oder um Satzzeichen ein paar Fakten das Staylongstaycool ja erfreuen wird.
Von Large Green aus IHUB:
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/...msg.aspx?message_id=107327060
Bonderman - Equity Friendly?
This could be the beginning which will happen quickly as these people are being sued individually as well to get them to sing like canaries. When they do sing, this may open the door for RICO charges and much, much more invalidating all releases signed by all parties. There is no statue of limitations on RICO, I do not believe. More importantly with a jury trial at stake and paying for this on their own, do the players want something that has been covered up for six plus years to be exposed worldwide? I think not.
Who knows for sure, but this filing could be a trigger ensuring the Perps follow through on whatever was negotiated or what will be negotiated in the finale to be sent to WMILT for our escrow share holder accounts. Could be a month delay from the P&AA expiration but only time will tell for sure.
Have I told you lately how much I love my escrow shares?
https://www.pehub.com/2008/12/26328/
Bonderman resigns from WaMu Board 12/2008. Bonderman was on the board at the time of the 500 million downstream and he may be our friend since I do NOT see his name listed anywhere. Time will soon tell.
http://www.wmitrust.com/WMITrust
WMI LIQUIDATING TRUST FILES LAWSUIT AGAINST-FORMER DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL - Claims Include Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Waste
https://www.kccllc.net/wmitrust/document/list/3956
Complaint Filed in State of Washington, King County Superior Court
https://www.kccllc.net/wmitrust/document/8817600141015000000000001
Complaint Objecting to, and Seeking Subordination and Disallowance of, Director and Officer Proofs of Claim
From Doc 02, PDF 3, line 20;
"JPMorgan bankers had begun analyzing how JPMorgan would operate WMB after JPMorgan purchased WMB out of an FDIC receivership. In these discussions, the bankers assumed that JPMorgan would acquire WMB out of an FDIC receivership and pay nothing for it. The Defendants should have understood the financial difficulties faced by WMB better than the bankers at JPMorgan, which was merely a potential buyer. Although many have speculated on the causes of WMB’s failure, nothing in this Complaint is based on, arises out of, directly or indirectly results from, is in consequence of, or in any way involves the acts that caused WMB’s and WMI’s financial condition in September 2008. Rather, this Complaint is based solely on the Defendants’ failure to preserve WMI’s assets once it was apparent by or before September 10, 2008 – as it should have been to each of the Defendants – that the FDIC was very likely to seize WMB in the next few weeks. "
PDF 4, line 5;
"8. Despite all these storm signals, on September 10, 2008, Defendant Thomas Casey (“Casey”) implemented a reckless and inexplicable transaction that wasted at least $500 million of WMI’s capital by transferring that amount from WMI to WMB (the “September Downstream”). On information and belief, WMILT alleges that Casey effected the September Downstream following the direction or acquiescence of all of the other Defendants and contrary to the advice of WMI’s trusted and reliable analysts and advisors.
9. The prudent decision would have been to preserve WMI’s assets at this critical time rather than to place them in the failing WMB. Instead, as described below, the Officer Defendants (defined below) and, by their lack of supervision or exercise of decision-making authority, the Director Defendants (defined below) responded out of panic rather than reason. They abandoned the interests of WMI and allowed the September Downstream, despite the complete absence of any evidence of deliberation as to whether a transfer should be made at that time. Half a billion dollars of WMI’s capital, which otherwise would have been available for the benefit of WMI’s creditors and shareholders, instead was transferred outside of creditors’ reach to WMB, a distressed entity facing imminent seizure.
10. The wasteful September Downstream did nothing to ameliorate the critical problems facing WMB. WMB’s problem in September 2008 was lack of adequate liquidity: WMB had inadequate cash or assets easily convertible to cash to satisfy its short-term obligations (primarily, to return money to its depositors). The September Downstream did not address WMB’s liquidity shortage because the cash that WMI used for the September Downstream already was on deposit at WMB before the September Downstream and was available to satisfy WMB’s short-term obligations. The September Downstream increased the amount of regulatory capital on WMB’s balance sheet, but did nothing to address WMB’s inadequate liquidity.
11. Ultimately, as the Office of Thrift Supervision (the “OTS”) acknowledged in a press release after it seized WMB (and as the Defendants knew or ought to have known at the time of the September Downstream), the seizure of WMB was not due to a lack of capital. Former OTS Director John E. Bowman reiterated this in his testimony before Congress in April 2010. According to Bowman and the OTS, WMB was “well capitalized” at the time it was seized, the highest grade of capitalization. WMB would have had this highest grade of capitalization even without the $500 million from the September Downstream. In fact, on September 7, 2008, WMI and WMB had entered into memoranda of understanding (each, an “MOU”) with the OTS, whichimposed no capital contribution obligations on WMI; indeed, entry into the MOUs was seen within WMI (including by some or all of the Defendants) as a way to avoid pressure from the OTS to make capital transfers to WMB at least in the near future. Thus, the September Downstream was utterly irrational from WMI’s perspective. The September Downstream could only address a problem that WMB did not have (adequate capitalization) and failed to address the problem that WMB did have (inadequate liquidity).
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