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''Elections Approach in Democratic Republic of Congo''
he constitutional referendum that was held in Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C.) on December 18, 2005 was accepted by 84.3 percent of Congolese voters and was approved in May 2005 by the National Assembly. The successful passage of D.R.C.'s new draft constitution is seen as a stepping stone in the new political and institutional course in the central African country.
Background to the Elections
The acceptance of the draft constitution comes after almost ten years of continued political and military instability that began with the Tutsi-led insurgency in October 1996 that brought the fall of one of the most prominent leaders of contemporary African history, Mobutu Sese Seko, and subsequently gave power to Laurent Kabila. Then, in August 1998, the conflict exploded with the deployment of troops from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Whereas for many years the conflict in the eastern regions had been limited to the presence of regular armies and militias from neighboring countries such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, the involvement of more African actors gave a continental dimension to the "quagmire."
The inter-Congolese accord signed in Pretoria on December 17, 2002 established the ruling principles and the directives for a transitional process to take place. The first part of the comprehensive plan culminated in the inauguration of the transitional government in June 2003, led by Joseph Kabila -- son of the former President Laurent Kabila who was assassinated in January 2001 -- that within two years should have organized and guaranteed presidential and parliamentary elections. The elections were repeatedly postponed and now they have been set for the period between the end of April and the beginning of June 2006, while local elections are scheduled for March and April.
Even though the transitional government encountered significant difficulties during the past two years, it was able to widely implement the inter-Congolese agreement that, together with the elaboration of key laws and the initial reintegration of the Congolese armed forces, put in place a draft constitution that set up new institutions. The successful constitutional referendum in December 2005 was a final legitimizing factor.
The referendum was considered a test to see whether general elections could take place in a successful way (former Zaire and the D.R.C. have not held an independent election in over 40 years), and the outcome has generally been deemed positive. Despite the huge difficulties in organizing and participating in the vote, nearly 25 million Congolese were registered and half of them went to the poll stations. The E.U. and other international observers said the referendum was free and fair. Additionally, the threat of violence and armed attacks from the bands of militiamen was limited and did not affect the regularity of the operations.
Elections Approach
The international community's judgment on the whole electoral process testifies that there are hopes for the development of an institutional transition system in D.R.C., acknowledging that the Independent Electoral Commission has demonstrated its ability to handle what the U.N. repeatedly defines as "the most complicated elections it has ever been involved in." Most of the burden in the coming months will be on the transitional government's shoulders. Kabila, although very young at 33, has shown great ability in maintaining the government's power and in dealing with the many obstacles coming from the transitional process, the internal political arena and the critical situation in the eastern regions of the country. Therefore, Kabila is widely expected to win the presidential poll.
What emerges clearly is that Kabila appears to have gained solid support from the international community, and mainly from Belgium, South Africa, France and the U.S. Both the United States and France have been crucial actors in the shaping of the geopolitical balances in the Great Lakes region, particularly since the end of the Cold War; Washington and Paris have been fighting a long "underground" struggle to obtain a sort of political supervisory role in this area but their attention is now oriented toward more strategic areas of the continent, such as the Sahel region, the Gulf of Guinea, Sudan and the Horn of Africa. [See: "Washington's Long War and its Strategy in the Horn of Africa"]
Nevertheless, outside support should guarantee the Congolese transitional government not only solid diplomatic backing -- which is fundamental to prevent the neighboring countries, and mainly Rwanda, from interfering in D.R.C.'s internal issues -- but also the financial and logistical support of the international community, which is definitely crucial for the elections to occur.
What appear to be the most difficult obstacles to overcome in the set up of the electoral process and in the effective and safe execution of the vote are the high levels of fragmentation within the political field and the still erupting military instability in some regions of the country.
Most likely, the government will soon face a spoiling redistribution of power within the principal members of the transitional government. Kabila has four vice presidents and his government includes 36 ministries, while the parliament is composed of 500 deputies and 120 senators. These political figures, some of which can still count on the backing of militia groups, will hardly leave their current positions without significant compensation. Kabila's People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (P.P.R.D.), Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba's Liberation Movement of Congo (M.L.C.), and Azarias Ruberwa's Congolese Democracy-Goma (R.C.D.), together with other former rebel groups, as well as the opposition parties, are expected to use their preeminent positions and influence in the electoral campaigns, mainly by controlling the media.
On the other side, Etienne Tshisekedi, one of the oldest Congolese politicians, who had fought both the Mobutu Sese Seku and the Laurent Kabila leaderships, will be another key player. As the leader of the main opposition party, Union for Democracy and Social Progress (U.D.P.S.), Tshisekedi constantly worked against the transitional government and has boycotted voter registration and participation at the recent referendum. Nevertheless, it is very likely that he will finally take part in the general and presidential elections.
Concern over Military Instability in Eastern Regions
Another major threat is the military instability in the eastern regions and the renewed calls for autonomy in Katanga.
In Kivus, the Rwandan Armed Liberation Forces (F.D.L.R.) still constitute a military menace; after negotiations in Rome in March 2005 with the Kinshasa government and the Sant'Egidio community, the F.D.L.R. announced that it would return to Rwanda peacefully; however, after one year the process of disarmament and demobilization is in jeopardy. The threats toward the institutional transition in D.R.C. come not only from the F.D.L.R.'s 8,000 combatants, but also because their presence in the border zone between D.R.C. and Rwanda provides the Kigali government with an alibi to intervene in the defense of its interests, mainly directed to the arrest of some of the F.D.L.R.'s leaders accused of a central role in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
From 2005 onward, the Katanga regions have become a cause of tensions both from the political and military points of view. Some conflicts in particular could destabilize the electoral campaign in D.R.C.'s most mineral-rich province. Those conflicts include rivalries between local ethnic groups and the attacks of Mai Mai militias against the national army.
From this side comes another source of uncertainty: the integration of units in the new Armed Forces of the D.R.C. (F.A.R.D.C.) has been slow, and the F.A.R.D.C. brigades that have been established lack both adequate training and equipment. This aspect indicates there's no real insurance for the electoral process to succeed and pose a threat if the election results won't be accepted by the leaders of the militia and rebel groups. Therefore, both the central government and the U.N. mission in the D.R.C. (M.O.N.U.C.) must take in great consideration the immediate strengthening of F.A.R.D.C.
Conclusion
D.R.C. is going to face one of the most crucial and delicate situations in its recent history. If the coming elections finally take place and the result is judged and accepted as free and fair by the majority of the political parties, rebel groups and militias that will take part in the reconstruction process, the situation could improve. The local vote scheduled for March and April will be a significant test, not only for the effectiveness of the whole electoral process, but mainly because it could draw the basic lines of the future political and institutional structure of the country. Indeed, D.R.C. may be too large of a territory to be considered a single political and administrative unit.
Security appears to be the key word in the coming months, with a pivotal role for the international community, both at the U.N. level (with the M.O.N.U.C. military contingent) and for the single actors -- the U.S., France, Belgium and South Africa -- to deploy their political and diplomatic influence and provide their financial support.
Report Drafted By:
Aldo Pigoli
Source: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
Date: 14 Feb 2006
Print E-mail Save EU eyes 1,250-strong force for DRC pollsBRUSSELS, Feb 14, 2006 (AFP) - European Union military planners have recommended that the bloc mobilise up to 1,250 soldiers to help with elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), an EU diplomt said on Tuesday.
The team of experts, which travelled to the DRC last week, have identified seven tasks that a EU force could undertake, including providing security in the capital Kinshasa and at airports, and assisting Congolese troops, he said.
The DRC is slowly making a UN-supervised transition towards its first free elections in four decades following years of war which have ravaged the resource-rich central African country.
The presidential and parliamentary elections are likely to take place in June but a first round could be held in April.
The diplomat said the EU experts would recommend three possible scenarios to the bloc's 25 member states.
The first option would see a force of 250 troops based in the DRC with a headquarters and intelligence and security specialists.
A second possibility would be to send an additional 200 troops backed by air support.
The third would involve sending some 800 additional troops -- bringing the total to 1,250 -- including a rapid reaction force. Under this scenario, not all the soldiers would be based in the DRC, the diplomat said.
The options were due to be examined in Brussels later on Tuesday by representatives from the member states. The issue is also likely to figure on the agenda of a meeting of EU foreign ministers on February 27.
While EU member states generally appear to support the idea, it is unclear which of them would be willing to commit troops to any such mission and how it would be funded.
Late last month, a senior UN peacekeeping official urged the bloc to move quickly to deploy its planned troop mission to the resource-rich but poverty-stricken central African country.
abd-loc/mt/kjm AFP 141832 GMT 02 06
Copyright (c) 2006 Agence France-Presse
Received by NewsEdge Insight: 02/14/2006 13:33:02
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