jetzt wissen wir es: irak krieg wegen öl ?

aber gar niiiie nicht.....
es ging um die (vor allem us, aber auch 'weltweite' (= us interessenten) bedrohung von saddam und seinen 'waepons of oil'

interessante us-öl, bzw. energie studie (lang aber seehr lesenswert)


STRATEGIC ENERGY POLICY CHALLENGES
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Report of an Independent Task Force
Sponsored by the
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University
and the
Council on Foreign Relations

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3535.htm

The report is linked to a veritable who's who of US hawks, oilmen and corporate bigwigs. It was commissioned by James Baker, the former US Secretary of State under George Bush Snr, and submitted to Vice-President Dick Cheney in April 2001 -- a full five months before September 11. Yet it advocates a policy of using military force against an enemy such as Iraq to secure US access to, and control of, Middle Eastern oil fields.

hier ein auszug:


RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations of the Task Force are divided into two sections: The first comprises actions to be considered in the very short term to assure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to deal with potential supply disruptions and to buffer the economy from adverse impacts of price volatility. The second set of recommendations is longer term in nature. The first set of recommendations concerns action items designed to provide the government with "breathing space" in case of shortfalls or emergencies. The second set concerns a framework for dealing with the challenges of creating new supplies and ample capacities along various linked global energy supply chains, while also preserving and enhancing the human habitat.

Immediate Steps
1. Deter and Manage International Supply Shortfalls
Recent oil market-price volatility has been driven by a number of complex factors. However, three key drivers continue to fuel upward pressure on prices: OPEC policy and the organization’s lack of spare productive capacity; the policies of Iraq and concerns about the reliability of its U.N.-monitored oil exports; and fears of a possible flare-up in the Arab-Israeli conflict. These factors have created uncertainty in markets that has at various times outweighed considerations of immediate market supply availability, fueling speculation and pushing prices above $30––$35 a barrel at various times in recent months. Although these situations cannot be solved overnight, certain steps could be considered to ameliorate their negative impact on oil market stability.

Develop a diplomatic program ensuring GCC allies remain prepared and willing to maintain stable prices to promote global economic growth and also to fill any unexpected supply shortfalls in times of turmoil in the oil markets, whether created by accident or by the adverse political actions by any producing nation. The vast majority of all unused, spare oil productive capacity is located in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It appears that Kuwait might soon be added to that list. Saudi Arabia has over 1 million b/d of spare sustainable capacity and considerably more surge capacity that could be brought online for several weeks in a crisis. The UAE has some limited spare capacity of several hundred thousand barrels a day. Kuwait might soon have a similar amount. These are all very important countries for the United States, with a fundamentally positive attitude toward cooperation and support, and with the only meaningful spare production capacity in the world. They all deserve being cultivated as special priorities of U.S. policy.
Over the past year, Iraq has effectively become a swing producer, turning its taps on and off when it has felt such action was in its strategic interest to do so. Saudi Arabia has proven willing to provide replacement supplies to the market when Iraqi exports have been reduced. This role has been extremely important in avoiding greater market volatility and in countering Iraq’s efforts to take advantage of the oil market’s structure. Saudi Arabia’s role in this needs to be preserved, and should not be taken for granted. There is domestic pressure on the GCC leaders to reject cooperation to cool oil markets during times of a shortfall in Iraqi oil production. These populations are dissatisfied with the "no-fly zone" bombing and the sanctions regime against Iraq, perceived U.S. bias in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and lack of domestic economic pressures. A diplomatic dialogue that emphasizes common U.S.-GCC goals and programs should be pursued at the highest levels to minimize the potential for tension over these other issues. Goodwill efforts such as a U.S. offer to buy oil from spare capacity for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve when market circumstances warrant and a willingness to discuss coordinated response to supply emergencies can be used to offset anti-American sentiment among elite groups in these countries.

There are, however, some trade-off issues. Working together with the GCC could restrict some of the U.S.’ freedom of movement on security and foreign policy actions that might be desirable with regard to Iraq or the Arab-Israeli conflict from a U.S. point of view.



Prepare for contingencies and gain agreement on coordination in the IEA in efforts to deal with any attempts by adversaries to remove oil from international markets. Some European country positions on economic sanctions against Iraq differ from the U.S. position, most notably France but also some other IEA countries including Japan. Still, the IEA must be assured of efficient joint decision-making in the event of a supply disruption under tight market conditions. This includes any possibility that Saddam Hussein may remove Iraqi oil from the market for an extended period of time and that Saudi Arabia will not or cannot replace all of the barrels. (This is a contingency that hangs over the market given the ability of Baghdad to continue to earn revenues through smuggling and other uncontrolled oil exports, even if it officially cuts off exports that are permitted through U.N. procedures.) IEA member countries should be in agreement in advance of such an event on what joint actions it will take. The IEA has been very successful in recent years in providing definitive and forceful statements of its intentions, and these statements have improved the maintenance of orderly markets. The administration needs to ensure that recent events do not derail this past success.


Minimize public conflicts with OPEC and other independent oil-exporting countries but emphasize importance of market factors in setting prices. The previous administration engaged in public exchanges with OPEC over the producer organization’s decisions to push oil prices higher. This fueled anti-American sentiment among certain sectors of the population in the Middle East, lent support to the claims of Saddam Hussein, and brought pressures on some U.S.-friendly regimes in the region. The United States needs to prevent aggravation of this situation by avoiding public discussion of the targeting of particular price goals and emphasizing common interests of promoting and protecting growth in the global economy. Such growth maintains demand for OPEC’s oil. Rather than specify a price level that is "good for the United States"—which creates an "us-against-you" mindset on oil-pricing policy—the United States should emphasize as a first line of policy its position that market forces should be left to set the price of oil. Specific discussion of price should be kept to private diplomatic discussion whenever possible. Although short-term political gains can be garnered at home in the United States for jawboning OPEC, longer term this activity is likely to stimulate more entrenched positions within that organization, leading to higher oil prices and eventually wearing down any short-term public relations benefit inside the United States.


While moving to defuse tensions in the Arab-Israeli conflict through conflict resolution and negotiations, maintain energy and political issues in U.S.–Middle East relations on separate tracks. The timing might not be appropriate for a major initiative to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict in a comprehensive manner, but it is important to reduce immediate tensions and violence in that conflict. While this is a tenet of U.S. foreign policy for other reasons, it can also be helpful to the oil situation in ensuring that the two issues do not become linked and are kept on separate tracks. Iraq has been engaged in a clever public relations campaign to intersect these two issues and stir up anti-American sentiment inside and outside the Middle East. The bombing of Iraq by the United States led coalition in February 2001 spurred anti-U.S. demonstrations in support of Iraq in traditional U.S. allies such as Egypt. Moreover, Saddam Hussein is trying to recast himself as the champion of the Palestinian cause to some success among young Palestinians. Any severe violence on the West Bank, Gaza, or Southern Lebanon will give Iraq more leverage in its efforts to discredit the United States and U.S. intentions. A focus on the anti-Israeli sympathies of some Arab oil-producing countries diverts attention from the repressive nature of the Iraqi regime. Instead it rewards Iraq in its claim to Arab leadership for "standing up to the United States for ten years." Israel will assert its right to defend itself from terrorist or other attacks, so it is important that both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict are given a stake in avoiding conflict and violence. Creating an atmosphere where both sides are willing to show restraint can be an important goal for U.S. diplomacy on this issue.


Review policies toward Iraq with the aim to lowering anti-Americanism in the Middle East and elsewhere, and set the groundwork to eventually ease Iraqi oil-field investment restrictions. Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to U.S. allies in the Middle East, as well as to regional and global order, and to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East. Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets. This would display his personal power, enhance his image as a "Pan Arab" leader supporting the Palestinians against Israel, and pressure others for a lifting of economic sanctions against his regime.
The United States should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq, including military, energy, economic, and political/diplomatic assessments. The United States should then develop an integrated strategy with key allies in Europe and Asia and with key countries in the Middle East to restate the goals with respect to Iraqi policy and to restore a cohesive coalition of key allies. Goals should be designed in a realistic fashion, and they should be clearly and consistently stated and defended to revive U.S. credibility on this issue. Actions and policies to promote these goals should endeavor to enhance the well-being of the Iraqi people. Sanctions that are not effective should be phased out and replaced with highly focused and enforced sanctions that target the regime’s ability to maintain and acquire weapons of mass destruction. A new plan of action should be developed to use diplomatic and other means to support U.N. Security Council efforts to build a strong arms-control regime to stem the flow of arms and controlled substances into Iraq. Policy should rebuild coalition cooperation on this issue, while emphasizing the common interest in security. This issue of arms sales to Iraq should be brought near the top of the agenda for dialogue with China and Russia.

Once an arms-control program is in place, the United States could consider reducing restrictions on oil investments inside Iraq. Like it or not, Iraqi reserves represent a major asset that can quickly add capacity to world oil markets and inject a more competitive tenor to oil trade. However, such a policy will be quite costly as this trade-off will encourage Saddam Hussein to boast of his "victory" against the United States, fuel his ambitions, and potentially strengthen his regime. Once so encouraged and if his access to oil revenues were to be increased by adjustments in oil sanctions, Saddam Hussein could be a greater security threat to U.S. allies in the region if weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sanctions, weapons regimes, and the coalition against him are not strengthened. Still, the maintenance of continued oil sanctions is becoming increasingly difficult to implement. Moreover, Saddam Hussein has many means of gaining revenues, and the sanctions regime helps perpetuate his lock on the country’s economy.

Another problem with easing restrictions on the Iraqi oil industry to allow greater investment is that GCC allies of the United States will not like to see Iraq gain larger market share in international oil markets. In fact, even Russia could lose from having sanctions eased on Iraq, because Russian companies now benefit from exclusive contracts and Iraqi export capacity is restrained, supporting the price of oil and raising the value of Russian oil exports. If sanctions covering Iraq’s oil sector were eased and Iraq benefited from infrastructure improvements, Russia might lose its competitive position inside Iraq, and also oil prices might fall over time, hurting the Russian economy. These issues will have to be discussed in bilateral exchanges.

 

???

*g*

füx  

..was allerdingd theoretisch sehr von Bedeutung ist ...und war.  

um die wirtschafts-bedrohungs und massenvernichtungswaffe...... öl ;-)  

Garner  war es in den ersten Wochen seiner Amtszeit nicht gelungen, der anhaltenden Kriminalität Einhalt zu gebieten. Zwar wurde von Beginn an das irakische Ölministerium von amerikanischen Truppen geschützt. Andere Einrichtungen – nach Angaben der „Washington Post“ sind auch irakische Nuklearanlagen darunter – wurden dagegen das Ziel von Plünderern.
Die USA stehen vor dem Problem, einerseits die Verwaltung von Baath-Parteigängern zu säubern, andererseits jedoch möglichst schnell die Administration wieder zum Laufen zu bringen.
Unter Beobachtern stellt sich zunehmend der Eindruck ein, dass es den USA an einem konsistenten Konzept für die Zeit nach dem Krieg fehlt. „Wenn man amerikanische Politiker vor dem Krieg nach ihrem Plan für den Irak fragte, dann sagten sie, die Dinge würden sich schon ergeben“, meint der Irak-Experte Volker Perthes von der Berliner Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). „Doch wenn die USA keine Ordnung schaffen, läuft der Irak tatsächlich Gefahr, ein sicherer Hafen für Terroristen zu werden.“
Diese Gefahr entsteht vor allem durch das Machtvakuum, das die Abwesenheit amerikanischer Kontrolle in vielen Regionen des Landes erst schafft. „Die USA dachten alleine militärisch“, sagt Amatzia Baram, Professor für die Geschichte des Nahen Ostens an der Universität Haifa in Israel. „Auf die Herausforderungen des Wiederaufbaus sind sie offensichtlich schlecht vorbereitet.“
Daraus erklärt sich, dass in den heiligen schiitischen Städten Kerbala und Nadschaf bereits die schiitische Geistlichkeit als Ordnungsmacht auftritt. „Die Leute im Irak sind doch froh, wenn überhaupt jemand Verantwortung übernimmt“, erklärt Perthes.
Aus Sicht der Amerikaner ist dieser schleichende Machtübergang auf die schiitischen Ayatollahs freilich keine gute Nachricht. „Auf diese Weise werden quasi autonome Provinzen geschaffen, in denen fundamentalistische Strömungen Platz haben“, sagt Baram. „Die Entwicklung später zurückzudrehen, ist außerordentlich schwierig.“
Die eigentlichen politischen Absichten der schiitischen Geistlichkeit im Irak sind nach Auffassung von Baram schwer einzuschätzen. Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim, der erst vorvergangene Woche aus dem iranischen Exil in den Irak zurückgekehrt war, sei kein Demokrat.Al-Hakim ist der Chef des Hohen Rates für die Islamische Revolution im Irak (Sciri) und gilt als einer der einflussreichste Schiitenführer

und was ist in Afghanistan los?
http://www.janes.com/security/...ecurity/news/jir/jir030423_1_n.shtml
Afghan security deteriorates as Taliban regroup

Anthony Davis

After a winter punctuated by scattered attacks, March and April saw the closest to a co-ordinated offensive the anti-Kabul opposition has yet achieved. This left no doubt that the predominantly Pashtun forces aligned against the western-backed government of President Hamid Karzai had used the winter to regroup, train and achieve a far greater degree of organisational cohesion than was evident in 2002. An ad hoc alliance comprising Taliban remnants, the Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) faction of former mujahideen leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and groups of Al-Qaeda stragglers now appears increasingly to be co-ordinating its command structures and support and logistics networks.

Politically, the opposition has displayed a new confidence and political assertiveness in recent months with various leaders publicly enunciating their goal of expelling western forces. In January, Hekmatyar vowed Afghan "mujahideen" would "force America out of their country like the Soviet Union" while in February, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar used the Pakistani press to renew his call for anti-Western jihad. Then in late March in an interview with BBC radio, the day after the murder of a foreign aid worker, senior Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah promised to step up the fight against "Jews, Christians, [and] all foreign crusaders", warning Afghan government officials at all levels "not to stand behind the puppet and slave regime."

Rocket attacks have gained both in frequency and intensity. Whereas last year one or two missiles was the norm, salvos are now being fired. There have also been barrages of mortar fire.

Rocket attacks targeted US bases in the provinces of Kunar, Nangahar, Paktia, Khost, Paktika, Kandahar and Uruzgan. On 29 March, two US military personnel, a Special Forces soldier and a National Guard airman, were killed in an ambush near Girishk in Helmand province. The following evening, the headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in central Kabul was hit by a 122mm rocket, while another missile landed near the Kabul Military Training Centre on the eastern edge of the city.

At the same time, the opposition has displayed greater aggressiveness both in attacking US Special Forces beyond their bases, and in concentrating larger numbers of fighters. The planting of mines on roads used by US patrols, which was begun last year, continues; but is now being reinforced with close-in ambushes. The Girishk ambush has been the only one to result in Coalition fatalities this year, but on 10 February a US patrol was attacked in the Baghran valley of upper Helmand province, by assailants using rocket propelled grenades and machine guns. Other ambushes have occurred near Asadabad in eastern Kunar and near Shkin, a well-known blackspot on the border of Paktika province with Pakistan.

Attacks on the Coalition's Afghan allies - which Taliban remnants had earlier specifically refrained from - have also gathered pace this year. Such assaults have occurred repeatedly against posts near Spin Buldak, the border settlement on the highway between Kandahar and Pakistan. The largest operation undertaken by former Taliban forces appears to have been in northwest Badghis an ethnically mixed province where Taliban leaders have successfully appealed to the fears of the Pashtun minority. An operation in late March involving up to 400 fighters and apparently timed to coincide with attacks in the south, triggered several days of fighting.

No less worrying has been the opposition's deliberate targeting of foreign aid workers and intimidation of Afghans working with foreign organisations. This new tactic was brutally highlighted by the murder of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) engineer Ricardo Munguia in Shah Wali Kot district, Kandahar province, on 27 March. Munguia was shot execution-style in front of his Afghan co-workers at a roadblock, after his captors had used a satellite phone to request instructions as to his fate; the Afghans were freed. This was the first incident involving the killing of a foreign aid worker in five years. But attacks on Afghans working with westerners have been rising: in November a veterinarian working for the US-based Mercy Corps was shot dead in the same district as Munguia. On 26 January an ambush of a UN convoy on the Jalalabad-Kabul road killed two Afghan security men. The same day grenades were thrown at a UN compound in northern Mazar-i-Sharif and the building of a French charity in Kandahar, although there were no casualties in either attack. More recently, on 16 April, another grenade was thrown at a UNICEF office in eastern Jalalabad. Anonymous leaflets known as 'shabnama' (night letters) warning Afghans that they should cease working with foreign organisations or face death are circulating.

Munguia's murder has badly shaken the confidence of the international aid community. The weeks following his death saw a sharp reduction or halting of field operations in the south by the UN, the Red Cross and other non-governmental organisations. Many staff have been withdrawn to Kabul. But as all sides are well aware, any significant reduction of aid and development programmes in a chronically poor part of the country threatens to trigger a vicious downward spiral of growing Pashtun disaffection from Kabul, accelerated opposition recruitment, and a further deterioration of security.

The perceived domination of Kabul's most powerful ministries by the Tajiks of the former Northern Alliance remains an abiding source of resentment. Afghanistan's largest ethnic community, the Pashtuns, have tended traditionally to view themselves as Afghanistan's natural rulers, a perception the post-Taliban dispensation in Kabul has directly challenged. Moves to induct more Pashtuns into senior positions in the Defence and Interior Ministries have done little to alleviate these concerns.

A more serious concern is the failure to move more swiftly on high-visibility reconstruction programmes that would alleviate unemployment, stimulate local economies and demonstrate Kabul's fiscal reach. In most of the south, frustrations over disappointed economic expectations are arguably more corrosive than concerns over imbalances in the division of power in Kabul.

Efforts to check the destabilisation of the south comes as Karzai prepares to negotiate another daunting security challenge - the disarming, demobilisation and reintegration of up to 150,000-200,000 militia fighters who for years have provided regional warlords with their muscle. The first steps to tackle this problem are due to begin in July when the government, in conjunction with the UN Development Programme, will attempt to demobilise 100,000 fighters over a three-year period. Initial tranches of funding for the Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) budgeted at US$127m, have already been pledged by Japan and, to a lesser extent, the UK and Canada.

Militiamen participating in the ANBP will choose between enrolling in vocational training for new jobs in the civilian economy, or joining the Afghan National Army (ANA) and receiving military retraining. The disarming, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, it is hoped, will provide a powerful boost to the painfully slow expansion of the ANA. Since training by US and French instructors began at the Kabul Military Training Centre in April 2002, the army has expanded to seven battalions of slightly less than 3,000 troops. These battalions have been organised into two infantry brigades of a projected three brigade-strong Central Corps based on Kabul. While the ANA has conducted company-level training operations in co-operation with US forces in various areas, it has little independent operational capability.

The DDR process is unlikely to be a smooth one. Much will depend on economic development providing alternative employment, and that in turn will hinge on stability and security. It is also clear that the process will be nowhere near complete by the time of national elections scheduled for June 2004, permitting regional warlords to influence the electoral process.

und wir mittenmag dabei und das Engagement der Deutschen soll auf Bitten der USA noch ausgeweitet werden.....  

Bin mal gespannt, auf den Mist, den unsere Regierung heute wieder von sich gibt.  

 

Den US-Soldaten in Bagdad ist die Lust an der Besatzung der irakischen Hauptstadt vergangen. Plünderungen, anti-amerikanische Demonstrationen und die sengende Hitze haben die Eroberer zermürbt. Sie wollen nur noch eines: Nach Hause.
Die Soldaten der 3. Infanterie-Division, die vor sechs Wochen die irakische Hauptstadt eroberten, haben mittlerweile ein Motivationsproblem. Im Vertrauen räumen Offiziere ein, dass es mit der Moral der Truppe nicht zum Besten stehe. Der Ton sei schärfer geworden, sowohl im Umgang der Soldaten untereinander als auch gegenüber irakischen Zivilisten.
Am Mittwoch kam es in der westirakischen Provinz al-Anbar erneut zu Zusammenstößen zwischen bewaffneten Irakern und US-Soldaten. Ein Reporter des arabischen TV-Senders al-Dschasira in der Stadt Hit berichtete von mehreren Explosionen in der Polizeistation des Ortes. Nach unbestätigten Augenzeugenberichten soll in der Nähe der Stadt ein US-Militärhubschrauber abgestürzt sein und vier Soldaten in den Tod gerissen haben.

Demonstrationen gegen Amerikaner

Am Nachmittag zogen Bürger der Stadt in einem lauten Demonstrationszug durch die Straßen und schossen in die Luft. Sie beschuldigten die US-Soldaten, bei der Suche nach Waffen zusammen mit irakischen Polizisten auf rücksichtslose Art und Weise in mehrere Privathäuser eingedrungen zu sein.
Hinzu kommt die Ungewissheit, wann die bereits seit sechs Monaten in der Golfregion stationierte 3. Infanterie-Division abgelöst werden wird. "Man hatte uns versprochen, dass nach der Einnahme von Bagdad andere Truppen hergeschickt würden", beschwert sich ein Soldat. "Diejenigen, die für das Töten zuständig waren, sollten nicht zur Wahrung des Friedens eingesetzt werden. Sie müssen uns nach Hause schicken."

Zwar sind in den vergangenen Tagen US-Soldaten der 1. Panzerdivision aus Wiesbaden eingetroffen, die in Bagdad die Kontrolle übernehmen soll. Aber wann die 3. Infanterie-Division abziehen darf, ist nach Angaben ihres Befehlshabers ungewiss

Hinter vorgehaltener Hand berichten Offiziere von wachsendem Stress unter den Soldaten, der sich durch lautstarke Streitereien bemerkbar mache. Zudem sinke die Bereitschaft, sich für weitere Dienstjahre bei der Armee zu verpflichten. Die Heerespsychiater, die die Truppen vorsorglich untersuchten, haben vielen Soldaten empfohlen, nach ihrer Heimkehr psychologische Hilfe in Anspruch zu nehmen. Aber niemand weiß, wann das möglich sein wird.
...
Außerdem bekommen die Soldaten Eiswürfel - damit sie einen kühlen Kopf behalten, wenn sie bei Temperaturen um 38 Grad Celsius mit ihrer dreizehn Kilogramm schweren Ausrüstung auf Fußstreife gehen.
(schreibt der Spiegel)
 

das Thema hatten wir schon. Aber ich hätte die Schnauze da auch voll. Mir haben ja auch schon 14 Tage Ägypten gereicht. Das Land war eigentlich nur unter Wasser erträglich.

Mal ernsthaft: Der Scholl-Latour hat denen das ja prophezeit. Und alle Politiker erklärten ihn zum alten Idioten. Und er hat vorausgesagt, daß man hinterher wieder u.a. Deutschland braucht für die Drecksarbeit. Und unsere Politiker scheinen ja zwischenzeitlich auch bereit dafür...  

Eskalation im Irak: Erdölleitung in die Türkei in Brand gesetzt. 27 Iraker von GIs erschossen
 
Die Gefechte zwischen bewaffneten Widerstandsgruppen und US-amerikanischen Besatzungssoldaten im Irak nehmen immer mehr die Züge einer neuen kriegerischen Auseinandersetzung an. Innerhalb weniger Tage kamen dabei mehrere Dutzend Menschen ums Leben. Im Norden des Irak sprengten am Freitag Guerilleros eine Ölpipeline. Durch einen doppelten Bombenanschlag geriet nach Angaben von Anwohnern die Erdölleitung in die Türkei in Brand. Die Angriffe fanden in der Nähe der Erdölfelder bei Machul statt, etwa 15 Kilometer von der Raffineriestadt Baidschi entfernt. Die nun unterbrochene rund 1000 Kilometer lange Pipeline verband die Ölfelder des Nordirak mit dem türkischen Hafen Ceyhan an der Mittelmeerküste.

Sechs Wochen nachdem US- Präsident George W. Bush das Ende der größeren Kampfhandlungen im Irak verkündet hatte, erschossen US-Soldaten am Freitag in der Ortschaft Balad nördlich von Bagdad im Zuge einer großangelegten Kampagne zur Aufstandsbekämpfung 27 Iraker. Nach Angaben des US-Zentralkommandos hatte eine »organisierte Gruppe« Granaten auf eine Panzerpatrouille der US-Streitkräfte abgefeuert. Die Soldaten hätten aus Panzern zurückgefeuert, vier Angreifer getötet und die übrigen in die Flucht getrieben. Panzer und gepanzerte Fahrzeuge hätten daraufhin zusammen mit Apache-Hubschraubern die Verfolgung aufgenommen und weitere 23 Iraker getötet. Angaben über eigene Verluste machten die Besatzungstruppen nicht.

In der nordirakischen Stadt Mosul wurden am Freitag bei einem Schußwechsel zwischen irakischen Zivilisten und US-Soldaten drei Iraker verletzt. Auch im Westen des Landes wurden die Besatzungstruppen in Kämpfe verwickelt. Mehrere Menschen sollen dabei nach US-Angaben getötet worden sein. Angaben zur Identität der Toten machte die US-Armee nicht. Am Donnerstag war im Westen des Irak ein US-Kampfhubschrauber vom Typ Apache abgeschossen worden. Südwestlich von Bagdad war ein amerikanischer Kampfjet abgestürzt – »aus bisher unbekanntem Grund«, wie das US-Zentralkommando erklärte.

Neben der größten Militäroffensive seit dem inoffiziellen Kriegsende startete das US-Zentralkommando auch eine mediale Kampagne gegen die Widerstandskräfte. So behaupteten die Besatzungstruppen, im Norden des Landes 74 Männer festgenommen zu haben, die Anhänger des Terrornetzwerkes Al Qaida seien. Hintergrund der Anschuldigungen dürfte sein, den legitimen Widerstand gegen die Besatzungstruppen als illegitimen Terrorismus zu diffamieren. Peinlich für die USA: Erst vor wenigen Tagen hatten zwei führende Al-Qaida-Aktivisten bei Verhören durch US-Truppen erklärt, daß der Terrorpate Osama bin Laden jede Zusammenarbeit mit der irakischen Führung unter Saddam Hussein abgelehnt habe.

Die irakischen Widerstandsgruppen erklärten unterdessen, ihren Kampf ausweiten zu wollen. Inzwischen stellten sie allen Angehörigen aus den Angreiferstaaten USA und Großbritannien oder ihnen verbündeten Ländern ein Ultimatum, den Irak bis zum 17. Juni zu verlassen. Dies berichtete die in London erscheinende arabischsprachige Zeitung Al Quds. Danach seien die Ausländer ebenso Ziel von Angriffen wie die Besatzungstruppen, »unabhängig davon, ob sie im zivilen Sektor oder bei den Streitkräften arbeiten«. Die Warnung schließe Staatsangehörige aus Katar, Kuwait, Saudi-Arabien, Iran und der Türkei ein. »Nach diesem Datum werden sie von der Widerstandsbewegung als Angriffsziele betrachtet«, heißt es in der am Freitag auch auf Englisch veröffentlichten Erklärung.

Seit Beginn der Irak-Invasion sind nach Angaben des Pentagon bislang insgesamt 183 US-Soldaten getötet worden, 45 davon nach dem 1. Mai. »Iraqbodycount« zufolge starben bis Anfang Juni zwischen 5531 und 7203 Iraker in direkter Folge der militärischen Intervention der USA und ihren Verbündeten sowie mehr als hundert in der ersten Maihälfte durch spät gezündete Streubomben. Die Angaben des unabhängigen Internetdienstes basieren auf der täglichen Auswertung internationaler Presseberichte.

www.iraqbodycount.net