiffs lodged an amicus brief [Amicus briefs are legal documents filed in appellate court cases by non-litigants with a strong interest in the subject matter. The briefs advise the court of relevant, additional information or arguments that the court might wish to consider. Briefs can also focus the court"s attention on the implications of a potential holding on an industry, group, or jurisdiction not represented by the parties. The court has discretion to grant or deny permission of parties to file briefs as amici curiae. A well-written amicus brief can have a significant impact on judicial decision-making. Cases are occasionally decided on grounds suggested by an amicus, decisions may rely on information or factual analysis provided only by an amicus, and holdings may be narrower or broader than parties have urged because of a persuasive amicus brief.] backing a bid for certiorari another group of Libor plaintiffs filed in March. Those bondholder plaintiffs argued the Second Circuit was wrong to deny their appeal simply because a final order had not yet been entered in the lower court"s MDL case."

.... "The amicus plaintiffs are represented by Drew D. Hansen, Marc M. Seltzer, Barry C. Barnett, Arun Subramanian, William Christopher Carmody and Seth Ard of Susman Godfrey LLP and by Joseph W. Cotchett and Nanci E. Nishimura of Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy LLP."

IMO...My assumption is that the "amicus plantiffs" might be referring to the FDIC LIBOR case because it was filed on March 14, 2014 and the fact that Susman Godfrey, specifically Seth Ard is involved. One of the lead counsels to that suit is Susman Godfrey....and one of the lawyers listed is Seth Ard (WAMU Equity Committee attorney during the BK proceedings). IMO....I have a feeling that Seth Ard is well versed as to the contributing factor that LIBOR rigging had on WAMU's demise.

For those interested in reading the whole article from Law360:

"Supreme Court Urged To End Circuit Split With Libor MDL By Melissa Lipman Law360, New York (April 30, 2014, 6:27 PM ET)

-- Institutional investors who brought antitrust claims against several major banks accused of rigging the London Interbank Offered Rate urged the U.S. Supreme Court on Friday to review a circuit split over whether parties whose suits are dismissed from in consolidated litigation can appeal immediately. A group of cities, pension funds and others known as the over-the-counter plaintiffs in the multidistrict litigation over Libor-rigging said the justices should review the Second Circuit's refusal to hear appeals from the plaintiffs whose antitrust suits were entirely dismissed from the litigation. The so-called OTC plaintiffs lodged an amicus brief backing a bid for certiorari another group of Libor plaintiffs filed in March. Those bondholder plaintiffs argued the Second Circuit was wrong to deny their appeal simply because a final order had not yet been entered in the lower court"s MDL case. "This case will enable this court to resolve the conflict in the courts of appeals regarding whether a party in an action consolidated for pretrial purposes with other actions may pursue an immediate appeal after a district court dismisses its action in full," the OTC plaintiffs wrote. The dispute stems from a March 2013 decision by U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald to dismiss the majority of the claims in the consolidated litigation, including the antitrust claims brought by the bondholders and the OTC plaintiffs. Lead bondholder plaintiffs Ellen Gelboim and Linda Zacher filed their suit on behalf of purchasers of bonds with Libor-linked interest rates in February 2012, alleging a single Sherman Act violation claim. Their suit was later consolidated into a sprawling MDL against the banks in New York federal court. After Judge Buchwald's ruling, the plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, but were told that the court lacked jurisdiction because a final order had not yet been issued in the lower court"s MDL. In Friday's amicus brief, the OTC plaintiffs — which include the mayor and City Council of Baltimore and the regents of the University of California, among others — emphasized that Judge Buchwald had dismissed the litigation in its entirety and refused to allow the plaintiffs to take another shot at their antitrust claims. "If petitioners" action were not consolidated for pretrial purposes with other actions, petitioners clearly would have the right to an immediate appeal," the brief said. "However, petitioners" action was consolidated for pretrial purposes under the authority of the multidistrict litigation statute ... and in some circuits (including the Second Circuit) consolidation has been held to impair one"s appellate rights." That consolidation would likewise create problems in the Federal, Ninth and Tenth circuits, but wouldn't have blocked an immediate appeal in the D.C., First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh circuits, according to the amicus brief. "The split exists because some courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit, have ignored this court"s direction that 'consolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administration, but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another,'" the OTC plaintiffs wrote. The OTC plaintiffs further argued that the process of getting a case certified for appeal was "irrelevant" because the MDL process does not merge separate claims into a single lawsuit. "The circuits that deny immediate appeals in situations such as petitioners" base their holdings on policy rather than statute or rule," the OTC plaintiffs argued. "And even as to policy, they fail to acknowledge that the concerns behind the policy against piecemeal review are absent in these situations, while the danger of delayed final adjudication — possibly by several years—is very real." An attorney for the defendants was not immediately available for comment Wednesday. The defendants — which include Bank of America Corp., Credit Suisse Group AG and other major banks involved in setting the influential benchmark rate — have not yet responded to the cert petition. The amicus plaintiffs are represented by Drew D. Hansen, Marc M. Seltzer, Barry C. Barnett, Arun Subramanian, William Christopher Carmody and Seth Ard of Susman Godfrey LLP and by Joseph W. Cotchett and Nanci E. Nishimura of Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy LLP. Plaintiffs are represented by Thomas C. Goldstein and Tejinder Singh of Goldstein & Russell PC, Karen Lisa Morris of Morris and Morris LLC. and David H. Weinstein of Weinstein Kitchenoff & Asher LLC. The bank defendants are represented by Hogan Lovells, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Covington & Burling LLP, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, Locke Lord LLP, Sidley Austin LLP, Gibson Dunn, and Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, among others. The suit is Ellen Gelboim and Linda Zacher et al.v. Credit Suisse Group AG et al., case number 13-1174, in the U.S. Supreme Court. --Additional reporting by Allissa Wickham. Editing by Chris Yates. "

----------------------------

Zitat ron_66271:

Maybe it's time for a re-read. Now with the Employee Claimants 'Golden Parachutes' issue back in BK court. Are the Employees responsible for WaMu's demise?

----------------------------

Zitat Dmdmd1:

Thanks to Deek for posting this article link which was published Sept. 08, 2014 regarding ISDAfix earlier this morning in the Off Topics section of this forum:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-08/...riminal-rate-rigging.html

Excerpts:

"Criminal Prosecution

The CFTC can only bring civil charges. When it suspects criminal prosecution is warranted, it sends the case to the Justice Department, which doesn"t have to accept the referral.

By rigging the measure, the banks stood to profit on separate derivatives trades known as swaptions they had with clients who were seeking to hedge against moves in interest rates. Banks sought to change the value of the interest-rate swaps because the ISDAfix rate sets prices for swaptions, which are used by firms such as the Alaska Electrical Pension Fund, a person familiar with the matter said last year. That may run afoul of the Dodd-Frank Act, a U.S. law passed in 2010 that bars traders from intentionally interfering with the "orderly execution" of transactions that determine settlement prices. Skyscrapers, Annuities ISDAfix rates were created in 1998 by ISDA and the predecessors of Thomson Reuters and ICAP to allow for swap trades to be settled before the termination of their contract. It"s also used to price trades in the $49 trillion swaptions market, as well as borrowing costs on bonds that finance skyscrapers to interest on annuities and structured notes. In the first lawsuit brought in the case, the Alaskan pension fund claimed the banks colluded to set ISDAfix at artificial levels that allowed them to manipulate payments to investors in the derivatives. The banks" actions affected trillions of dollars of financial instruments tied to the benchmark, the pension fund said. The banks communicated using electronic chat rooms and other means of private communication, typically submitting identical rate quotes beginning at least in 2009, the Alaska fund said. "Astronomical" Odds "This could not have happened without some form of advanced coordination," the Alaska fund said in its complaint, filed in a federal court in Manhattan. "Even if reporting banks always responded similarly to market conditions, the odds against contributors unilaterally submitting the exact same quotes down to the thousandth of a basis point are astronomical. Yet, this happened almost every single day between at least 2009 and December 2012." The near-identical bank submissions to ISDAfix ended in late 2012, the fund said. The original CFTC subpoenas to ICAP and the banks were issued in November of that year, a person familiar with the matter said last year. The pension fund is seeking to represent all investors that took part in interest rate derivative transactions tied to ISDAfix from January 2006 to January 2014. It"s seeking unspecified damages, which may be tripled under U.S. antitrust law. The fund also named as defendants Deutsche Bank AG (DBK), BNP Paribas SA (BNP), HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA), Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN), UBS (UBSN), Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), Nomura Holdings Inc. (8604), Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) and JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and ICAP." Conclusions...IMO:

1) Alaskan Pension Fund is going to get more plantiffs to join this battle regarding ISDAfix against the defendants....IMO....the FDIC or WMILT will add ISDAfix along with the LIBOR cases to potential third party litigation in the future.

----------------------------

Zitat deekshant:

Thanks Dmd for putting this together. I was myself looking for the difference between the two but couldn't separate it out. From the given example below, at least we can understand what it amounts to

"Page 5

"The following example of a simple interest rate swap demonstrates how the manipulation of LIBOR and ISDAfix can together affect the value of a swap.

Assume that there is a $500 million swap that matures in 20 years, where a bank (Party A) makes a floating payment based on the LIBOR rate (3-month USD LIBOR paid quarterly) and receives a fixed rate of 5.9% (which was determined using ISDAfix) paid quarterly by a pension fund (Party B). Party A,would receive the same fixed quarterly payments from Party B for the life of the swap. This fixed payment is $7,273,97210. Assume further that on day 90, the end of the first quarter, the current 3-month USD LIBOR rate is 6.2%. This would mean that Party A would pay Party B $7,643,83511 and would receive $7,273,972. In net terms, the bank owes the pension fund $369,863. If, however, the bank had manipulated the fixed rate and increased the relevant ISDAfix rate by five basis points (0.05 percent) to 5.95% at the beginning of the swap, the bank would have received an ill-gotten gain each quarter in the amount of $61,645 or $246,580 annually for a total manipulated gain of $4,931,600 for the life of the swap."

http://voiceofdetroit.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/...ntial-Impact.pdf --------------------------------------------------

Zitatende

MfG.L:)

wie User Kroete schon richtig bemerkt hat ist das Short Voümen am 09.09.2014 auf 0 gewesen !

http://otcshortreport.com/...?index=WMIH&action=view#.UtlJWuWIVFn

Sep 09 0% 2.73 2.65 2.71 0 98,100
Sep 08 0.86% 2.73 2.70 2.72 365 42,426
Sep 05 15.91% 2.73 2.65 2.70 20,339 127,828
Sep 04 10.81% 2.75 2.68 2.74 6,293 58,201
Sep 03 35.62% 2.75 2.70 2.74 61,900 173,787
Sep 02 10.33% 2.77 2.65 2.75 9,035 87,433
Aug 29 16.31% 2.75 2.65 2.75 20,744 127,213
Aug 28 10.89% 2.80 2.70 2.72 12,668 116,278
Aug 27 11.64% 2.78 2.70 2.75 9,769 83,907
Aug 26 25.57% 2.87 2.70 2.70 47,404 185,410
Aug 25 13.48% 2.85 2.77 2.81 12,464 92,444
Aug 22 0.43% 2.84 2.76 2.84 400 93,126
Aug 21 15.19% 2.81 2.72 2.77 5,141 33,840
Aug 20 34.64% 2.80 2.70 2.77 30,736 88,732
Aug 19 31.00% 2.78 2.70 2.71 18,522 59,741
Aug 18 11.18% 2.73 2.70 2.73 9,918 88,704
Aug 15 19.50% 2.72 2.68 2.71 46,075 236,296
Aug 14 6.94% 2.72 2.65 2.72 12,721 183,304
Aug 13 10.16% 2.72 2.60 2.71 10,285 101,278
Aug 12 7.84% 2.72 2.68 2.72 12,038 153,462
Aug 11 51.06% 2.72 2.69 2.72 52,743 103,296


MfG.L:)

WMI Holdings Corp. FORM 8-K WMMR AS OF 7/31/14

WM MORTGAGE REINSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
UNAUDITED CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET
AS OF JULY 31, 2014

http://archive.fast-edgar.com//20140910/...RK2ZZ2H2A22XSM9PQZZ22ZS62/


MfG.L:)

https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cb/web/pl/...a982a0ce2c5ddd6592bfa2dabdfc

MfG.L:)

FDIC All Summary Information - Washington Mutual Bank
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6152.msg77770#msg77770
Zitat Kszabo:

Washington Mutual Bank
2273 N. Green Valley Pkwy.
Henderson, NV 89014
FDIC Certificate #: 32633   Bank Charter Class: SA
Definition    Dollar figures in thousands    
Washington Mutual Bank
Henderson, NV
June 30, 2008
 
Washington Mutual Bank
Henderson, NV
June 30, 2007
    All Summary Information
    Assets and Liabilities      
1   Total employees (full-time equivalent)    41,360   47,384
2   Total assets    307,021,614   311,053,133
3   Cash and due from depository institutions    5,236,368   4,099,890
4   Interest-bearing balances    1,833,078   207,282
5   Securities    25,905,261   27,860,442
6   Federal funds sold & reverse repurchase agreements    2,750,000   3,267,343
7   Net loans & leases    233,160,128   232,794,466
8   Loan loss allowance    8,435,399   1,560,088
9   Trading account assets    2,172,260   5,391,458
10   Bank premises and fixed assets    2,542,547   2,903,597
11   Other real estate owned    1,534,287   764,708
12   Goodwill and other intangibles    13,779,471   16,731,004
13   All other assets    19,941,292   17,240,225
14   Total liabilities and capital    307,021,614   311,053,133
15   Total liabilities    282,641,867   283,352,363
16   Total deposits    188,260,793   203,416,782
17   Interest-bearing deposits    181,434,211   199,332,800
18   Deposits held in domestic offices    188,260,793   203,416,782
19   % insured    N/A   N/A
20   Federal funds purchased & repurchase agreements    288,851   12,747,396
21   Trading liabilities    N/A   N/A
22   Other borrowed funds    74,728,236   46,773,483
23   Subordinated debt    7,861,598   8,303,711
24   All other liabilities    11,502,389   12,110,991
25   Total equity capital    24,379,747   27,700,770
26   Total bank equity capital    24,379,747   27,700,770
27   Perpetual preferred stock    0   179,275
28   Common stock    331   329
29   Surplus    28,235,896   24,033,390
30   Undivided profits    -3,856,480   3,487,776
31   Noncontrolling interests in consolidated subsidiaries    N/A   N/A
   Memoranda:
32   Noncurrent loans and leases    10,025,164   3,688,279
33   Noncurrent loans that are wholly or partially guaranteed by the U.S. government    78,274   118,315
34   Income earned, not collected on loans    1,454,060   1,742,793
35   Earning assets    265,820,727   269,520,991
36   Long-term assets (5+ years)    N/A   N/A
37   Average Assets, year-to-date    316,884,741   324,986,366
38   Average Assets, quarterly    312,422,783   314,674,170
39   Total risk weighted assets    237,167,056   238,104,512
40   Adjusted average assets for leverage capital purposes    299,945,115   301,394,032
41   Life insurance assets    5,072,534   4,883,094
42   General account life insurance assets    N/A   N/A
43   Separate account life insurance assets    N/A   N/A
44   Hybrid life insurance assets    N/A   N/A
45   Volatile liabilities    94,635,776   92,356,068
46   Insider loans    635   677
47   FHLB advances    58,363,124   21,411,636
48   Loans and leases held for sale    N/A   N/A
49   Unused loan commitments    100,607,420   163,356,616
50   Tier 1 (core) risk-based capital    19,932,019   19,378,698
51   Tier 2 risk-based capital    9,590,963   9,597,184
52   Total unused commitments    105,262,399   186,706,216
53   Derivatives    N/A   N/A
   Restructured Loans and leases        
   Past due and nonaccrual assets        
   Fiduciary and related services        
    Income and Expense   (Year-to-date)   (Year-to-date)
54   Number of institutions reporting    1   1
55   Total interest income    8,986,179   9,938,474
56   Total interest expense    4,160,604   5,399,530
57   Net interest income    4,825,575   4,538,944
58   Provision for loan and lease losses    9,422,769   606,318
59   Total noninterest income    2,505,564   3,848,902
60   Fiduciary activities    N/A   N/A
61   Service charges on deposit accounts    N/A   N/A
62   Trading account gains & fees    -375,451   -82,643
63   Additional noninterest income    2,881,015   3,931,545
64   Total noninterest expense    4,562,740   5,345,615
65   Salaries and employee benefits    1,867,693   2,006,020
66   Premises and equipment expense    761,578   709,088
67   Additional noninterest expense    1,933,469   2,630,507
68   Pre-tax net operating income    -6,654,370   2,435,913
69   Securities gains (losses)    -493,055   359,166
70   Applicable income taxes    -2,874,774   955,654
71   Income before extraordinary items    -4,272,651   1,839,425
72   Extraordinary gains - net    0   0
73   Net income attributable to bank    -4,272,651   1,839,425
74   Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests    N/A   N/A
75   Net income attributable to bank and noncontrolling interests    N/A   N/A
76   Net charge-offs    3,557,315   676,247
77   Cash dividends    0   3,858,350
78   Sale, conversion, retirement of capital stock, net    0   0
79   Net operating income    -3,957,096   1,602,375
   Memo:
   Gross fiduciary and related services income        
    Performance and Condition Ratios      
80   % of unprofitable institutions    N/A   N/A
81   % of institutions with earnings gains    N/A   N/A
                Performance Ratios (%, annualized)   (Year-to-date)   (Year-to-date)
82   Yield on earning assets    6.51%   7.01%
83   Cost of funding earning assets    3.01%   3.81%
84   Net interest margin    3.50%   3.20%
85   Noninterest income to assets    1.58%   2.37%
86   Noninterest expense to assets    2.88%   3.29%
87   Loan and lease loss provision to assets    5.95%   0.37%
88   Net operating income to assets    -2.50%   0.99%
89   Return on assets (ROA)    -2.70%   1.13%
90   Pretax return on assets    -4.51%   1.72%
91   Return on equity (ROE)    -34.05%   12.89%
92   Retained earnings to average equity (YTD only)    -34.05%   -14.15%
93   Net charge-offs to loans and leases    2.88%   0.54%
94   Loan and lease loss provision to net charge-offs    264.88%   89.66%
95   Earnings coverage of net loan charge-offs (x)    0.78   4.50
96   Efficiency ratio    61.32%   62.79%
97   Assets per employee ($ millions)    7.42   6.56
98   Cash dividends to net income (YTD only)    0   209.76%
   Condition Ratios (%)
99   Loss allowance to loans and leases    3.49%   0.67%
100   Loss allowance to noncurrent loans and leases    84.14%   42.30%
101   Noncurrent assets plus other real estate owned to assets    3.76%   1.43%
102   Noncurrent loans to loans    4.15%   1.57%
103   Net loans and leases to assets    75.94%   74.84%
104   Net loans and leases to deposits    123.85%   114.44%
105   Net loans and leases to core deposits    138.26%   136.47%
106   Domestic deposits to total assets    61.32%   65.40%
107   Equity capital to assets    7.94%   8.91%
108   Core capital (leverage) ratio    7.07%   7.02%
109   Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio    8.40%   8.14%
110   Total risk-based capital ratio    12.44%   12.17%
   Memoranda:
111   Average assets    316,884,741   324,986,366
112   Average earning assets    276,040,334   283,682,444
113   Average equity    25,094,109   28,542,875
114   Average loans    246,909,288   249,419,793

Definition    Demographic Information    September 4, 2014    June 30, 2008    June 30, 2007
1      Status    Inactive    Active    Active
2    Bank Holding Company (Regulatory Top Holder)    See Note!      
3      Certificate#    32633    32633    32633
4      Federal Reserve ID Number    1222108    1222108    1222108
5      Institution Name    Washington Mutual Bank    Washington Mutual Bank    Washington Mutual Bank
6      City,State,Zip    Henderson, NV, 89014    Henderson, NV, 89014    Henderson, NV, 89014
7      Number of Domestic Offices         2292    2211
8      Number of Foreign Offices         N/A    N/A
9      Interstate Offices         Yes    Yes
10      Summary Of Deposits         June 30, 2008    June 30, 2007
11      Current List of Total Offices              
12      Asset Concentration Hierarchy       Mortgage Lending Specialization    Mortgage Lending Specialization
13      Subchapter S Corporation         No    No
14      County    Clark    Clark    Clark
15      Metropolitan Statistical Area    Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV    Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV    Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
16      Established Date    December 27, 1988    December 27, 1988    December 27, 1988
17      Date of Deposit Insurance    December 27, 1988    December 27, 1988    December 27, 1988
18      Last Structure Change Process Date    September 30, 2008          
19      Last Structure Change Effective Date    September 25, 2008          
20      Ownership Type         Stock    Stock
21      Directly Owned by Another Bank?(CERT)         No    No
22      Trust Powers Granted    N/A    No    No
23      Bank Charter Class    Savings Association    Savings Association    Savings Association
24      Regulator    OTS    OTS    OTS
25      Insurance fund membership    DIF    DIF    DIF
26      FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile Region    San Francisco    San Francisco    San Francisco
27      FDIC Geographic Region    San Francisco    San Francisco    San Francisco
28    FDIC Supervisory Region    San Francisco    SAN FRANCISCO    SAN FRANCISCO
29      FDIC Field Office    Phoenix    Phoenix    Phoenix
30      Federal Reserve District    San Francisco    San Francisco    San Francisco
31      Office of the Comptroller of the Currency District    Western    Western    Western
32      Primary Web Address    Web site not available.    N/A    N/A
-----------------------------
To get FDIC reports go to url:
https://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp
enter either 32633 or 33891 in the FDIC Certificate # field and click Find
32633 is Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV
33891 Is Washington Mutual Bank FSB, Park City UT
Then you can create reports from the page that comes up.
-----------------------------
Here is a list of the FDIC WAMU Certificate Numbers.

Institution Name                                  FDIC #   Locations

Washington Mutual Bank                    32633          HENDERSON, NV
                                                                           
Washington Mutual Bank                     9576           SEATTLE, WA
                                                                             
Washington Mutual BankFSB                33891         PARK CITY, UT
                                                                           
Washington Mutual Bank, FA                32633        STOCKTON, CA
                                                                             
Washington Mutual Federal Savings      33891         LAKE OSWEGO, OR
                                                                           
Washington Mutual Savings                 9576           SEATTLE, WA
                                                                     
Washington Mutual, A FSB                  28089          SEATTLE, WA
----------------------------
Zitat doo_dilettante:
And then you play with the numbers and see what happened....

Please look at the derivatives that JPM was sitting on in their Investment Banking .... aeh ....Gambling Unit.....as of 06/30/2008 - a whopping 91 trillion. Yes, this would have crashed all markets in the world...and ignited wars!

Thank you Sheila, Jamie, Hank, Mary, etc. ....now please kindly return our funds before another London Whale gobbles it all up.....

Information kindly provided by FDIC....


----------------------------------
Numbers of the JPM Gambling Unit! From 91 trillion to 68 trillion - may be they have been slapped on their sticky fingers!

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
1111 Polaris Parkway
Columbus, OH 43240
FDIC Certificate #: 628   Bank Charter Class: N
Definition   Dollar figures in thousands  
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
Columbus, OH
June 30, 2014
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
Columbus, OH
June 30, 2008
    Derivatives      
1   Derivatives   68,706,686,000   91,630,939,000
2   Notional amount of credit derivatives:   5,101,376,000   7,850,264,000
3   Bank is guarantor   2,435,479,000   3,821,391,000
4   Bank is beneficiary   2,665,897,000   4,028,873,000
5   Interest rate contracts   52,363,975,000   73,180,022,000
6   Notional value of interest rate swaps   31,088,647,000   56,985,936,000
7   Futures and forward contracts   12,256,261,000   5,495,370,000
8   Written option contracts   4,315,257,000   5,514,779,000
9   Purchased option contracts   4,703,810,000   5,183,937,000
10   Foreign exchange rate contracts   9,447,678,000   8,270,665,000
11   Notional value of exchange swaps   3,689,147,000   1,626,655,000
12    Commitments to purchase foreign currencies & U.S. dollar exchange   4,317,472,000   4,140,952,000
13   Spot foreign exchange rate contracts   558,512,000   342,892,000
14   Written option contracts   725,403,000   1,261,617,000
15   Purchased option contracts   715,656,000   1,241,441,000
16   Contracts on other commodities and equities   1,793,657,000   2,329,988,000
17   Notional value of swaps   421,168,000   343,068,000
18   Futures and forward contracts   191,702,000   208,583,000
19   Written option contracts   639,301,000   862,755,000
20   Purchased option contracts   541,486,000   915,582,000

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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Zitatende

MfG.L:)