Gestern hat China laut einer Meldung im britischen "Telegraph" damit gedroht, seine Dollar-Reserven zu verkaufen, wenn USA auf einer kompletten Freigabe des Yuan-Wechselkurses bestehen. Der Telegraph-Artikel wiederum basierte auf einem Meinungsartikel aus einer chinesischen Zeitung. Der chinesische Autor dieses Artikels wies vorsorglich darauf hin, dass dies seine eigene Meinung sei und nicht die der Regierung. Da die Zeitung aber der Regierung gehört, darf man die News als dezenten "Wink mit dem Zaunpfahl" verstehen.
Doch kann China seine Dollar-Reserven - realistisch betrachtet - überhaupt verkaufen?
Währungs-Experte Marc Chandler (unten) meint: Nein.
1. Es gibt keine andere Währung in ausreichender Menge zum Umschichten. Der Dollar ist DIE Weltreservewährung, immer noch.
2. China hat so viele Dollars, dass diese sich nicht ohne weiteres verkaufen lassen. Bei Forex werden täglich "nur" 2,5 Milliarden Dollar gehandelt - ein winziger Bruchteil der China-Holdings.
3. Sobald China mit den Verkäufen beginnt, würde der Wert der bis dahin noch nicht verkauften Dollars in Chinas Besitz deutlich sinken.
4. Würden die Chinesen ihre US-Staatsanleihen verkaufen, die etwa 407 Milliarden Dollar ausmachen von insgesamt umgerechnet 1330 Milliarden Dollar an Devisenreserven, würden diese Verkäufe in USA stark auf die Kurse langlaufender Bonds drücken - was deren Zinsrendite erhöht. Folglich würden die Zinsen am langen Ende der Zinskurve steigen. Kredite für die US-Wirtschaft, die sich danach bemessen, würden dann ebenfalls teurer. Folge: USA fielen in eine Rezession. China würde als Haupthandelspartner der USA dann selber stark unter Druck kommen, evtl. auch innenpolitisch.. Die Chinesen würden sich mit dem US-Bond-Verkauf daher selber den Ast absägen, auf dem sie sitzen.
Currencies China vs. Greenback: Thunder, but No Rain By Marc Chandler Street.com Contributor 8/10/2007 2:33 PM EDT
Only the suggestion that China could use its vast U.S. dollar holdings to influence American policy managed to rival the dramatic developments in the capital markets for the attention of investors and the media. Of all the things that investors and policymakers have to worry about, China's dollar holdings should keep anyone up at night. But the current situation is not as dire as some would fear, mainly because once you walk through the "nuclear scenario," you see that it could be mutually assured destruction.
Put Comments in Context
The facts are fairly straightforward. The latest official data indicate China had reserves worth about $1.33 trillion at the end of July. In May, the latest data provided by the U.S. Treasury (June figures will be released Aug. 15) show that China has about $407 billion worth of U.S. marketable Treasury notes and bonds. Meanwhile, bills are making their way through the U.S. Senate that would penalize China if it does not let its currency appreciate faster.
Two relatively junior Chinese officials put in words what others have contemplated. China's dollar holdings give it significant leverage to influence U.S. policy. Xia Bin, the head of finance at the Development Research Center (a government arm with cabinet status) suggested that China's dollar reserves can be used as a bargaining chip. Ha Fan, an official at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences went as far as to suggest that China could, if it chose, set off a dollar collapse.
Some argued that since the stories appeared in government media that they were an official warning. Yet one does not have to be a Sinologist to appreciate that most of the Chinese media is owned and/or run by the Chinese government. Moreover, according to reports, Xia had stated explicitly that these were his personal views and not the view of the Development Research Center. And Ha said it was unlikely that China would sell dollars.
However, that U.S. President Bush and Treasury Secretary Paulson found it necessary to comment on such suggestions ("foolhardy" and "absurd," they said) may have given the junior Chinese officials more gravitas than they deserved.
Hard to See the Truth
Nevertheless, it touched a raw nerve in the market. Reserve diversification and the related issue of sovereign wealth funds has been an undercurrent in the foreign exchange market for some time.
News that China actually was a net seller of Treasuries in April and May had already gotten chins wagging. In those two months, China's Treasury holdings fell by about $12.4 billion to $407.4 billion. In May 2006, China held $322.3 billion in U.S. Treasuries, which means the nation has increased its holdings by more than 26% over the past year.
Because of the nature of the data, it is not completely clear what China has really done. For example, if it bought Treasuries from say a German bank, the U.S. data might not pick it up. Alternatively, China may have sold Treasuries and bought U.S. agency paper or maybe even bought higher-yielding dollar bonds from Germany's AAA-rated KfW Bankengruppe.
Last, as with other economic time series, there seems to be some noise in the data. For example, if there were some bonds that China was holding that were maturing and that it was waiting on a particular duration or price before reinvesting, or if the proceeds of a maturing or sold bond were recycled into the bill market, the data would look the same yet the implications would be completely different.
But there are good reasons to believe that China is not about to sell its Treasury holdings. First, if China felt itself a victim of illegal economic action from the U.S., it has shown a desire to use the conflict-resolution mechanisms of the World Trade Organization. It stands to gain more by appearing to adhere to the multilateral rules.
Second, China is such a large holder of dollars that if it were to try aggressively selling them, it could undermine the value of its remaining holdings. It would be difficult to sell them quickly. Estimates of the foreign exchange market's turnover are upward of $2.5 trillion a day.
And even if China was able to sell dollars, it is not clear what other market is big enough to absorb the flows. Already China's reserve accumulation this year is larger than the new sovereign issuance in the U.S. and Europe.
Third, China is a significant beneficiary of the international economy for which the dollar remains the numeraire. China's economic prowess rests on two legs. The first is the domestic political and economic reforms, which include attracting foreign investment and technology.
The second is liberal international trade regime. The indiscriminate and disorderly liquidation of dollars and purchases of other currencies could disrupt the functioning of the international economy that has been vital to China's growth and provided an element of social stability.
The Storyboard Has a Different Ending
Play out the scenario: China is angry at what it perceives to be U.S. protectionism, so it sells its Treasury holdings. If it is an effective retaliation, U.S. rates will rise sharply and weaken the U.S. economy.
Given the interdependency of the economies, a weaker U.S. economy translates into less demand for Chinese goods. In democracies, governments that oversee a recession frequently are voted out of office.
Of course, China is not a democracy. A recession there -- which means less than, say, 5% growth -- might trigger social unrest as rising expectations are not met. To mix metaphors, by selling its U.S. Treasury holdings China would be cutting off its nose to spite its face and would risk killing the goose that has been laying the golden egg.
Yet it is not even clear that such a move would be effective. The U.S. Treasury market and the larger dollar-denominated bond market are much larger than China. As we have been reminded in recent days, the Federal Reserve often buys Treasury securities from the market (via primary dealers) and the federal government. It and/or the U.S. Treasury could buy Treasuries that China was to sell. Other countries and market participants would also likely absorb the selling from China.
Limits to Money's Influence
Finally, on another level of analysis, the U.S., with a $14 trillion economy, often has found it difficult to translate its economic might into political influence. For example, some of the biggest recipients of U.S. aid often vote against the U.S. at the United Nations.
It's not just the U.S. that has trouble getting political leverage from its economic power. Other countries, such as the U.K., France and Japan, face similar challenges. There is no reason to expect China to have any better luck.
The textbook case of the U.S. successfully using its economic strength to influence a country's foreign policy was in the 1956 Suez Crisis. Recall that in retaliation for the U.S. and U.K. reneging on an offer to build the Aswan Dam, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal.
Israel, which was technically still at war with Egypt (and had been since 1948); France, challenged by Egypt in Algeria; and the U.K., which had been operating the Suez Canal and depended on the canal for its oil, invaded. The U.S. (and Soviet Union) opposed the invasion.
The U.K. at the time was running a current account surplus. But the pound, fixed under Bretton Woods at $2.80, was under pressure and the country's reserves were running low. It sought U.S. assistance in supporting the pound and a relatively large International Monetary Fund aid package.
According to historical accounts, then-President Eisenhower threatened to sell the pound in the foreign exchange market and deny IMF assistance to the U.K. The U.K. capitulated and, well, the rest is history.
Yet this episode seems exceptional. The U.K. has specific policy objectives (protecting its reserves and the pound) that the U.S. was in a position to block. China does not appear to be in such a position today.
The U.K. (and France) was reconciling itself to a new role in the world post-WWII. The development of the U.S. and global capital markets makes it difficult to envisage a country successfully trying to use those markets to the detriment of the U.S.
In the final analysis, China has bought U.S. dollars and U.S. Treasuries not out of altruism or to do the U.S. some kind of favor. Rather, Chinese officials recognize it to be in their interest. China has arguably done more to support a strong dollar policy than the U.S., which has not bought dollars since 1995. |