Korruption, schlechte Sozialsysteme und viele andere Probleme sprechen gegen eine neue Wirtschaftssupermacht in naher Zukunft.
China: Nation Based On Connections Rather Than Merit
§If a mayor announces a plan to reclaim hundreds of acres from the sea and build a massive industrial complex, after a few years you'd see busy factories, families are living in thousands of new apartments, and 10,000 workers launching Phase Two. This is the side of China that awes the outside world. The mainland's extraordinary ability to mobilize people and capital to accomplish daunting feats in record time is the reason it has averaged annual growth of 9.5% for three decades. Why, then, is it so hard for this same government to crack down on exporters of dangerously tainted seafood, toothpaste, and medicine, despite years of warnings by local and foreign experts? The party has talked for decades about building a social safety net, yet as the working population ages the government isn't investing nearly enough to head off looming crises in health care, education, and pensions. China spends more than Japan on research and development, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD), but its record of innovation is underwhelming. The same policies that have been so successful at boosting the gross domestic product, it turns out, undermine initiatives that might move China's economy to a higher level. In its pursuit of growth at all costs, China skimped on investments needed to provide basic affordable health care and the regulatory machinery that can enforce environmental, safety, and corporate governance regulations nationwide.
The root of many problems is China's power structure. Although Beijing holds a monopoly on politics, local Communist Party officials enjoy wide latitude over social and economic affairs and have huge professional and financial incentives to spur GDP growth, which they often do by ignoring regulations or lavishing companies with perks. Even if Beijing has the best intentions of fixing problems such as undrinkable water and unbreathable air, it is often thwarted by hundreds of thousands of party officials with vested interests in the current system. Conjuring ancient Confucianism, President Hu Jintao harps repeatedly on the need to attain a "harmonious society," implying that China today is anything but. To their credit, Chinese officials have unveiled a blitz of corrective measures. Beijing is launching new health care initiatives, regulations on food producers and pirating, trying to tame the runaway stock market and passing stringent environmental rules. In 2006 alone, nearly 30,000 officials were prosecuted for corruption. If problems persist, the world will have to keep living with a giant trade partner that can't guarantee safe products, control piracy, or curb pollution. China could keep growing rapidly for years, but a scenario of dysfunctional administration calls into question whether it will really become an economic superpower. What Beijing does lack is the will to overhaul a political structure that gives party officials down to even the smallest villages huge influence over many facets of economic life.
The roots of China's ersatz capitalism go back to devil's bargains made in the 1980s and '90s to accelerate China's takeoff. Late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping declared it was O.K. to "get rich," a green light for legions of cadres to discard their Mao suits and rush into business, often by setting themselves up as middlemen or grabbing stakes in communal assets. Beijing also granted great latitude to provincial and local officials to manage development and social services such as education and health care. The two requirements: Remain loyal to the party and meet high economic-growth targets. That explains why many mainland companies have financial ties to county, city, and township governments. In terms of China's pollution dilemma, the central government struggles to impose its will on local officials nationwide. A 2006 OECD study says that while pollution fines are rising, they're usually far below the cost of installing equipment to cut pollution. Local authorities often negotiate down the charges. "For the sake of their own political scorecards, some local officials have joined forces with businesses seeking windfall profits," Pan Yue, SEPA's deputy chief.
The misplaced economic priorities explain the decrepit state of social services. Compared with spurring growth, social services got the short end of the stick. Government surveys show that nearly half of Chinese say they can't afford to visit a doctor when ill, 70% lack health insurance, and 30% refuse hospitalization due to cost. Hospitals earn most of their revenue selling drugs, and get kickbacks from pharmaceutical suppliers, creating an incentive to overprescribe. In China, everything seems to come down to the cozy relationship between government and industry. Some 95% of the stocks on the Shanghai bourse are state enterprises, and last year no private companies were permitted to list there. Although, 14 state enterprises did. The reason: By floating 10% to 30% of their shares, state companies can ease their dependence on bank loans without ceding any real control, while insiders make windfalls on the stock offering. The list of shortcomings in China's economic model is long, but is it fair to expect any different? It took the U.S. and Europe centuries before they developed modern financial systems and methods for ensuring food safety, providing pensions, and protecting the environment. Americans tend to think China should be held to the same standards that we have today, disregarding that we had the same problems ourselves in the past. So how can China tame the raw self-interest that flows from Deng's historic compromise with the party and the people? By getting the communist party out of business. "SmallCap MarketWatch"
Ministerium für außerplanetarische Angelegenheiten/ Außenkolonienkontaktdienst |