Der USA Bären-Thread

Die Inflation macht Dir keine Sorgen??

Auf längere Sicht sicher nicht falsch, weil nämlich der Konsum wegbrechen wird.....nur ist der Schaden dieses Mal nicht wieder so einfach zu beheben.....

Kurzfristig ist die Inflation eher doch sehr hoch und normal hätte die Fed schon lange erhöhen müssen, hat sie aber nicht, wegen dem Immo-Markt, da die Schwachen aber jetzt sowieso über die Klinge springen, wäre dieser Hemmschuh aus dem Weg...

Und Zinssenkung wird es trotzdem hoffentlich so schnell keine geben, sonst verschleppen wir die Sache nur....

Es muss einfach eine Rezession her und damit verbunden, sehr strenge Kreditbestimmungen, um ein solches Disaster nicht noch einmal zu erleben....

Wer glaubt es sei schon vorbei, der hat sich gewaltig geirrt....

Servus, J.B.
--------------------------------------------------
"If any man seeks for greatness, let him forget greatness and ask for truth, and he will find both." (Horace Mann)


 

auf, da können wir dann diskutieren....

Ist das ein Vorschlag??


Servus, J.B.
--------------------------------------------------
"If any man seeks for greatness, let him forget greatness and ask for truth, and he will find both." (Horace Mann)


 

Vorweg: Ich bin kein Antisemit und habe Hobbypirat für sein Posting oben ja sogar verwarnt. Fakt ist aber, dass die Mehrzahl der Leute, die an der Wall Street agieren, jüdisch sind, z. B. George Soros, der Superinvestor, der einst das Pfund und den Thai-Bath stürzte.

Doch daraus irgendwas abzuleiten, was über pure Religionszugehörigkeit hinausgeht, ist absurd. Sonst könnte man ebensogut behaupten, die thailändische Börse würde von der Buddhisten-Mafia, die indische von der Hinduisten-Mafia und die saudiarabische von der Islamisten-Mafia "kontrolliert".

Ach ja, und dann gibt es noch die Christen-Mafia in Frankfurt. Dass sind die Emmis. Immer wenn die beten gehen, schalten die vorher die Server ab, damit man seine OS nicht mehr günstig verkaufen kann. Und sie beten dann heimlich für ungünstige Kurse!
 

Inflation runter, Therapie erfolgreich. Nur der Patient ist nun leider tot.  

15.03.2007 17:35
US-Industrie: Wenig Schwung, aber vorsichtiger Optimismus


Im Großraum Philadelphia, ein Ballungsgebiet der USA, hat sich das Wachstum der Industrie wieder verlangsamt. Der Index der Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Philli-Fed-Index) fiel im März auf 0,2 (Februar: + 0,6). Der Durchschnitt der von Bloomberg befragten Volkswirte hatte nur mit 4,5 gerechnet.

Ein Wert über der Null-Linie zeigt ein leichtes Wachstum. Werte unter der Null-Linie bedeuten dagegen einen Rückgang.

Der Teilindex für neue Aufträge verbesserte sich auf 1,9 (Februar: minus 0,5).

Der Teilindex für Auslieferungen stieg auf 6,8 (Februar: 1,7).

Gleichzeitig beschleunigte sich der Preisanstieg. Der Index für die Preise, die an die Zulieferer gezahlt werden, stieg auf 21,8 (Februar: 15,8). Der Index für Preise, die von den Kunden erlöst werden, stieg auf 16,3 (Februar: 9,4).

Der Ausblick ist vorsichtig optimistisch. Die Befragten erwarten, dass der Geschäftsverlauf im 2. Quartal an Schwung gewinnt. Die Geschäftsbedingungen sollten sich in den nächsten 6 Monaten verbessern.



Gruß Jokko  

Was glaubt ihr was geschehen wird, wenn die Zinsen gesenkt/erhöht würden?  

...wie im Vorjahr, kennen wir doch...  

beides schlecht;
Zinsen rauf, wegen Öl ins Feuer bei der Immo-Krise.
Zinsen runter, wegen der Reaktion "Scheiße uns geht's wirklich schlecht".

Am besten wäre imho auf der nächsten Sitzung eine Änderung des Bias in Richtung weniger Inflationsrisiken und damit Ankündigung einer Zinssenkung bei der übernächsten Sitzung. Ich weiß nur nicht, wie man das auf Basis des PPI verkaufen will. Vielleicht fällt der CPI morgen unerwartet niedrig aus; das wäre die letzte Rettung, um auch eine sofortige Zinssenkung zu rechtfertigen. Also würde es mich nicht überraschen, wenn wir morgen eine "überraschenden" Rückgang im CPI sehen. Wie der dann hinmanipuliert wurde, interessiert in einem Monat niemand mehr.  

Geb dir völluig recht. Will in dem Zusammenhang aber auch noch erwähnen, das der Anteil der jüdischen Bevölkerung in NewYork nunmal sehr hoch ist. Nur zur Erklärung für die anderen User. Das dadurch der Anteil jüdischer Millionäre oder gar Milliardäre auch relativ hoch ist, versteht sich von selbst.
Genauso hoch ist aber der Anteil von armer Juden in NewYork.

Ist einfach ein weitverbreitetes Vorurteil, das Juden grundsätzlich mehr Geld und Macht besitzen. Möglicherweise streben sie etwas mehr danach, aber das kann man ja niemandem vorwerfen. Im 3.Reuich gabs diese Vorurteile auch. Die meisten Juden lebten damals in Osteuropa, aber unter ärmlichsten Bedingungen. Trotzdem haben sich die Vorurteile bis heute gehalten.

Nur weil der Anteil der Juden heute in NewYork so hoch ist, auf eine jüdische Finanzmacht zu schließen, ist einfach sowohl logisch als auch statistisch totaler Unfug.  

Wenn morgen die Optionen verfallen (und heute um 22:00 h die Index-Optionen), geht es um schnödes Geld. Da werden die Kurse so hinmanipuliert, dass möglichst viele Optionshalter möglichst wenig verdienen. Permanent schrieb ja schon, dass es bei SP-500 von 1400 sehr viele offene Positionen gibt. [Wir können ja mal gucken, ob der SP-500 heute um 22:00 h, wenn die Indexoptionen verfallen, tatsächlich nahe 1400 schließt.]

Es ist daher tatsächlich so, dass die US-Finanz-Mafia - der sicherlich auch viele Christen und sonstige Bibeltreue angehören - die Kurse genau so hinbiegt, wie sie sie braucht. Schlechte Phili- oder sonstige Zahlen sind kein Hindernisgrund, mit Futures die Kurse dahin zu peitschen, wo man sie hinhaben will. Die Presse sekundiert dann und erfindet Begründungen wie "besser als die noch schlechteren Erwartungen", um die Kursbewegungen scheinbar rational zu "erklären".

Und wer auf Grund solcher Wirtschaftszahlen tradet, wird für dumm verkauft. Diese Zahlen zählen nur, wenn sie die Kurse in die bereits vorher feststehende Vorzugsrichtung lenken.
 

zeichnet sich langsam ab:

---

Clarity Builds on Subprime
By Tony Crescenzi
Street.com Contributor
3/15/2007 12:33 PM EDT

The most important point that I would make with respect to the subprime dilemma is that investors everywhere are engaged in a discovery process, a process that is helping to restore calm to the financial markets.

When the subprime problems became front-page news, enormous uncertainties existed with respect to five key questions:

1. How big is the subprime market?

2. How much of the subprime market is at risk?

3. What amount of subprime loans are likely to default?

4. Who is left holding the bag -- which lenders will have to take writedowns?

5. Will the problems of the subprime spill over?

Answers to these questions are slowly being answered and a consensus is developing on most of them. Savvy investors are looking for the winners in the current dilemma.

Every major firm is trying to answer these questions for their clientele, and a wealth of information is pouring out and aiding the discovery process.

The consensus answres seem to be:

1. About 15% of the mortgage market, or about $1.5 trillion.

2. Several hundred billion dollars. [!!!]

3. Between $50 billion and $100 billion.

4. Many names and they are nonbanks. [Heißt das: Hedgefonds gehen hopps?]

5. Still open for debate but not much yet.
 

 

die Produkte die aus "faulen" Krediten geschnürt wurden gekauft. Dazu zählen neben Privatleuten auch Fonds und vor allem Pensionskassen. Es wird wohl niedrigere Pensionen und ärmere Privatleute geben.  

 

Active Trader Update
Kass: Fed Is No Savior in Subprime Slide
By Doug Kass 
Street Insight Contributor
3/15/2007 12:54 PM EDT


Bullish observers have increasingly been making the case that the growing fungus of subprime credit problems will force the Federal Reserve into a loosening of monetary conditions sooner rather than later.

These days, the private-equity put doesn't seem to be working, so it appears that the struggling bulls now must hold on to the notion of a Bernanke put to counter the currently troubling and tenuous stock market conditions.

After all, lower interest rates always reverse investor sentiment and adverse financial conditions, right?

My view is that with the level of inflation remaining stubbornly high, coming to the aid of a bunch of reckless and overly aggressive mortgage bankers is not necessarily seen by Chairman Ben Bernanke & Co. as an immediate responsibility of the Federal Reserve.

They might deem it too early in the crisis, or think there is no crisis at all.

In fact, consider the cheerleading of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson in Tokyo last week and remarks made recently by Federal Reserve Governor Susan Bies, both of whom have downplayed the subprime problems:

"Credit issues are there, but they are contained. I don't think it (subprime) has, at this point, implications for the aggregate economy in terms of the ongoing expansion."
-- U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson

"Based on some recent observations, mortgage lending certainly is an area in which we believe financial institutions and supervisors have learned some key lessons about risk management."
-- Federal Reserve Governor Susan Schmidt Bies

Also, consider this quote from another Fed official on what he sees as the Fed's true role.

Ultimately, though, ex ante judgments about leverage, concentrations and liquidity risk will continue to prove elusive. Our principal focus should therefore be not in the search for the capacity to preemptively diffuse conditions of excess leverage or liquidity, but in improving the capacity of the core of the financial system to withstand shocks and on mitigating the impact of those shocks.

And, as always, central banks need to stand prepared to make appropriate monetary policy adjustments if changes in financial conditions would otherwise threaten the achievement of the goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth. - Timothy Geithner, president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Feb. 28, 2007.

Now even if the Federal Reserve did lower interest rates in March or April, the markets could interpret the move more negatively than the bulls realize by calling attention to the magnitude of the mortgage crisis and by fueling inflationary fears, serving to pull the capital markets into a tailspin.

As we move into the summer or fall (at the latest), there will be better visibility of the subprime problems. By that time, it will be abundantly clear to even the bulls that an inventory-swollen housing market is back on the sick bed as the two most important marginal buyers -- the first time and trade-up buyers -- have lost access to home-financing. And, by then, the multiplier effect of the housing downturn should be in full force, causing the economy to sputter and for corporate profit expectations to fall to more realistic levels.

The upheaval in the subprime mortgage industry is in its middle stages, but the broad impact on the U.S. economy is in its infancy. To paraphrase, Frankenstein's Dr. Waldman, the credit markets and Wall Street have created a monster -- subprime -- and it will destroy the economy.

---

Doug Kass is founder and president of Seabreeze Partners Management, Inc., and the general partner and investment manager of Seabreeze Partners Short LP and Seabreeze Partners Short Offshore Fund, Ltd. Until 1996, he was senior portfolio manager at Omega Advisors, a $4 billion investment partnership.  

March 15 (Bloomberg) -- Shares of U.S. mortgage companies rose after buyout firm Blackstone Group LP agreed to buy PHH Corp.'s home-lending business and Bear Stearns Cos. said it's interested in buying more subprime loans.
Countrywide Financial Corp., the biggest U.S. mortgage lender, gained $1.48, or 4.3 percent, to $35.87 at 1:04 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange trading. Two subprime lenders that have been battling defaults also rebounded. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co. added as much as 65 percent while New Century Financial Corp. doubled.
Shares of mortgage companies have been battered by reports of rising defaults by borrowers and lack of demand from investors who buy home loans. Today, Blackstone Group, the world's biggest buyout fund, said it will purchase the PHH mortgage unit from General Electric Co., and Bear Stearns Cos., the biggest underwriter of mortgage-backed bonds, said it's shopping for distressed debt, including subprime mortgages that have soured.U.S. subprime borrowers fell behind on their mortgages at the highest rate in four years in the fourth quarter and foreclosures on all types of home loans rose to an all-time high, the Mortgage Bankers Association said earlier this week. The share of subprime borrowers making late payments climbed to 13.3 percent from 12.6 percent in the third quarter, the Washington- based group said. ...
Shares of IndyMac Bancorp Inc., the ninth-biggest U.S. mortgage lender, jumped as much as 8 percent today. The company, the ninth-biggest U.S. mortgage lender, said its holdings in subprime mortgages are ``small.'' The shares previously had lost about 36 percent of their value this year.......
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/...d=20601103&sid=asC0BUleBZVs&refer=us  

Leveraged Buyouts von Firmen, die an sich schon bis zur Oberkante Unterlippe "leveraged" sind. Hörte ich das gerade einen Wind durch das Kartenhaus pfeifen?
 

US-IMMOBILIEN

"Erst ein Drittel der Krise bewältigt"
Von Lutz Reiche

Die Krise am Immobilien- und Hypothekenmarkt in den USA wird sich verschärfen. Am Ende könnte sie die größte Industrienation sogar in eine Rezession stürzen, sagt Folker Hellmeyer. Im Interview warnt der Chefanalyst der Bremer Landesbank zugleich vor den Risiken der internationalen Kapitalverflechtung.

mm.de: Herr Hellmeyer, die Sorgen um den US-amerikanischen Immobilienmarkt wachsen. In diesem Kontext wird stets auf überzogene Immobilienpreise und faule Hypothekenkredite verwiesen. Wovon geht die größere Gefahr aus?

Hellmeyer: Die Gefahr geht primär von den faulen Krediten und nur sekundär von überzogenen Immobilienpreisen aus. Ein überzogenes Preisniveau auf diesem Markt kann lange Bestand haben. Faule Kredite zwingen Banken, ihre Bilanzen vergleichsweise schnell anzupassen. Diese Anpassungen erhöhen die Risikoaversion und entfalten damit markante Folgen für den Finanzmarkt.

mm.de: Wie hoch ist das Risiko, dass die Krise zahlreicher US-Hypothekenbanken für Kunden mit schlechter Bonität auf den gesamten amerikanischen Bankensektor überspringt?

Hellmeyer: Das Risiko ist gegeben, weil es viele Finanzmarktteilnehmer gibt, die in diesen Subprime-Sektor recht blauäugig dem Zeitgeist der jüngeren Vergangenheit folgend Kredite vergeben haben oder Kreditrisiken im Rahmen von derivaten Geschäften eingegangen sind. Gleichwohl ist bis zu dem jetzigen Zeitpunkt eine Infizierung des gesamten US-Bankensystems nicht erkennbar. Die Schäden für das Bankensystem sind bislang überschaubar. Die Betonung liegt hier auf dem Wort "bislang".

mm.de: Welche Folgen erwarten Sie für die US-Konjunktur, sollte sich die Entwicklung auf dem US-Immobilien- und Hypothekenmarkt verschlechtern?

Hellmeyer: Wir gehen davon aus, dass sich die Krise des amerikanischen Immobilienmarkts und der US-Hypothekenbanken verschärfen wird. Nach unseren Einschätzungen ist etwa erst ein Drittel der Krise bewältigt. Am Ende dieses Prozesses dürfte das die US-Wirtschaft, die zu über 70 Prozent vom privaten Verbrauch bestimmt ist, nahe an eine Rezession führen, womöglich sogar in eine Rezession fallen lassen.

Mit Blick auf die US-Wirtschaft dürfen wir nicht außer Acht lassen, dass in den vergangenen Jahren die Subventionierung des privaten Verbrauchs durch Beleihung nicht realisierter Buchgewinne aus dem Immobilienbereich unterfüttert worden ist. Diese Subvention des privaten Verbrauches steht nun zur Disposition, kann sich in ihrer Wirkung sogar umkehren. Insofern sind die Folgen für die US-Konjunktur nachhaltig, auch wenn der gesamte Immobilienbereich samt Baubranche lediglich einen Anteil von rund 15 Prozent an der US-Wirtschaftsleistung hat.

mm.de: Die Aktien von US-Hypothekenfinanzierern stehen unter starkem Verkaufsdruck. In Deutschland fallen parallel Bankenwerte und Aktien von Immobilienfinanzierern deutlich - eine nachvollziehbare Reaktion?

Hellmeyer: Die Reaktion der Märkte hierzulande ist in meinen Augen übertrieben. Das gleicht einem pawlowschen Reflex. Rational ist das Ganze jedenfalls nicht nachvollziehbar. Denn im europäischen Rahmen haben wir im Gegensatz zu den USA keinen Subprime-Sektor. Von daher ist die Konstellation nicht vergleichbar. Zudem ist die Situation des deutschen Immobilienmarkts nicht ansatzweise überhitzt.

mm.de: Ist angesichts der zunehmenden internationalen Verflechtung der Banken die Ansteckungsgefahr für Europa nicht ungleich größer als früher?

Hellmeyer: Grundsätzlich gilt, dass die Verflechtung im internationalen Geschäft - gerade im derivativen Sektor - das Risiko von Dominoeffekten in der Finanzbranche erhöht. Von daher ist die Frage zu bejahen. So weit die Theorie, nun kommen wir zur Praxis. Bezüglich der global operierenden Topbanken ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Ausfällen minimal. Die Erfahrungen aus der EWS-Krise im Jahr 1992, Savings & Loans in den USA und der Bankenkrise in Japan belegen, dass die Gesetze des freien Markts im Finanzsektor nur bedingt gültig sind. Im Zweifelsfall werden die Verluste wie bisher sozialisiert. Fakt ist, dass für die Finanzinstitutionen, die sich in diesem Marktsegment getummelt haben, nachhaltige bilanzielle Ernüchterung folgen wird. Eine Krise für den europäischen Bankensektor kann ich in diesem Zusammenhang derzeit jedoch nicht erkennen.

mm.de: Ein Beispiel für Verflechtung ist sicherlich das florierende Geschäft mit Hypothekenkrediten, überhaupt mit faulen Krediten. Sie werden aufgekauft, gebündelt, zerlegt und weiterverkauft - etwa an Hedgefonds oder Pensionsfonds. Lassen sich mögliche Risiken dann überhaupt noch überblicken und kontrollieren?

Hellmeyer: Bei diesem Thema sind die Zentralbanken der führenden Industrienationen mittlerweile sehr dünnhäutig geworden. In der Tat sind die Risiken in diesem Bereich kaum überschaubar und damit auch nur unzureichend quantifizierbar. Was nicht ausreichend quantifizierbar ist, ist nicht vollständig kontrollierbar. Ergo bleibt es bei hohen Risiken für die Stabilität des globalen Finanzsystems resultierend aus dem Zeitungeist mangelnder Risikoaversion und Kasinomentalität infolge verfehlter Zentralbankpolitik, insbesondere der US-Zentralbank aber auch der Bank of Japan.

http://www.manager-magazin.de/geld/geldanlage/0,2828,471702-2,00.html

 

Seh ich auch so: Egal was die FED demnächst macht, es wird negativ ausgelegt werden. Das klügste was sie tun kann ist die Füsse still zu halten und über eine Zinssenkung in "naher Zukunft" zu orakeln, falls die Konjunktur kippen sollte. Das übliche blabla halt.

Werden eigentlich schon in großen Stil Gewinnprognosen gesenkt?  

Unwinding the Yen, Unravels Global Stock Markets

By Gary Dorsch, Editor, Global Money Trends newsletter

Millions of words have been written about the heavy handed tactics of Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) in manipulating the value of the Japanese yen, the Japanese bond market, and squeezing short sellers in the Nikkei-225 futures market. Manipulation of markets through the use of jawboning, re-jigging of inflation statistics, and outright intervention is a time honored tradition at the MoF.

Japan’s Ministry of Finance is a political, economic, and intellectual force without parallel, and with a greater concentration of power than any branch of government amongst the major industrialized democracies. In Japan, there is no institution with more power, and it has a borrowing ceiling for foreign exchange intervention of up to 140 trillion yen ($1.2 trillion) for the upcoming fiscal year.

So if US Treasury chief Henry Paulson was looking for a quick fix to rescue the Dow Jones Industrials from crashing below the psychological 12,000-level, his visit to Tokyo’s Financial Warlords on March 6th, was perfectly timed. The US dollar was plummeting towards 115.25-yen, when Paulson arrived at MoF headquarters in Tokyo. “Yen carry” traders borrowed an estimated 40 to 70 trillion yen ($350-600 billion) and channeled much of the funds into commodities and stocks around the globe.

But the “yen carry” trades were going sour, when the yen suddenly zoomed 5% higher.
US stocks lost $837 billion of value in the five-day period ended March 2nd, amid a worldwide rout that began in Hong Kong. The sudden unwinding of the “yen carry” trade had whacked $1.5 trillion of value from global stock markets, threatening the global economy.

The infamous “yen carry” trade stopped generating rewards, soon after the Group of Seven central bankers warned on February 10th, that speculators could get burned by one-way bets against the yen. Then, under heavy pressure from angry European finance ministers who are fed up with Tokyo’s six-year “cheap yen” policy, the Bank of Japan hiked its overnight loan rate to 0.50%, its highest level in 10-years, to stop the slide in the Japanese yen against the Euro and US dollar.

While the BoJ’s rate hike put a floor under the yen, it wasn’t enough to push the low yielding currency higher. What lifted the yen sharply higher, and ignited the global stock market shake-out, were meltdowns in share prices of US sub-prime mortgage lenders, and fears the weakening US housing sector could topple the US economy. Former Fed chief “Easy” Al Greenspan put the odds of a US recession at 1:3.

Carry traders were losing an estimated $10 to $12 billion on over-extended short yen positions, and it was looking very bleak for the global stock markets until the US dollar suddenly found support at 115-yen and the Euro bottomed at 150-yen. Did the Bank of Japan intervene in the currency markets on March 6th, at the request of US Treasury chief Paulson, to stop the surge in the yen? Did the BoJ and the US Treasury intervene to support the Japanese and US stock markets last week?

The Nuts and Bolts of the “Yen Carry” Trade

Before examining the latest Japanese MoF and US Treasury intervention tactics, it’s important to understand how the “yen carry” trade works. It’s simple to understand, and it’s not just hedge funds and international bankers who engage in the trade. Many brokerage firms offer margin loans at near 1% in Japanese yen, which are re-invested by their clients to buy stocks around the world.

The “yen carry” trade is primarily a simple game of interest rate arbitrage. Step 1: Borrow yen at 0.5% and convert the yen into $9,000 US dollars. Step 2: With $9,000 from Japan and $1,000 of your own money, invest $10,000 in US Treasury notes at 5.00%. Step 3: Collect $500 in interest from the US Treasury, and pay $45 to the Japanese lender. Step 4: Pocket the $455 difference as a profit, for a rate of return of 45.5% on your original $1,000. Step 5: Sell the US Treasury note, and convert the US dollars back into Japanese yen to pay off your loan.

Step 5 is the tricky part, because if the yen were to suddenly surge by 5% against the US dollar, the principal amount of the yen loan would also climb 5% from $9,000 to $9,450, which would wipe out the $455 profit from the interest rate spread. It would be nice to buy yen futures as a hedge against a climbing currency. The problem is that yen futures trade at a hefty premium to the cash market price.

Locking into a yen futures contract at say a 4.5% premium to the cash price would wipe out the profit from the interest rate differential between the two currencies. So carry traders must take on currency risk to play the game, which can go very wrong, if the yen suddenly shoots higher. And that’s what happened earlier this month, when the Japanese yen suddenly surged by 5% against the Euro and US dollar, until US Treasury chief Paulson huddled with Tokyo financial warlords on March 6th.

On February 10th, G-7 central bankers had warned traders against the practice of borrowing vast amounts in low-yield currencies such as the yen and Swiss franc to reinvest for a profit elsewhere. “We want the markets to be aware of the risks of one-way bets, in particular on the foreign exchange market. One-way bets in the present circumstances would not be appropriate. We want the markets to be aware of the risks they contain,” said European Central Bank chief Jean “Tricky” Trichet.
Japanese Finance Minister Koji Omi was singing from the same song book. “This means that G-7 countries think that markets, particularly foreign exchange markets, should recognize the risk of moving in one direction too heavily. I think we have come to the appropriate conclusion,” he said. And when the chief of the powerful Japanese ministry of finance speaks, currency traders listen but don’t always obey.

European Central Bankers demand a Stronger Yen

Aided by the Euro’s strength against the yen, Japanese exports to the European Union nearly doubled to 1.06-trillion yen in December. But on the flip side, European exports to Japan have waffled between stagnation and deterioration. While Japan is a small market for European exporters, Euro zone finance ministers understand that its exporters will suffer badly in world markets because of cheap competition from Japan in addition to cut-throat competition from China.

“I will read again what we just said in Essen, we reaffirm that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals,” said ECB chief Trichet at the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce and Industry on Feb 15th. “We believe that the Japanese economy is on a sustainable economic path and that exchange rates should reflect these economic fundamentals,” Trichet added.

Earlier on Jan 31st, Bank of France chief Christian Noyer said there was room for the Bank of Japan to raise its interest rates carefully. “I’m concerned about developments in the yen. The yen exchange rate is not in line with an improvement in the Japanese economy and its strength. Japan is one of the engines to drive global growth. A weak yen will cause distortion in the world economy in the medium term. However, I think the market will correct it in an autonomous manner,” he concluded.

So last month, European finance ministers demanded and received an interest rate hike from the Bank of Japan to 0.50%, to stop the slide of the yen. For his part, US Treasury chief Paulson was opposed to Europe’s idea of pressuring Japan for a rate hike, and instead was content with Tokyo’s cheap yen policy. “I may be looking at it a bit more carefully only because of the publicity coming out of Europe. But from my standpoint, the yen’s value is set in a competitive marketplace,” he said on Feb 1st.

On Feb 14th, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke aligned himself squarely with Paulson before the Senate Banking Committee. “We don’t see any manipulation or intervention in the value of the yen. The Treasury and Federal Reserve have expressed a view that exchange rates ought to be determined in free and open markets. As best we can tell, the yen’s value is being determined in a free, open, competitive market. There is no evidence of any intervention going on.”

Yet Bernanke’s testimony coincided with an announcement by DaimlerChrysler that it was slashing 13,000 jobs at its North American car plants, bringing the loss of US auto manufacturing jobs to 80,000 over the past 12-months. “The last time the Japanese purchased dollars was in March 2004,” Bernanke quipped. The disintegration of the US manufacturing base is the price that the US Treasury is willing to pay in return for cheap credit from China, Japan, and South Korea.

But European finance ministers were not buying the US Plunge Protection Team’s propaganda and demanded that Japan begin to lift its abnormally low interest rates into alignment with the rest of the world. Four weeks later, the yen carry trade began to unravel, triggering widespread selling of commodities and stocks around the globe by over-extended speculators, banks, and hedge funds.

Brief history of Japanese MoF Intervention in the Yen

There are many tricks of the trade that the US Treasury’s Plunge Protection Team can learn from Tokyo’s Financial Warlords, who have decades of experience in hand to hand combat with nasty currency speculators and bearish stock market operators. Tokyo’s MoF has acquired $875 billion of foreign currencies through its intervention operations, and has skillfully manhandled the $6.7 trillion Japanese government bond market into a range of just 1.2% to 1.9% for most of the past six years.

(The next edition of the Global Money Trends newsletter will present a special section with a chronological history of Japanese MoF intervention in the yen, Japanese bond market and the Nikkei-225 stock index over the past five-years).

MoF jawboning is very effective in moving the yen into Tokyo’s desired range, because it has built up a reputation for uncompromising ruthlessness in the markets. The last time foreign currency traders engaged in all-out war with the MoF was after Canadian, European, and US finance officials called for a stronger yen at the Group of Seven meeting in Dubai Sept 23, 2003. Within minutes, the BoJ’s previous nine-month and $78 billion defense of 115-yen collapsed.

 

Currency traders were given the “green light” to knock the US dollar lower, and it quickly fell through the BoJ’s next line of defense at 110-yen. But Tokyo was determined to cushion the dollar’s downfall, and stepped up its intervention over the next six months, by selling 26 trillion yen and purchasing US$250 billion in the foreign exchange market between 104 and 110-yen.

But the massive BoJ intervention campaign on behalf of the dollar came to a halt on March 16th, 2004 after former Fed chief Greenspan critiqued the manipulative practice. “We are getting closer to the point where continued intervention at this scale will no longer meet the monetary policy needs of Japan,” he said on March 9th, 2004. US Treasury chief Snow added, “No currency can be regarded as strong if it relies on life support, is being propped up, by interventions.”

Since March 2004, the BoJ has stayed out of the FX market, the longest period that Tokyo has gone without getting its hands dirty since 1991. But that hasn’t stopped the practice of jawboning and verbal threats to guide the yen, when unruly currency traders get out of line with Tokyo’s target zones.

 
Since March 2004, Japan’s foreign currency reserves have grown by around $50 billion to a record $875 billion, mostly due to the appreciation of the Euro against the yen. About 65% of Japan’s FX reserves are in US dollars and 35% in Euros, so MoF warlords can enforce a floor under the yen at any point of its choosing, and keep a lid on the “yen carry” trade through massive intervention.

Angry US Democrats are demanding that Tokyo start boosting the yen in the FX market. “We believe that a weak yen is a reflection of Japanese government policy,” said Rep’s Charles Rangel, Barney Franks, John Dingell and Sander Levin on Feb 11th. “We urge the Japanese government to reverse their weak yen policy through concrete action. Japan should be selling the massive reserves it has accumulated, thereby changing the imbalances with the dollar and the Euro."

In October 2006, Japanese FX chief Hiroshi Watanabe put a lid on the US dollar rally near 120-yen and then triggered a slide to as low as 114.5-yen over the next six weeks, after telling reporters in New York, “I see no reason for a further deterioration in the yen given the strength in the Japanese economy.” Watanabe said he had “no fear of the Japanese economy tipping into recession any time in the next two years,” adding that Japan’s economy had become resilient to high oil prices.

But “yen carry” traders regrouped for another rally in the Euro and US dollar, and also pushed the yen to its lowest level in 21-years against a basket of currencies representing Japan’s largest trading partners. Japan’s ultra-low interest rates have created enormous bubbles in global stock markets, and have increased the risk of disorderly unwinding of global trade imbalances.

For a second time, Japanese MoF warlords put a lid on the dollar’s rally, this time to 122-yen last month, when the radical inflationist Prime minister, Shinzo Abe finally bowed to the European demand for a stronger yen. The Bank of Japan’s rate hike to 0.50% capped the dollar’s rally at 121.50-yen, and then trouble in the US housing sector, sent herds of “yen carry” traders scrambling for the exits at the same time.

The dollar was dealt the final hammer blow on March 5th, after Japanese trade minister Akira Amari said, “I’ve been thinking that 120-yen /dollar was too cheap in light of Japanese economic power,” he told a Fuji TV program. By the time US Treasury chief Paulson arrived in Tokyo for meeting with MoF chief Omi, the dollar was plunging to 115.25-yen, after guru Greenspan told a big ticket audience in Hong Kong that the US economy faced a 1:3 chance of a recession in 2007.

While MoF chief Omi huddled with US Treasury chief Paulson, Japanese deputy Finance Minister Hideto Fujii did damage control on March 5th, saying he was “keeping a close eye on moves in the stock and foreign exchange markets.”

Japanese MoF and US Treasury try to Rescue Global Stock markets

With all eyes focused on the world’s two most powerful figures in global finance huddled in Tokyo, to stitch a rescue package for the dollar and global stock markets, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki said, “As share prices have fallen worldwide, our stance is that we are closely watching, while keeping close contact with authorities from other countries,” he said.

But Japan’s near-zero interest rates and severely undervalued currency are at the root cause of financial market bubbles and distortions, says Eisuke Sakakibara, “Mr Yen” the former Japanese vice-minister for international finance in 1997-99. Mr Yen estimates the “yen carry” trade to be worth Y40 trillion ($430 billion), “it may be Y60 trillion or Y70 trillion, but I don’t think it matters now, it’s so large,” he said.

Sakakibara said it’s “worrying that nobody had any real idea of the scale of the yen carry trade, and traders, hedge funds and asset fund managers operating within it are accustomed to operating only in relatively calm market conditions. All the BoJ can do is to normalize Japanese interest rates at the earliest reasonable opportunity because the excess liquidity situation emanating from the Japanese monetary system needs to be changed as soon as possible,” he warned.

It seems like deja’vu all over again. After witnessing a 575-point plunge in the Nikkei-225 index, a 3.3% loss to 16,642 on March 5th, the powerful MoF warlord, Hiroshi Watanabe was asked for his opinion on the market. “We should be closely monitoring stock markets, but we don’t have any serious concern. In Japan the size of the correction is very big, but I don’t think it will last for very long.”

Sure enough, Watanabe’s comments put a floor under the Nikkei-225 on March 5th, similar to his rescue of the Nikkei-225’s rout in January 2006 from the Livedoor fiasco. Japanese traders have complete faith in Watanabe’s ability to put out fires and turn bearish markets around. Within a few days, the US dollar rebounded from a low of 115.25 on March 5th to as high as 118.50-yen, which triggered a 700-point rebound in the Nikkei-225 index.

US Treasury borrows MoF Script on Intervention

With MoF warlords putting a floor under the Nikkei-225 at 16,600, the US Plunge Protection Team (PPT) went into action on March 5 and 6th. Just 12-hours earlier, the share price of Goldman Sachs had plummeted by $5.75 to $190 per share, off 14.7% from its record highs set on Feb 22nd. Shares of New Century Financial NEW.N, the second-largest US home lender in the sub-prime market had plunged 70% the previous day, after some lenders refused to let it tap credit lines. Goldman Sachs is one of New Century’s lenders, along with Morgan Stanley and Citigroup.

Suddenly, the masters of the universe, with their slick and sophisticated Ponzi schemes requiring ever-larger infusions of cheap money were caught off guard. Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Bros, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley, which earned a record $24.5 billion in 2006, are exposed to sub-prime junk bonds, equaling 10% to 15% of their firm’s capital. Prices for credit-default swaps linked to their bonds traded at levels that equated to debt ratings of Baa2.

Speaking from Tokyo on March 5th, with the Dow Jones Industrials (DJI) teetering on the brink of the psychological 12,000 level and Goldman Sachs stock in need of some oxygen, PPT chief commander, Henry Paulson issued a buy signal, “Some of the credit issues are there, but they’re largely contained. The global economy is more than sound. It’s as strong in the last couple of years as I’ve seen in a lifetime. All the economies are growing, inflation is low, and liquidity is high,” Paulson declared. His comments triggered a powerful 160-point DJI rally by day’s end.

On Feb 27th, White House spokesman Tony Fratto said President Bush got a briefing over the phone from Paulson concerning the 416-point plunge in the DJI. “The president’s economic advisers are keeping an eye on the markets. We believe that the economic fundamentals in the US economy are sound,” said Fratto, borrowing the script from Tokyo’s Ministry of Finance.

Treasury spokeswoman Brooklyn McLaughlin said the President’s Working Group of Financial Markets (Plunge Protection Team) was monitoring the markets. “The president’s working group regularly monitors markets and will continue to do so,” McLaughlin said. The high-level group is made up of the Federal Reserve chairman, Treasury secretary, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

It’s very interesting to note that the Dow Jones Industrial futures market gapped 80-points higher after Paulson’s “don’t worry, be happy” comments in Tokyo, during the first 15-minutes of Asian trading on March 6th, putting a nasty squeeze on short sellers. On the previous day, March 5th, a large buyer entered the market to catch a falling knife, and lifted the DJI futures 140-points off their intra-day low within the second hour of Asian trading, when market conditions are usually thin. By week’s end, Goldman Sachs shares had recovered to $201 /sh.

Is there Intervention in the Stock Index futures markets?

Did Japan’s finance ministry and the US Treasury intervene in the stock index futures markets, to prevent panic free-falls, and engineer short squeeze rallies? Only their floor brokers know for sure. But intervention also includes jawboning, painting rosy scenarios, downplaying bad economic news and sub-prime mortgage defaults, and pushing money into the hands of securities dealers through coupon passes.

The US Plunge Protection Team (PPT) gave frazzled US investors a chance to catch their breath as the Dow Jones Industrials rebounded 226 points last week, after a 736-point plunge from its Feb 20th record high. But it has been almost four years since the Dow Industrials or the Standard & Poor’s 500 fell 10% from a high, which is an exceptionally long period without such a pullback. Not even Tokyo’s financial warlords have been able to put together such as winning streak!

The upcoming March 16th edition of Global Money Trends will examine the next likely move in the “yen carry” trade, with its implications for the global stock markets, commodities and gold. Was the 416-point plunge in the Dow Jones Industrials and sharp declines in other global stock markets the beginning of a bear market, or just a nasty correction in the a longer term bull market?

What are the signals to look for, to determine when the US Treasury is intervening in the stock market? Which foreign market is a top leading indicator of the next likely move for the global stock markets? What are Chinese and European central bankers saying about the correction in the global stock markets, and what is their next likely move on interest rates? The answers can be found in the upcoming March 16th edition of Global Money Trends. Subscribe today!

 

welche Assets Hellmeyer mit Beleihung von nicht realisierten Buchgewinnen meint ?
Etwa die US-Bruchbuden ? Die haben doch nie Buchgewinne erzielt, oder wie ?  

Auszug aus einem Artikel von goldseiten.de
Bedroht das Platzen der amerikanischen Immobilienblase die Weltwirtschaft?
http://www.goldseiten.de/content/diverses/artikel.php?storyid=4129

###In den USA ist es möglich und weitverbreitete Praxis, die Preissteigerungen bei Immobilien zu realisieren. Dazu werden die bestehenden Hypotheken umgeschuldet und bei dieser Gelegenheit an den gestiegenen Preis der Immobilien angepasst, mit anderen Worten erhöht. Die den ursprünglichen Betrag der Hypothek übersteigende Summe (oder Teile davon) werden ausgezahlt. In Zeiten deutlich fallender Zinsen (in Amerika fiel der Zins der Notenbank von 6¼% auf 1% im Jahre 2003/4) führt diese Umschuldung zusätzlich zu einer Verringerung der monatlich zu zahlenden Hypothekenzinsen. Auf diese Weise konnten in den vergangen Jahren (bis 2006) riesige Summen in die Wirtschaft gepumpt werden.###

Ich verstehe es so: Jemand nimmte einen Kredit auf über 100.000$ um ein Haus zu kaufen und 2Jahre später hat das Haus einen Marktwert von 120.000$.Also nimmt er einen neuen Kredit über 120.000$ auf zahlt die 100.000$ zurück und hat 20.000$
zum konsumieren. Natürlich abzüglich der Zinsen + Vermittlungsprovisionen und
als Sicherheit dient das Haus welches ja einen Marktwert von 120.000$ jetzt hat.
Das ganze läuft dann so weiter je höher der Marktwert des Hauses usw. und somit verdienen alle(Kunde hat mehr Geld und Banken kassieren Zinsen + Provisionen).
 

Spy Market:

The bigger trend is down and we are expecting and intermediate term decline to take the SPX down to near the 1140 range. For short however, a possible bounce may be in the making. Today the SPY tested the “Selling Climax Day” low and closed above it on lighter volume and suggest the SPY may start a rally for near term. Resistance lies at the gap level near 144.20 on the SPY which equates to 1442 on the SPX. It is doubtful the market will get through the gap as volume will have to be better then 250 million shares as the gap is tested to get through it. Therefore most likely the gap will be tested on lighter volume and becomes resistance. If the gap level is tested on lighter volume then that would be a good place to add to short positions. We are short the SPX at 1381.95.

Nasdaq 100 market:
Below is the daily Nasdaq 100, (QQQQ). Today the QQQQ tested the previous low of 3/1 on lighter volume and closed above the 3/1 low triggering a short term bullish signal. A “Sign of Weakness” and a “Break away Gap” form on 2/27 and that is a very bearish combination on the bigger time frames. The “Break away Gap” will not become rock solid resistance because the gap was formed on huge volume of 318 million and to get through the gap the volume will need to be at least that much, which will be unlikely. Also on 2/27 a “Sign of Weakness” appeared which is a huge volume day with a big price spread and is the type of condition that confirms a top. Therefore it is unlikely the market will see new highs any time soon. We are still expecting a bounce to the gap level during the current option expiration. If the gap (44.50) on the QQQQ (1810 range on the NDX) is tested on lighter volume then that will create a bearish signal. If a bearish signal is triggered, then that would be a good place to add to short positions. We hold an average short position on the Nasdaq at 2378.59. Our downside target on the Nasdaq is near the 1900 level.

 

diesem Thread? Meiner Meinung nach dieser chart von moebius.
Die Treppe der " endlosen " Zinserhöhungen ist am Ende. Der Gaul kann nicht mehr. Er ist müde ( schon an den charts im November 06 beim SP ) zu sehen und kann die Karre nicht mehr weiter ziehen. Zu oft wurde auf die Bremse getreten. Hinten in der Karre ruft ein Grünspecht unentwegt und nahezu verzweifelt, die Bremsen zu lösen; aber der Kutscher vorn, genannt Bernanke, steht wieter auf der Bremse. Die Fahrgäste springen bereits von der Karre, der Kutscher fordert aber noch Unerfahrene dazu auf, die kommende Höllenfahrt mitzumachen. Wer sich den Chart ohne Scheuklappen ansieht, weiß, was er zu tun hat! Auch ohne Immobilienkrise sind die nahezu  7 fetten Jahr vorbei; aber vielleicht bekoomt auch noch Bernanke einen Traum mit den 7 mageren Kühen, die die fetten Kühe auffressen.

3    687. Dax vs. Zinsen o. T.   moebius   15.03.07 18:23  

Angehängte Grafik: daxvsir.gif

  Bisherige Bewertungen:
1x interessant ,
2x gut analysiert
--------------------------------------------------

Boardmail schreiben
ID markieren, ignorieren

--------------------------------------------------
Regelverstoß